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Non-independent territories today account for more than half the states in the Caribbean but 
regional and global histories of the twentieth century tend to exclude them from narratives of 
protest and change. This thesis addresses this gap. Using the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin 
Islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe as case studies, it argues that a focus on the processes of 
decolonisation in these non-sovereign states reveals features common to the global experience of 
twentieth century decolonisation elsewhere. This comparative perspective shows how the postwar 
context, the Cold War, differing colonial policies, local elites, local party politics and protest 
movements shaped political outcomes in British and French territories. Thus, a comprehensive 
account of decolonisation must acknowledge the developments in non-independent territories. 
No longer formal colonies, yet having not become conventional independent sovereign states, 
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Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean Region1 
 
1 Wikipedia.org, https://sco.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Caribbean_general_map.png. 
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Figure 3: Map of the British Virgin Islands3 
 
2 Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cayman_Islands_regions_map.png. 
3 Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_Virgin_Islands_locator.svg. 
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4 Wikipedia, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wikivoyage_Guadeloupe_map_PNG.png. 
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5 Wikipedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wikivoyage_Martinique_map_PNG.png. 
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A Note on Terminology 
 
This thesis uses the term ‘non-sovereign’ to refer to the current status of Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. Bonilla uses ‘non-sovereign’ in her analysis of 
labour movements in Guadeloupe, in an attempt to move beyond ‘the epistemic constraints of 
political modernity’.6 Like this thesis, her work seeks to counteract the separation and isolation of 
the non-sovereign territories of the Caribbean from the independent states that is common in 
scholarship. In line with this, the title of this thesis uses the term non-sovereign. However, ‘non-
independent’ is also used in this thesis for clarity, in instances where it is specifically the 
decolonisation without independence of these territories that is under consideration. 
 
The term ‘overseas territories’ is used throughout this thesis to refer collectively to the four case 
study island groups: Martinique, Guadeloupe, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. 
In the period in question, the British islands were, at various points, a presidency, a dependency, a 
colony and a dependent territory. The French islands were colonies which then became overseas 
departments. Overseas France is split into regions and departments, collectivities, and territories, 
and currently the only overseas territory is the French Southern and Antarctic Lands. Strictly 
speaking, Martinique and Guadeloupe are overseas departments rather than overseas territories. 
However, for ease, and to avoid confusion, this thesis uses the term overseas territory to refer to 









6 Yarimar Bonilla, Non-Sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of Disenchantment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), xiv. 
 13 
Introduction 
‘A Paradox in Paradise’? 
 
 
The era of decolonisation in the twentieth century has led to an assumption that today’s world of 
nation states was inevitable. However, in the twenty-first century, more than forty non-
independent and partially independent states remain.7 This phenomenon is particularly apparent 
in the Caribbean region, where there are more non-independent territories than independent 
nation states.8 Surely then, this form of political status should be crucial to our understanding of 
both Caribbean and global politics. Nonetheless, political scientists simply dismiss these territories 
as ‘paradoxical’ and anomalous.9  
 
This thesis will argue that these non-sovereign territories are very much part of the history of 
decolonisation in the twentieth century. It will do so by studying four Caribbean territories: 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. After the Second 
World War, the global political context of the Cold War and growing anticolonial nationalism 
shaped the development of these territories. They embody that notion of islands as places of both 
connection and separation, in that they were closely connected to many of the developments taking 
place in the Caribbean region and globally. Yet, at other times decisions were very particular to 
local circumstances. Their history tells us that during the processes of decolonisation many 




7 David A. Rezvani, Surpassing the Sovereign State: The Wealth, Self-Rule, and Security Advantages of 
Partially Independent Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 12. 
8 Bonilla, Non-Sovereign Futures, 6. 
9 Richard D. E. Burton, Assimilation or Independence?: Prospects for Martinique (Montreal: McGill 
University, 1978); William F. S. Miles, Elections and Ethnicity in French Martinique: A Paradox in Paradise 
(New York: Praeger, 1985); William F. S. Miles, ‘Democracy Without Sovereignty: France’s Post-Colonial 
Paradox’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs 11, no. 2 (2005): 223–34. 
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The thesis will focus on the period from 1945 to 1980, which covers the main era of twentieth 
century decolonisation. The end of the Second World War is frequently seen as the start of 
decolonisation for many regions of the world. Shipway, for example, places the war at the centre 
of his analysis suggesting that the impact of the Second World War was ‘multi-layered and pluri-
dimensional’, causing a significant shift in the colonial interaction and accelerating change.10 This 
was certainly the case for the four Caribbean colonies under scrutiny, as the war encouraged 
citizens to reconsider their relationship with the colonial metropole. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, all four colonies changed their political status, beginning with the French Antilles and 
departmentalisation in 1946. 
 
The time frame ends in 1980 because significant changes in the 1980s altered the context of 
decolonisation for both the British territories and the French departments. In the case of the 
British territories, the last British Caribbean colony to become independent was St Kitts and Nevis 
in 1983. As a result, British policy, as well as the expectations of Caribbean politicians and people, 
changed. Furthermore, the Falklands War in 1982 had a considerable impact on debates about the 
British Overseas Territories.11 For the French Antilles, the decentralisation laws of 1982 reduced 
restrictions on expressions of cultural distinctiveness, such as the speaking and teaching of 
Creole.12 As a direct result of decentralisation, the question of autonomy was no longer at the 
centre of local political debates. Aimé Césaire, the mayor of Fort-de-France, signalled this change 
in his 1981 declaration of a moratorium on the question of Martinique’s political status, after the 
 
10 Martin Shipway, Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 234–39. 
11 Robert Aldrich and John Connell, The Last Colonies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30; 
Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 329. 
12 Jean Bernabé and Raphaël Confiant, ‘Le CAPES de créole: Stratégies et enjeux’, Hermès, La Revue 1, no. 
32–33 (2002): 211. 
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election of socialist President François Mitterrand.13 Though these developments did not end 
debates about decolonisation and independence, later events are outside the scope of this study. 
 
Historical Background 
A longer historical perspective is crucial to understanding the post-Second World War era in the 
Caribbean. Both the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands were dependencies of British 
colonies (Jamaica and the Leeward Islands respectively), and thus the Colonial Office in London 
did not administer them directly.14 The British established colonies in Cayman and the BVI in the 
seventeenth century and, while Taíno and Kalinago populations had settled in the Virgin Islands 
prior to European colonisation, no archaeological evidence exists to date of an indigenous 
presence in the Cayman Islands.15 These two islands groups had a similar early colonial history, 
characterised by: temporary settlement; piracy and privateering; wrecking; fishing; and small-scale 
agriculture.16 Colonial accounts of this time commonly describe these colonies as ‘lawless’. For 
example, a 1797 report described Cayman as ‘inhabited by a handful of lawless men… who are in 
reality nothing more than sea-robbers’.17 The British eventually founded slave-based plantation 
economies in both colonies, though they were on a smaller scale to the large plantations of other 
Caribbean colonies like Jamaica. 18 As a result, issues of race and racism have been left out of the 
popular and archival narrative of early Caymanian history.19 
 
13 Aimé Césaire, ‘Discours du Moratoire’, 15 June 1981, Fort-de-France, reproduced in Gérard Théobald, La 
Liberté est ou n’est pas... (Paris: Éditions Publibook, 2014), 669–72. 
14 Annual Report, 1950, CO 1071/93, 7, TNA.; Governor of Leeward Islands to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 15 December 1949, CO 152/536/8, 1, TNA. 
15 Colleen Ballerino Cohen, Take Me to My Paradise: Tourism and Nationalism in the British Virgin Islands 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 77; Roger C. Smith, ‘The Caymanian Catboat: A West 
Indian Maritime Legacy’, World Archaeology 16, no. 3 (1985): 330. 
16 Christopher A. Williams, Defining the Caymanian Identity: The Effects of Globalization, Economics, and 
Xenophobia on Caymanian Culture (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 3–25; Eugenia O’Neal, From the Field 
to the Legislature: A History of Women in the Virgin Islands (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 1–20. 
17 Report from Captain Don Juan Tirri to the Governor-General of Cuba, 1797, cited in Ulf Hannerz, 
Caymanian Politics: Structure and Style in a Changing Island Society (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 
1974), 25. 
18 Alan West, African Caribbeans: A Reference Guide (London: Greenwood Press, 2003), 45. 
19 Annual Report, 1946, CO 1071/93, 26-28, TNA. 
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In Cayman, fishermen from Jamaica built temporary dwellings during the turtle season, but 
permanent settlement did not occur until 1734 when timber felling began.20 Cotton cultivation 
later replaced timber, reaching its height at the start of the nineteenth century.21 After abolition in 
1834, some white planters left to settle in more economically viable places like the Bay Islands off 
the coast of Honduras, but many stayed.22 Williams has highlighted several flaws in the 
historiography of the Cayman Islands.23 While some suggest that Cayman was, from the outset, a 
place of relative racial harmony and mixing, in reality, this did not occur until the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century when economic hardship and isolation encouraged Caymanians to 
focus on survival rather than racial hierarchies.24 The traditional historiography, which emphasises 
the seafaring traditions of Cayman, suggests that slavery was less significant and less harsh than 
elsewhere in the Caribbean.25 In reality, slavery was an essential part of both the agricultural and 
the maritime industries, and the role of slavery in the creation of Caymanian society and culture 
should not be underestimated. Furthermore, although timber felling and cotton farming were not 
as rigorous or regimented as sugar cultivation, slavery in the Cayman Islands was nevertheless 
violent and brutal.26 For example, in 1820 an enslaved woman named Long Celia was sentenced 
to public flogging with fifty lashes for ‘uttering seditious words’.27 
 
 
20 George Hirst, Notes on the History of the Cayman Islands, Commissioner of the Cayman Islands (1907-1912) 
(CINA, 1910), 24. 
21 Our Islands’ Past: Volume I: Edward Corbet’s Report and Census of 1802 on the Cayman Islands ed. CINA 
(George Town, Cayman, 1992) 1-2. 
22 L. R. Fyfe, Grand Cayman: Report of Official Visit Preceded by Minute of Instructions by His Excellency Sir 
H. W. Norman, Governor of Jamaica (Kingston: Government Printing Establishment, 1887). 
23 Williams, Defining the Caymanian Identity, 21–25. 
24 Ibid., 67-87. 
25 E.g. Roger C. Smith, The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2000); J. A. Roy Bodden, The Cayman Islands in Transition: The Politics, History, and Sociology of a 
Changing Society (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2007). 
26 Williams, Defining the Caymanian Identity, 21–25. 
27 Hirst, Notes on the History of the Cayman Islands, 205–7. 
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In 1832, the Cayman Islands inaugurated an elected council, known as the Assembly of Justices 
and Vestry.28 Though Cayman was supposedly under Jamaican control, as the Governor of Jamaica 
approved the appointment of the Chief Magistrate and Justices of Peace, it was not until 1863 that 
Cayman was formally named a dependency of Jamaica.29 The British Virgin Islands, on the other 
hand, were administered through the government of the Leeward Islands in Antigua from 1672 
onwards. A plantation economy based on cotton and sugar began in the seventeenth century in 
the BVI, but was only prosperous between 1756 and 1783, due to trade links with North American 
colonies during the American War for Independence. After hurricanes and drought in the 
nineteenth century, and abolition in 1834, most of the white planter class left the BVI for Britain.30 
Thus in 1902, following decades of economic decline, the British abolished the legislative council 
and established the BVI as a presidency within the Leeward Islands colony, further reducing 
political representation in the islands.31 It is noteworthy that in both the BVI and Cayman, formerly 
enslaved people were able to acquire land in the second half of the nineteenth century. Unlike 
many other Caribbean colonies, an agricultural peasantry developed in the BVI, as land became 
available on abandoned estates.32 
 
In the twentieth century, the societies of the BVI and Cayman were ethnically very different and 
this affected British attitudes towards each colony. An American geographer who visited Cayman 
in the 1940s observed how ‘the majority of the population are of white or mixed blood, many of 
the older families being pure white, and a considerable number very blond.’33 As a result, twentieth 
century British colonial reports show a measure of respect and some sense of kinship towards 
 
28 Colonial Office Annual Report on the Cayman Islands, 1946, CO 1071/93, 28, TNA. 
29 ‘Imperial Act - An Act for the Government of the Cayman Islands’, 22 June 1863, Cayman Laws 1863-1929, 
CINA. 
30 Bill Maurer, Recharting the Caribbean: Land, Law, and Citizenship in the British Virgin Islands (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1997), 61. 
31 British Virgin Islands Report for the years 1961 and 1962, 52-53, VINA. 
32 Laws of the Cayman Islands up to No. 12 of 1889 (Kingston, 1889), 1-4, cited in Williams, Defining the 
Caymanian Identity, 59. 
33 James H. S. Billmyer, ‘The Cayman Islands’, Geographical Review 36, no. 1 (1946): 34. 
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Caymanians.34 In the BVI, on the other hand, where the majority of the population were of African 
descent, British attitudes tended far more towards condescension, racism and scorn.35  
 
Prior to the war, these two dependencies held little interest for Britain and were underfunded and 
underdeveloped. For example, from 1927 to 1928, Britain spent £83 149 on Antigua, but only £7 
240 on the BVI.36 Revealingly, J. A. C. Cruikshank, the newly appointed Commissioner of the 
British Virgin Islands, included in a report that, ‘there were three chairs in my office not one of 
which had a seat,’ on his arrival in 1945.37 Having finally resolved the situation, he was no longer 
‘diverted by the spectacle of official visitors endeavouring to detach the chairs from their posteriors 
nor am I irritated by finding myself in the same predicament when rising from my desk’.38 His 
account highlights the underdevelopment of the British Virgin Islands from years of neglect both 
by the Governor in Antigua, and the Colonial Office in London. The Cayman Islands, 
geographically isolated in the north-western Caribbean, were similarly ignored and neglected until 
Allen Wolsey Cardinall, Commissioner from 1934 to 1941, drew attention to their potential as a 
source of skilled naval recruits.39 Nonetheless, this did not lead to immediate investment and in 
1950 journalist John Maloney was still able to refer to them as ‘The Islands That Time Forgot’.40  
 
As elsewhere across the British Empire, in the decade before the Second World War, widespread 
political protest broke out in the British West Indies due to economic hardship, unemployment 
 
34 E.g. Colonial Reports, 1946-1950, CO 1071/93, TNA. 
35 E.g. Commissioner’s Report, 4 December 1946, CO 152/536/3, TNA. 
36 Annual Report for the Leeward Islands, 1927-1928, TCO 1071/231, TNA; It should be noted that while the 
population of the Virgin Islands was six times smaller than Antigua, colonial expenditure was twelve times 
smaller, representing a considerable difference per capita. 
37 Commissioner of the British Virgin Islands to Governor of the Leeward Islands, 4 December 1946, CO 
152/536/3, TNA. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Harold Banks, Carley Ebanks and Harvey Ebanks, in interview conducted by Liz Scolefield, 18 May 1996, 
20, CINA. 
40 John Maloney, Saturday Evening Post, 41.222, 8 April 1950, 38. 
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and a lack of political representation.41 Although no major political protests or trade union action 
arose in BVI, the emerging merchant class placed pressure on the Commissioner to reinstate the 
legislative council. In 1938, a lawyer from Tortola, Hope Stevens, returned from studying in New 
York and set up the Civic League to encourage political change.42 Along with other Civic League 
officers, Stevens prepared a petition with hundreds of signatures from BVIslanders calling for a 
legislative council.43 This elite group were predominantly lighter-skinned merchants and traders 
who had profited from working abroad in the first half of the twentieth century. A second civic 
group was set up among the BVI community in New York: the British Virgin Islands Pro-
Legislative Committee of America.44 Though the BVI elite were influenced by American and other 
Caribbean political movements, they remained conservative in approach. The Secretary of State 
for the Colonies rejected their petition, but the action of the Civic League garnered some attention 
for the neglected islands.45 
 
Merchants also constituted the elite sector of society in the Cayman Islands, the principal 
difference being that, in Cayman, the majority of these merchant families were white.46 They 
controlled much of the economic and political life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
through their gatekeeper status, managing access, communications and goods to and from the 
outside world.47 The economic structure of society was vertical: between the peasant-fisherman 
who made up the majority, and the small, economically dominant merchant elite. This patron-
client relationship with shared interests and loyalty meant that, generally, the peasants and 
 
41 Richard Hart, Labour Rebellions of the 1930s in the British Caribbean Region Colonies (London: Caribbean 
Labour Solidarity and the Socialist History Society, 2002). 
42 Vernon W. Pickering, A Concise History of the British Virgin Islands: From the Amerindians to 1986 (New 
York: Falcon Publications International, 1987), 71. 
43 The term ‘BVIslander’ to refer to citizens of the BVI is a relatively recent phenomenon. See Maurer, 
Recharting the Caribbean, xiv. 
44 Bill Maurer, ‘Writing Law, Making a “Nation”: History, Modernity, and Paradoxes of Self-Rule in the British 
Virgin Islands’, Law & Society Review 29, no. 2 (1 January 1995): 265. 
45 Maurer, Recharting the Caribbean, 58. 
46 Ibid., 61. 
47 Hannerz, Caymanian Politics, 39–54. 
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fisherman respected the merchants and their roles as Justices of the Peace, in the Church, and in 
charitable organisations.48 Merchants sometimes encouraged resentment through abuse of power, 
racism, or when they intervened in court matters.49 For most of the nineteenth century, no 
government official from Britain resided in Cayman, since the office of Commissioner was not 
established until 1898.50 Although Vestrymen were elected from across different groups in 
Caymanian society, the local merchant elite maintained considerable influence over the Assembly.51 
  
Like the British dependencies, the French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe trailed behind 
the metropole in terms of political representation, social rights, and economic development. 
Unlike the populations of the British colonies, people in Martinique and Guadeloupe had been 
French citizens since 1848, meaning all adult men could vote for representatives in the French 
National Assembly in Paris.52 However, in reality the French President, the Minister of the 
Colonies and the Governor controlled Martinique and Guadeloupe, in what Nesbitt describes as 
a ‘quasi-feudalistic juridical relic’.53 
 
Along with French Guiana and Réunion, Martinique and Guadeloupe were referred to as the ‘Old 
Colonies’ because France had colonised them during the monarchical imperial age in the 
seventeenth century, as opposed to the republican era of the nineteenth century.54 The slave trade 
had shaped the societies of the French Antilles until abolition in 1848.55 The colonial encounter 
displaced and wiped out the indigenous population, leaving a plantation-based society with a small 
 
48 Kenneth Pringle, Waters of the West (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1938), 180–90. 
49 Hannerz, Caymanian Politics, 39–54. 
50 Colonial Office Annual Report on the Cayman Islands, 1946, CO 1071/93, 28, TNA. 
51 Hannerz, Caymanian Politics, 49–53. 
52 Robert Aldrich and John Connell, France’s Overseas Frontier: Départements et Territoires d’outre-Mer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 51–56. 
53 Nick Nesbitt, ‘Departmentalization and the Logic of Decolonization’, L’Esprit Créateur 47, no. 1 (2007): 33. 
54 William Miles, ‘Fifty Years of Assimilation: Assessing France’s Experience of Caribbean Decolonisation 
through Administrative Reform’, in Islands at the Crossroads: Politics in the Non-Independent Caribbean, ed. 
Angel Israel Rivera Ortiz and Aarón Gamaliel Ramos (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2001), 46. 
55 Bill Marshall, The French Atlantic: Travels in Culture and History (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2009), 187. 
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minority of rich whites, known as Békés, controlling the majority of the industry and economy. A 
key difference in the histories of Martinique and Guadeloupe occurred during the French 
Revolution. In Martinique, the Békés managed to maintain control, because the British protected 
the institution of slavery in the island. In Guadeloupe, on the other hand, most of the white 
planters fled or were killed, and slavery was abolished during the regime of Victor Hugues between 
1794 and 1798.56 Despite the attempts of resistance leaders Louis Delgrès, Solitude and Joseph 
Ignace, Napoleonic France reoccupied Guadeloupe in 1802 and reinstated slavery for another 
forty-six years. This split during the revolution made the societies of Martinique and Guadeloupe 
quite different and altered the way constructions of race operated within society.  
 
Though they are often left out of the historiography, it is important to acknowledge the presence 
and influence of Indian indentured labourers in the French Antilles.57 Between 1853 and 1888, 
over 68 000 labourers arrived in Martinique and Guadeloupe, from both French enclaves in 
Pondichéry and Karikal, and British India.58 At the same time, from abolition onwards, a black 
political elite developed, greatly inspired by the French revolutionary ideals of liberté, égalité, 
fraternité.59 Assimilationist doctrines established through education had engendered a society 
which valued French language and culture. By the twentieth century, some of this black middle 
class worked and studied in Paris, coming into contact with other elites from across the French 
Empire.60 Martinicans Aimé Césaire and Paulette Nardal, for example, spent the 1930s in Paris, 
collaborating with Léopold Senghor from Senegal and Léon Damas from French Guiana on the 
concept of Négritude and on the journals L'Étudiant Noir and La Revue Du Monde Noir.61 Césaire 
 
56 Auguste Lacour, Histoire de La Guadeloupe, Tome 2e, 1789-1798 (Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe: Imprimerie du 
gouvernement, 1857). 
57 David Northrup, ‘Les immigrants indiens engagés aux Antilles françaises’, Revue française d’histoire 
d’outre-mer 87, no. 326 (2000): 245–71. 
58 Ibid., 267-271. 
59 Leon de Lepervanche, JORF, 13 March 1946, 665. 
60 Kesteloot Lilyan, ‘La Littérature Négro-Africaine Face à l’histoire de l’Afrique’, Afrique Contemporaine 241, 
no. 1 (2012): 43–53. 
61 La Revue Du Monde Noir (Paris), founded in 1931; L’Étudiant Noir (Paris), founded in 1935. 
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went on to write Cahier d'un retour au pays natal which discussed issues of racism, oppression, 
assimilation and colonialism.62 Like many British West Indian colonies in the 1930s, the French 
Antilles experienced major strike action by plantation and sugar workers. Colonial authorities often 
responded by violently repressing uprisings and protests.63 Despite widespread strikes among 
labourers and developing notions of Négritude among intellectuals, French Antilleans remained 
generally loyal to France.64 Césaire and his associates certainly perceived themselves to be part of 
the imagined French community.65 Across the four colonies, patriotic enthusiasm for the ‘mother 
country’ characterised responses to the outbreak of war. But the war would challenge the seeming 
dominance and invulnerability of Britain and France, changing perceptions of empire and the 
colonies’ place within it. 
 
Non-Independent Territories 
Despite being neglected in many larger works on decolonisation, several studies focusing 
specifically on the non-independent Caribbean do address the question of their decolonisation. 
Peter Clegg has written extensively about small states in the international system, including the 
non-independent Caribbean, from an International Relations perspective.66 Clegg highlights the 
‘inter-island antipathy and rivalry’ that is often at the root of twenty-first century calls for 
 
62 Aimé Césaire, Cahier d’un Retour Au Pays Natal (Paris: Volontés, 1939). 
63 H. Adlai Murdoch, ‘The Language(s) of Martinican Identity: Resistance to Vichy in the Novels of Raphaël 
Confiant’, L’Esprit Créateur 47, no. 1 (2007): 70. 
64 Parcours de Dissidents, (2006), documentary film by Euzhan Palcy. 
65 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983). 
66 Peter Clegg, ‘The UK Caribbean Overseas Territories, New Labour, and the Strengthening of Metropolitan 
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independence, rather than direct antipathy towards Britain.67 This is not a recent phenomenon, as 
this thesis will demonstrate. A couple of collections have compared the non-independent 
territories of the Caribbean, though these contain separate chapters on each territory, limiting the 
comparative analysis.68 However, unlike these works, this research compares the territories 
throughout, in every chapter. A comparative approach, it is argued, is a crucial part of moving past 
interpreting these islands as mere anomalies. It allows us to identify trends across linguistic and 
colonial borders. Furthermore, the differences identified help to highlight the local dimensions 
which influenced the particular outcomes of decolonisation in each territory. Caribbean studies 
are too often bounded by the divisions set up by the colonial past, with scholars studying groups 
of islands which all belonged to the same empire. Comparing across these boundaries encourages 
us to step beyond colonial limits. 
 
The Cayman Islands 
Turning to specific island focused studies, after Neville Williams’ short official history of the 
Cayman Islands published in 1970, relatively little was written on Caymanian history until the 
twenty-first century.69 A growing interest in protecting and promoting Caymanian traditions, 
culture and history in the late twentieth century led to the establishment of several useful 
institutions for historians, including the National Archive and the oral history Memory Bank. 
Making use of these resources, Michael Craton’s Founded Upon the Seas offers a detailed and 
comprehensive history of the islands from the sixteenth century to today.70 Importantly, Craton 
acknowledges that Cayman was a ‘slave society’ and includes a chapter on the experiences of 
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enslaved people. This is often overlooked in popular understandings of Caymanian history as 
rooted in buccaneering and maritime pursuits.71 Nonetheless, Craton’s account, to a certain extent, 
presents a ‘white settler’ perspective on Caymanian history. For example, he suggests that ‘the first 
permanent inhabitants were probably poor but respectable turtlers and logcutters, who settled 
down with their families and a few slaves to a lifestyle that was more congenial, though no richer, 
than they could have enjoyed in planter-dominated Jamaica’.72 Furthermore, he rather surprisingly 
describes the history of slavery in Cayman as ‘fascinating – and occasionally uncomfortable’, 
underestimating the impact of slavery and racism on the development of Caymanian society and 
identity.73 Going further than Craton, this thesis analyses the dynamics of racial inequality and 
white minority government which are at the heart of understanding political developments in the 
territory. 
 
The white merchant oligarchy and their monopoly over Caymanian politics is the subject of Ulf 
Hannerz’ anthropological study.74 Based on extensive interviews in the 1970s, Hannerz offers a 
useful insight into the political crises of the 1960s and 1970s. Roy Bodden builds on these themes 
in his study of Caymanian politics, describing the workings of Caymanian society as a ‘patronage 
system’ in which most of the population was dependent on the merchant elite for resources, 
transport and jobs.75 In his earlier work on Caymanian history, Bodden suggests that Cayman was 
a ‘society with slaves, rather than a slave society’.76 He is outspoken on issues of racial inequality 
in Caymanian politics, but this claim regarding slavery could be interpreted as part of an overly 
positive, patriotic notion of Caymanian history as being more harmonious and equal than other 
Caribbean islands. More convincing, is Christopher Williams’ assertion of the importance of 
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slavery in shaping Caymanian society such that ‘the entrenchment of a stubborn homegrown 
racism…would continue to privilege all things white…well beyond emancipation’.77 Mindful of 
these issues, this research highlights the role of the merchant oligarchy and racial dynamics in 
Caymanian society in shaping political debates and the process of decolonisation. 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
The creation of the College of the Virgin Islands in the USVI in 1962 facilitated increased scholarly 
attention on the history of the British Virgin Islands. As a result, in 1975, two histories of the BVI 
were published, one by Guyanese historian Isaac Dookhan, and the other by BVIslanders Norwell 
Harrigan and Pearl Varlack.78 Dookhan presents a government perspective on BVI history, relying 
solely on British archival records. Using oral history as well as archival sources, Harrigan and 
Varlack’s Virgin Islands Story analyses the islands’ history from a BVI viewpoint. They were early 
proponents of the now more common insistence on using the term ‘Virgin Islands’ rather than 
‘British Virgin Islands’.79 Although it is a useful brief overview of BVI history, the book suggests 
that contact ‘between the Virgin Islands blacks and other black West Indians had never amounted 
to much’.80 This contradicts evidence which will be presented in this thesis of the extensive 
migration by BVIslanders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, 
experiences in administrative and political roles in other British Caribbean colonies greatly shaped 
the outlooks of the BVI political elite in the 1950s. Frequently absent from historical accounts, the 
important role of women in BVI history is covered in depth by Eugenia O’Neal, who explores 
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how women have defined themselves in relation to Virgin Island society.81 Likewise, this research 
will acknowledge the influential women who have shaped developments in the BVI. 
 
Our understanding of identity and culture in the British Virgin Islands has been greatly enhanced 
by the work of anthropologists.82 Colleen Ballerino Cohen uses the annual British Virgin Islands’ 
Festival as a means of exploring notions of BVI identity.83 She investigates the relationship 
between tourism, globalisation and nationalism, issues rooted in the social change which took place 
in the 1960s and 1970s.84 This period of rapid transformation has been analysed by W. Errol 
Bowen, who demonstrates how three great transformations in the 1960s, in development, 
immigration, and politics, combined to provoke ‘discomfiting’ social change for BVIslanders.85 
This thesis situates these changes within the context of decolonisation, assessing their impact on 
the decolonisation process. 
 
An important intervention came from Bill Maurer, who focuses on the ways land ownership and 
law writing have become expressions of BVI identity and citizenship. 86 Self-rule is imagined 
through the ability to write legislation, despite the continuation of deeply entrenched colonial 
structures.87 Certainly, ownership of land was central to political debates and moments of crisis 
and conflict. This is most evident in the 1968 Positive Action Protest which is glossed over or 
absent from the literature, with the exception of Bowen. Unlike previous accounts, this research 
highlights the vision of figures like Positive Action leader Noel Lloyd, whose global anticolonial 
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perspective demonstrates the impact of international campaigns and ideas on certain groups in 
BVI society. 
 
Martinique and Guadeloupe 
Turning next to the French Caribbean, the literature on the history of Martinique and Guadeloupe 
is extensive. A tendency exists in French scholarship to focus either on institutional or economic 
history, particularly the development of the sugar industry.88 This has been countered by Antillean 
historians centring their analysis on moments of crisis and revolution, such as the 1802 reinstating 
of slavery in Guadeloupe or Vichy rule in the Caribbean during the Second World War.89 
Furthermore, influential Antillean thinkers, from Césaire to Fanon to Glissant, have explored 
French Caribbean history and identity.90 Their impact is explored in greater detail in chapter four. 
More recently, Jacques Dumont’s account of twentieth century history in the French Caribbean 
explores issues of assimilation, identity and political status, yet he fails to place this within the 
context of global developments.91 
 
The question of departmentalisation has been tackled from different angles by historians, political 
scientists and anthropologists.92 Too often, it is either analysed in isolation from global events, or 
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is treated as a pernicious capitulation to French assimilationism. Instead, this thesis will situate 
departmentalisation within a comparative analysis of decolonisation and will present it in its 
historical context, without the assumption of independence as a natural destination for colonies. 
Kristen Stromberg Childers makes a useful contribution to the literature on departmentalisation, 
particularly in regards to the gender and family dynamics in the Antilles.93 However, Childers 
presents Martinique and Guadeloupe as ‘anomalous’ within the Caribbean, suggesting that they 
are ‘a curious exception in the larger history of decolonization’.94 This is a common but unhelpful 
framing of recent Antillean history for two reasons. Firstly, it fails to acknowledge the prevalence 
of various non-sovereign arrangements across the Caribbean region. Secondly, it reinforces the 
idea that decolonisation was simply a transfer from colony to independent nation state. By 
contrast, this thesis examines how political developments in the French Antilles since the Second 
World War can be understood as part of the global experience of decolonisation. 
 
Crucially, the literature on these territories fails to offer any comparative perspective across 
linguistic boundaries. Matthew Bishop’s political economy is the exception, comparing Martinique 
and Guadeloupe with St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines.95 This research compares the 
four case study territories side-by-side throughout to allow for a deeper understanding of their 
shared patterns and trends, as well as differences and anomalies. It is the fundamental premise of 
this thesis that only through comparisons across linguistic boundaries can we fully understand 
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The Caribbean Region in the Era of Decolonisation 
Broadening out from the local perspective, this thesis situates the developments in the overseas 
territories within the regional context of Caribbean decolonisation.96 Politicians and activists in 
these territories were part of regional networks and exchanges of ideas. Migration was 
commonplace and many islanders travelled to other parts of the Caribbean for work or study. 
They also participated in the interwar and postwar Caribbean networks in metropolitan centres 
like New York, London and Paris.97 Independence did not end debates about sovereignty and 
racial inequality in the region. As Kate Quinn has demonstrated, although scholarship on Black 
Power has traditionally focused on North America, people across the Caribbean engaged in 
debates about imperialism, racism and notions of Black Power in the 1960s and 1970s.98 As chapter 
six explores, activists in all four case study territories engaged with ideas about Black Power and 
other forms of social protest. 
 
Scholars who work specifically on British decolonisation in the Caribbean have tended to focus 
on the failure of the West Indies Federation, the independent states that came out of the 
Federation’s break up, and the political and economic issues of the newly independent nations. 
For example, David Killingray, whilst acknowledging attempts at federation in the nineteenth 
century, identifies the 1930s, with labour unrest and the Moyne Commission, as the root of the 
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West Indies Federation.99 Howard Johnson highlights the importance that British policy makers 
placed on the economic viability of the colonies in the decolonisation process.100 This became a 
crucial part of independence debates in the non-independent territories, as this research explores 
in detail. Eric Duke’s more recent study on the Federation has moved beyond the focus on the 
short-term influences of the Federation to look at the longer historical seeds of federation in the 
early twentieth century.101 He offers a more global perspective, exploring the relationship between 
the Federation and the wider black diaspora.102 Similarly, this thesis considers the interactions 
between activists in the overseas territories and the black diaspora on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
In Caribbean Studies, it is common to focus solely on the history of one island or island group. In 
Richard Hart’s political history, he recounts his own involvement as a lawyer, labour journalist and 
political activist in the early stages of decolonisation in Jamaica.103 Jerome Teelucksingh assesses 
the labour movements in Trinidad and Tobago during decolonisation, moving the focus away 
from British colonial officials and the middle-class politicians.104 Teelucksingh argues that 
‘Democracy was neither a gift to the West Indian colonies bestowed by imperial Britain nor was it 
granted out of good intentions. Instead, it was consistently and brazenly demanded by Labour’.105 
With this in mind, this research considers the impact of the lack of labour movements and unions 
in the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, as well as the significant influence and power 
of unions in the French Caribbean. These factors are important in providing a more complete 
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picture of the processes of decolonisation in these territories. In an earlier account of 
decolonisation in Trinidad and Tobago, Selwyn Ryan argues that the small size of the state was a 
significant factor in its decolonisation.106 This thesis takes into account the relative small size of 
the territories under consideration, including the fact that the French islands are much larger, in 
size and population, compared to the British territories. 
 
In a more regional approach, Spencer Mawby examines the failures of British policymaking at the 
end of empire and the breakdown of the West Indies Federation.107 Unlike Mawby’s account, this 
research balances an analysis of British and French policymaking with a local perspective, to fully 
explore the range of influences. Anne Spry Rush explores the development of British West Indian 
middle-class identity in early twentieth century up to independence.108 Though absent from her 
study, this middle-class identity rooted in respectability was apparent in the Cayman Islands and 
British Virgin Islands. Notions of Britishness were influential in the debates about decolonisation, 
particularly in the Cayman Islands. Political systems are central to our understanding of 
decolonisation. Historians of the Anglophone Caribbean have highlighted the legacy of the 
Westminster model which continues to influence contemporary Caribbean politics.109 Like the rest 
of the former-British Caribbean, the BVI and Cayman maintain a Westminster style political 
system, which has shaped political developments in the islands. 
 
Francophone Caribbean accounts of decolonisation centre on departmentalisation in 1946, as 
discussed in the previous section.110 Departmentalisation is rarely considered in comparison to 
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Federation in the British Caribbean, something this research directly addresses. Scholarship in the 
Caribbean is usually divided along linguistic frontiers, limiting comparative analysis. Yet this thesis 
offers a comparative approach and a Caribbean perspective to decolonisation. In considering the 
wider history of the Francophone Caribbean, it is worth noting that Guadeloupe’s history is more 
closely tied to that of Haiti than it might first appear.111 During the chaotic decades after the French 
Revolution, slavery was abolished in Guadeloupe and many of the plantation owners were killed. 
Solitude, Louis Delgrès and Joseph Ignace led a resistance movement opposing the reoccupation 
of Guadeloupe and the reinstatement of slavery in 1802 but were ultimately unsuccessful.112 
 
Although not the subject of this research, decolonisation in other non-independent territories such 
as Puerto Rico, the Caribbean Netherlands and Aruba provides useful examples of the diversity 
of the decolonisation experience in the region.113 As Chapter two details, decolonisation in these 
territories took place in the context of the Cold War and the ever-growing US influence in the 
region. The Cuban Revolution was hugely significant for regional political dynamics.114 Several 
studies assess decolonisation within this regional geopolitical framework.115 The Caribbean region 
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challenges not only assumptions about the outcomes of decolonisation, but also the temporal 
boundaries. Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic achieved independence from France and 
Spain in the nineteenth centuries.116 Though this research focuses on events in the twentieth 
century, it is important to acknowledge that decolonisation was not solely a twentieth century 
phenomenon. As part of a more global understanding of decolonisation, we should also extend its 
chronological boundaries to encompass earlier decolonisation. 
 
Non-Sovereign Territories in the Context of Global Decolonisation 
Though they have largely been left out of global histories of twentieth century decolonisation, this 
thesis will situate the Caribbean territories within this global context.117 The twentieth century 
decolonisation of empires has been the subject of many works in the fields of imperial history and 
postcolonial theory. Traditionally, there has been little conversation between these two disciplines, 
either in Anglophone or Francophone scholarship. However, as Dane Kennedy highlights, both 
could be enriched by further dialogue and engagement.118 In line with recent endeavours to 
integrate imperial and postcolonial studies, this thesis draws on strands identified as useful from 
both spheres of research. It engages with both fields to illustrate a neglected part of the history of 
decolonisation. In an effort to move past constructing historical narratives ‘from the centre out’, 
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this research employs a variety of sources and seeks to look beyond a Western colonial perspective 
in its analysis.119 
 
Firstly, when writing on the subject of decolonisation, it is crucial to consider the problematic 
nature of the term itself. When defined as the end of European empires, or as the withdrawal of 
European powers and giving of independence, ‘decolonisation’ is Eurocentric and denies agency 
to local actors involved in negotiating independence.120 The OED defines decolonisation as ‘the 
withdrawal from its former colonies of a colonial power; the acquisition of political or economic 
independence by such colonies.’121 However, a clear chronological separation of formal imperial 
rule and national independence does not acknowledge the more informal, neocolonial influences 
and systems of control at work after independence.122 Moreover, as the existence of European 
overseas territories today attest, global decolonisation did not transform all colonies into 
independent nation-states. Thus, this thesis approaches decolonisation ‘less as a sequence of events 
and more as a globally connected process’, one which is ongoing.123 
 
Furthermore, interpreting decolonisation is not a question of choosing to see it as strictly change 
or continuity.124 Whilst the success of nationalist, anticolonial movements ‘appears less as a linear 
progression than as a conjuncture’, there are also elements of continuity in the history of 
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decolonisation.125 Additionally, Cooper places great importance on studying the period from the 
1940s to the 1970s.126 He argues that in order to understand decolonisation and the postcolonial 
world we need to return to this period to see exactly what people said, wrote and did, rather than 
interpreting it from a contemporary perspective.127 Returning to the post-war period, as this 
research does, allows for the variety of possibilities and routes that different actors wished to take 
at the time. This thesis analyses the processes of decolonisation without seeing them as an 
inevitable course of events. 
 
In the case of the overseas territories, the range of political possibilities available after the Second 
World War makes their political status today appear less of an anomaly. Indeed, research on 
Francophone Africa demonstrates that greater power within the French Republic, and integration 
or federalism, rather than independence, was a route favoured by many African political leaders.128 
Decolonisation was not the end of a historical process and many independent states remain under 
different levels of external control and influence.129 This thesis uses these insights to integrate 
overseas territories into the wider narrative of global decolonisation. Gary Wilder explores the 
theme of federalism through the intellectual thought of Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor, 
suggesting that they envisaged freedom from colonial rule through a decentralised federation of 
former colonies governed democratically by the French Republic.130 These studies reveal that, in 
the midst of decolonisation, the current world of nation-states was not a foregone conclusion. 
Thus, as this thesis demonstrates, the decolonisation of the French Antilles through integration 
with France is far more closely linked to wider French decolonisation than it may at first appear. 
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Focusing on British decolonisation, initial accounts grew out of the preceding body of imperial 
literature written during the days of empire. They continued to focus on the actions and intentions 
of British politicians, policy-makers and civil servants. Many historians have addressed what 
Robinson and Gallagher call ‘the official mind’.131 This includes Frank Heinlein’s investigation of 
British government policy during decolonisation, made possible by the new evidence available in 
the series British Documents on the End of Empire.132 Hemming assesses decolonisation through the 
role of Macmillan, concluding that Macmillan and the British often battled between the desire to 
prepare colonies for independence and to advance fast enough to avoid nationalist unrest.133 Many 
accounts of decolonisation centre on the notion of stable British institutions, an orderly retreat 
from empire with little consequence for the metropole, and the continuing importance of Britain 
globally through the Commonwealth.134 Unlike these accounts of ‘orderly’ decolonisation, this 
research demonstrates the, at times, chaotic nature of decolonisation, with British officials often 
responding to events on the ground or British representatives in the colonies acting counter to 
official policy. The fact that the British Overseas Territories maintained their links to Britain in the 
1970s, when other small colonies were encouraged to become independent, suggests that Britain 
did not maintain control of the decolonisation process. The British Government often reacted to 
events, rather than dictating them.135 
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By comparison, decolonisation has traditionally received less attention from French historians.136 
A 2005 law which required history teachers to promote the ‘positive role’ of French colonialism 
overseas caused much controversy and reignited the debate on the French Empire and 
decolonisation. This was notable, not only in the media and the political arena, but also in historical 
scholarship.137 There appears to be a greater tendency to write comparative histories of 
decolonisation, compared with the Anglophone historiography.138 Several French accounts of 
decolonisation give a sense of it being the logical conclusion to colonialism and ultimately 
inescapable.139 Yet in his analysis of the demographic dimensions of decolonisation, Guy Pervillé 
emphasizes that colonisation does not necessarily lead to decolonisation.140 When it comes to the 
French overseas departments, Pervillé resorts to purely economic reasoning, arguing that income 
transfer from the metropole has meant that the French Antilles live beyond their means, making 
independence undesirable. This is a greatly simplified argument which fails to take into account 
the many dimensions of decolonisation in the French Antilles. This thesis explores the different 
factors which led to the non-independent status of Martinique and Guadeloupe today, 
demonstrating the complex range of dynamics at play. 
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Algeria forms a significant part of the narrative on French decolonisation, due to the complicated 
and violent nature of the Algerian War of Independence and the significant impact it had regionally 
and globally. Like Martinique and Guadeloupe, Algeria was legally classified an integral part of 
France. The nature and great impact of its decolonisation has been assessed from a variety of 
perspectives.141 The Algerian War held great consequences for political developments in the 
French Antilles. Many Antilleans fought in the war and were left disillusioned with French 
colonialism. Beginning less than a decade after the French Antilles had become overseas 
departments of France, the war challenged ideas about liberté, égalité, fraternité and France’s supposed 
benevolence overseas. The independence movements which developed in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe were heavily influenced by the Algerian War and many groups fostered ties with the 
newly independent Algerian leadership. This context is central to understanding Antillean 
independence movements and France’s repressive response. 
 
In fact, in the Francophone historiography, decolonisation traditionally received greater attention 
from scholars studying anticolonial nationalism than imperial policies.142 Pan-Africanist and 
socialist writers have contributed to this anticolonial narrative, including writers from the 
Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean.143 One of the earlier criticisms of colonialism appeared 
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in the famous Discours sur le colonialisme by the Martinican politician and poet Césaire.144 Fanon, a 
pupil of Césaire, critiqued colonialism and decolonisation from a psychiatric and psychological 
perspective in Les damnés de la terre.145 Leslie James has demonstrated the extensive interaction 
between Caribbean scholars, particularly Padmore, and global Pan-African, Communist and 
anticolonial movements in the twentieth century.146 Local elites in the BVI and Cayman engaged 
in these global movements despite not always articulating their political aims in a nationalist, 
anticolonial framework. Attempts to decentre decolonisation are less well established in the 
overseas territories. However, examples can be found in Sainton and Gama’s ‘nationalist’ history 
of the 1967 massacre in Guadeloupe and in Bodden’s works on the history the Cayman Islands.147 
 
The end of the empire has been explored from the perspective of various elite groups. This 
includes Philip Murphy’s assessment of the role of the monarchy in British imperial ideology.148 
The monarchy held symbolic importance for the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, 
and their relationship with Britain.  At key moments in their decolonisation, the Queen was evoked 
by politicians and local people to add weight to their negotiating positions. Other historians have 
focused on the economic aspects of decolonisation, including the relationship between economic 
elites and the end of empire.149 This thesis acknowledges the economic elites, like the Békés in 
Martinique and the merchant oligarchy in Cayman, who influenced decolonisation but balances 
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this with other significant, non-economic factors to offer a more complete picture of political 
developments. 
 
Moving away from economic interpretations, a growing body of literature analyses the cultural 
history of decolonisation and the impact it had on metropolitan British society.150 While this 
research does not look at the impact of decolonisation on domestic British politics, it incorporates 
a cultural, as well as political, analysis. Other scholars have emphasised the international 
dimensions of decolonisation.151 Chapter two of this thesis explores the international political 
environment and pressures such as the Cold War which influenced the process of decolonisation 
in the overseas territories. Contributions to the scholarship on decolonisation since the 1980s have 
attempted to break away from the split between accounts of official decision-making in the 
metropole and local developments in specific colonies.152 This research balances the international 
climate, British and French colonial approaches, regional factors and local political dynamics to 
offer a full picture of decolonisation in the overseas territories. 
 
Narratives of chaotic decolonisation highlight its violent nature.153 For example, Lewis, Anderson 
and Elkins all indicate the violence of British decolonisation in Kenya.154 In the overseas territories, 
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decolonisation was not a well-directed, peaceful affair. Colonial policy trailed behind and reacted 
to local events.155 Violence was particularly apparent in the French Antilles as clashes between 
sugar workers and their employers were frequently subdued through extreme force by colonial 
troops.156 Though they do not always appear in official records, using a wide range of sources can 
unearth instances of violence or chaos, presenting a more complicated view of decolonisation. 
Researching instances of police violence has been difficult due to restrictions on archival material. 
As a result, this thesis has used oral history to get a sense of people’s experiences and to try to fill 
in the gaps in the official history. 
 
The French and British empires feature prominently in most comparative texts on twentieth 
century decolonisation.157 Comparisons of colonial approaches and legacies often hold up France 
and Britain as opposing examples.158 Although this thesis compares French and British colonial 
approaches, it will not set up the two approaches as opposing forms of governance. Instead, it will 
highlight similarities and differences in approaches in the territories, including comparing policies 
in the BVI compared to Cayman and Martinique compared to Guadeloupe. Through years of 
scholarly debate on these two imperial models, a stereotypical comparison has developed in which 
the British imperial model is portrayed in a much more favourable light. Typically, the 
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assimilationist, centralised French style of colonialism is contrasted with the pragmatic, indirect 
rule of the British.159 Véronique Dimier maintains that the two imperial models were in reality far 
more similar than is usually acknowledged, a view echoed by John Iliffe.160 As Martin Thomas has 
argued, a comparative study of decolonisation should not aim to determine which decolonisation 
was ‘better’ but simply to analyse differing policies and approaches, and their outcomes.161 A 
comparative, transnational approach to British and French decolonisation allows engagement in 
two bodies of historical research which do not always interact. There are great possibilities within 
comparative studies that go across linguistic borders and new discoveries to be made in this 
‘contact zone’.162 
 
Decolonisation without Independence 
Moving beyond the current literature, this thesis will make a key contribution to the historiography 
of global decolonisation by demonstrating the connection between the process of decolonisation 
in these overseas territories to developments elsewhere. Decolonisation was a globalising force 
which encouraged the growth of global geopolitics and significant movements of migration.163 In 
the non-independent territories, regional and global connections were forged through migration, 
transnational networks of ideas and social protest, and the movement of goods and capital. 
 
Like many other colonies, the Second World War had a significant impact on political debates in 
the territories. Major changes to political status were made in the aftermath of the war. 
Furthermore, the global Cold War environment intersected with the process of decolonisation, 
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shaping political outcomes. Though these territories have been left out of the narrative of global 
decolonisation, the role of the mobile middle classes can help to reveal the ways in which these 
territories are intimately connected to decolonisation in other post-colonial states. Travelling to 
metropolitan centres in London, New York and Paris, often as students, islanders from these 
territories participated in the interwar and postwar networks of anticolonial activism. They were 
greatly influenced by international debates about anticolonialism and decolonisation. However, 
their debates about their islands’ political status took place within the particular context of island 
society. They applied these anticolonial ideas to their situation and envisaged a future which 
remained, for the moment, tied to the colonial power.  
 
The colonial state had an impact on the process of decolonisation in these territories. As they did 
in other colonies, Britain and France influenced decolonisation through repression, assimilation 
and a variety of policies. Decolonisation in these territories highlights the chaotic nature of colonial 
governance. As well as the colonial state, local elite groups wielded a considerable amount of power 
in local political debates. Economic, political and intellectual elites used their positions in society 
to shape public debates to their advantage. Whereas in some colonies political parties were used 
to generate political support for independence, in the territories under consideration, the 
establishment of a European model of political parties obstructed attempts to achieve change.  
 
Nonetheless, independence movements and activists did exist, and protests fuelled by issues of 
self-determination did take place in the postwar decades. Positioning local politicians, activists and 
intellectuals as both interconnected to wider anticolonial debates and yet acting in a somewhat 
separate island society, helps us to understand how these islands negotiated a decolonisation 
without independence. Including the non-sovereign states in our narrative of twentieth century 
decolonisation encourages us to approach decolonisation from the perspective of not seeing 
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independence as an inevitable outcome.164 Ultimately, a better understanding of the processes of 
decolonisation in the non-independent territories allows for a more complex and more accurate 
picture of how decolonisation developed around the world. It is a broader definition which 
acknowledges the differing spheres of influence and control that colonial powers continue to 
maintain in the so-called postcolonial world. 
 
Methodology 
Part of the originality of this thesis lies in its methodology. It employs comparative analysis to 
draw conclusions about decolonisation across linguistic, national and colonial divides. 
Furthermore, this research embraces a wide range of sources, including extensive oral history 
where official sources are scarce. Despite the great diversity of the Caribbean region and the scope 
for comparative research, too often scholars stick to old colonial borders. Yet a comparative 
analysis of different island groups is hugely rewarding in highlighting parallels and points of 
connection between events and peoples across the region. It also identifies anomalies and 
moments that appear to run against the regional trends. Comparing decolonisation in the overseas 
territories identifies more clearly the factors that had the greatest impact on the way decolonisation 
developed. Within this analysis is a multidisciplinary approach which combines, not only historical 
research methods, but also draws on the fields of anthropology, sociology, geography and political 
science. 
 
This thesis uses three kinds of sources to offer a diverse and detailed picture of decolonisation 
developments and the political debates which surrounded negotiations: archival sources; 
newspaper reports; and oral history. The arguments of this thesis are based on extensive archival 
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research in English and French. This was undertaken in archives in London, Paris, Aix-en-
Provence, Martinique, Guadeloupe, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 
 
At the National Archives at Kew (TNA), 143 files were consulted relating to the Cayman Islands 
and the British Virgin Islands. The majority of these were Colonial Office (CO) or Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) files containing correspondence between the governments in the 
territories and London. They also contained accounts of local assembly meetings, intelligence 
reports and internal Foreign Office correspondence in London, relating to issues in the territories. 
Where relevant, files from the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM), the Ministry of Overseas 
Development, later the Overseas Development Administration (OD), and the Treasury (T) were 
consulted. Furthermore, Cabinet Office (CAB) files detailing the memoranda of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee between the years 1946 to 1980 were checked. This was used to establish 
how relevant or important issues in the Caribbean region were perceived to be by the Intelligence 
Committee.  
 
To add greater depth to the local dimensions and perspectives on decolonisation, the Cayman 
Islands National Archive (CINA) was consulted. The archives contain Annual Reports for the 
territory and the Legislative Assembly minutes, most of which are also available in Kew, London. 
In addition to this, the archives contain a useful collection of Vestry Papers which include speeches 
made in the local assembly, petitions sent to the Cayman government and local government 
correspondence with other local bodies as well as governments in the Caribbean. The Legislative 
Assembly storeroom is also a source of speeches made in local assembly meetings and local events, 
as well as local committee meetings, circulars and correspondence. 
 
The National Archives and Records Management Unit (VINA) in the Virgin Islands, Tortola has 
a more limited collection. As well as duplicates of Legislative Assembly minutes and government 
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correspondence held at Kew, VINA has a small but useful collection of memoirs and writings by 
local politicians, civil servants and influential figures. The special edition collection of writings on 
the anniversary of the restoration of the Legislative Assembly was particularly valuable for local 
perspectives on political developments in the twentieth century.165 
 
The French Archives for the Overseas Territories (ANOM) in Aix-en-Provence provided sources 
for the process of departmentalisation in the 1940s. The Political Affairs collection (AFFPOL) 
from the Ministry of the Colonies contains extensive documents on the ‘Assimilation of the Old 
Colonies’, including correspondence between Paris and the colonies, reports, newspaper articles 
and speeches. The private collection of Émile Devouton (APOM), who led an inspection of the 
administration in the French Antilles during the Second World War, provided useful background 
information and context on the social and economic issues facing the Antilles at this time.  
 
For post-1946 documents, after Martinique and Guadeloupe had become overseas departments, 
the French National Archives (AN) at Pierrefitte contains a collection of files from the 
Management of the Overseas Departments and the Ministry of Overseas France. The documents, 
ranging from 1946 to 1979, include correspondence between Paris and Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, intelligence service reports, election details and prefectural reports. The French 
National Assembly archives online are an invaluable resource for parliamentary debates from the 
fourth and fifth republics. 
 
At the departmental archives in Martinique (ADM), the contemporary series W contains sources 
from the local administration, including prefectural correspondence. Communications between 
the prefect and the police were particularly helpful in revealing the extent of censorship and 
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repression. The private papers collection provided an insight into the lives of certain Martinican 
public figures. The most relevant for this study were the files by communist activist Louis Adrassé, 
including correspondence with imprisoned activists in the 1960s, solidarity campaigns with other 
Caribbean figures, and the workings and communications of the Martinican Communist Party. 
Unfortunately, part of the departmental archives in Guadeloupe (ADG) were unavailable at the 
time of request due to flood damage. Nonetheless, series W did contain some valuable sources 
from the intelligence services (Renseignements Généraux). 
 
Newspaper accounts are used in this thesis to enrich the archival sources. Joanna Lewis argues 
that we need to acknowledge the importance of the media’s role in public opinion during 
decolonisation.166 This can be difficult, given that the press’ dealings with government often took 
place ‘off the record’.167 Local Caribbean newspapers offer a useful insight into issues that were 
most prominent in public and political debates at the time. They reveal the kinds of rhetoric and 
language used to discuss local identity and issues of political status. Furthermore, the official 
newspapers of political parties offer an important account of party policies and propaganda. 
Nonetheless, caution must be exercised when using newspaper accounts. They contain both 
deliberate and unconscious biases, and events may be misreported. As long as this potential for 
error and bias is taken into account, newspapers are an excellent source of events and opinions 
that may not appear in official archives. When compared over several decades, they can highlight 
trends and changes in public opinion and debate. 
 
Neither the Cayman Islands nor the British Virgin Islands had local newspapers until the 1950s. 
This lack of local press had a significant impact on the communication and development of 
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nationalism and decolonisation in the islands. The Virgin Islands Daily News, based in St Thomas, 
USVI often reported events from the BVI, especially in the days before the BVI had its own 
newspaper. The Daily News is available on the Google newspaper archive online. The archives in 
the British Virgin Islands has a collection of Tortola Times and The Island Sun. The Cayman Islands 
National Archives contains copies of Cayman Times, The Caymanian Weekly, Tradewinds, The 
Northwester, and The Newstar. Certain editions of these newspapers can also be found at the British 
Library, London. Both the departmental archives in Guadeloupe and Martinique have extensive 
newspaper collections. Newspapers and journals proliferated in the postwar years, with every 
political party and group having their own journal. In total, sixty-one different newspapers were 
consulted to build up a picture of political debates across the political spectrum in the French 
Antilles. The journal of the Guadeloupean independence movement GONG was banned in the 
1960s. Ken Kelly, the former editor, kindly allowed me to look through his private collection of 
GONG journals. 
 
Finally, written memoirs and interviews are used to provide personal accounts of political 
developments and to give greater context where archival sources are incomplete. Oral history can 
offer an important perspective on political events and public sentiment, helping to highlight 
silences in the official record. Nonetheless, personal accounts have been compared with archival 
sources to help to filter biases and inaccuracies from both the interviewer and the interviewee. The 
archives in the Virgin Islands, as well as the HLSCC library Virgin Islands studies collection, hold 
memoirs of BVI politicians and political figures.168 I was also able to obtain a copy of the 
unpublished memoirs of political activist Noel Lloyd from Dr Angel Smith at HLSCC. The 
University College of the Cayman Islands has a collection of political memoirs. Memoirs of French 
Antillean political figures are available in libraries in Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as in the 
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French National Library in Paris. The memoirs of Pierre Bolotte, the prefect of Guadeloupe during 
the turbulent events of 1967, are held in the Sciences-Po archives in Paris. 
 
The Cayman Islands National Archive has an indispensable oral history collection, including 
interviews with all major politicians and government officials from the postwar period. The 
archives in the Virgin Islands holds interview footage of activists involved in the 1968 Positive 
Action Movement. In Martinique and Guadeloupe, I conducted interviews with independence 
activists and people affected by the 1967 massacre in Pointe-à-Pitre. The extensive range of oral 
history sources has allowed this thesis to bring to light previously unheard life stories and life 
histories. This is particularly apparent in chapter six, which documents the experiences of activists 
and protestors formerly overlooked by historians. The combination of archival, newspaper and 
oral history sources creates a richer, more detailed picture that goes beyond official government 
records. I spent fifteen months in the Caribbean region to fully immerse myself in the archives 
and to connect with local political debates and social movements. This allowed for multiple 
perspectives on current and historical issues, helping to fill in gaps in the official historical record. 
 
Outline 
The thesis is split into six chapters and is organised thematically, with the British and French 
territories being compared side by side throughout. Firstly, chapter one looks at the key factors 
behind postwar changes in political status, the motivations of local politicians involved in these 
negotiations, and the impact of these changes on future steps to decolonise. In 1946, Martinique 
and Guadeloupe gained overseas department status, to integrate them fully into the French 
Republic. Meanwhile, the West Indies Federation negotiations gave the Cayman Islands and the 
British Virgin Islands the opportunity to reconsider their position within the British Empire. Both 
chose to become crown colonies with a more direct link to Britain. This chapter will argue that 
these changes to political status were crucial to later attempts to negotiate greater autonomy. It 
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was particularly significant for the French Antilles as it would halt debates about independence for 
the following ten to fifteen years. In the British territories, it stabilised British rule and shifted the 
focus towards economic development. 
 
Chapter two explores the impact of the global Cold War on decolonisation in these Caribbean 
territories. Three factors relating to the Cold War are explored: Americanisation in the Caribbean 
region; the significance of the Cuban Revolution; and anticolonial and Third World solidarity 
movements. As a newer colonial power in the Caribbean, the US played an important role as a 
cultural and ideological counterpoint to the metropolitan governments of Britain and France. In 
the French Antilles, the popularity of the Communist Party caused great concern for the French 
State which took extensive measures to monitor and suppress it. The Cuban Revolution was a key 
moment for the region, inspiring activists across the Caribbean, including in the four territories in 
question. Fear of the spread of communism affected local politics and was used to discredit pro-
autonomy politicians and activists. Chapter two will demonstrate that the Cold War in the 
Caribbean was, at times, a backdrop to political developments and, at other times, a crucial part of 
the political situation. 
 
The third chapter addresses British and French involvement in the decolonisation of the case study 
territories. It assesses the differing approaches of colonial representatives towards the political 
status of the territories. This includes measures taken to repress anticolonial protests and activists, 
the Gallicisation of Guadeloupe and Martinique after departmentalisation, and the impact of years 
of chronic underfunding. This chapter places these territories within the wider context of 
decolonisation of the British and French empires. It will argue that colonial pressures prevented a 
fair and open debate on the question of independence in these territories. 
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Chapter four assesses the nature and position of local elites in the four territories. In the Cayman 
Islands, economic and political power was concentrated in the hands of a small, mostly white elite 
group. In the French Antilles, though the descendants of white plantation owning families 
controlled the economic sphere, local politics were dominated by a black political elite who had 
emerged after abolition. Local intellectuals, like Aimé Césaire in Martinique, were key negotiators 
of decolonisation. Some have described the British Virgin Islands as a ‘classless’ society. Certainly, 
the redistribution of land and the departure of the white plantation owners in the decades after 
abolition had led to a relatively equal population of smallholders. However, it is important to note 
that the first political group to champion Virgin Islander rights was established in the 1930s by a 
group of merchants and a lawyer, who had all become more economically successful and politically 
active through opportunities in the US and during the Prohibition era. Local elites, seeking to 
improve the islands, acting in self-interest or collaborating with colonial representatives, were key 
actors in the negotiation of the islands’ political status and thus are crucial to our understanding 
of decolonisation.  
 
The fifth chapter analyses and compares the development of political parties in the territories. 
Many of the local political parties in the French Antilles, like the Communist and Socialist parties, 
were associated with their metropolitan counterparts. As a result, their position towards French 
colonialism and local autonomy was compromised. This made for a striking blend of political 
discourse that was vehemently anticolonial yet also pro-French and anti-independence. Attempts 
to establish political parties in the Cayman Islands caused heated debate and much opposition 
from the Caymanian oligarchy, and ultimately failed. This was intimately tied up with the failure 
of the most significant pro-autonomy politician. In the British Virgin Islands, personal battles 
between political parties and politicians often pushed issues of autonomy to the background. 
Chapter five will contend that the development of political parties in each of the territories was 
closely tied to the ways nationalism and decolonisation evolved. 
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Finally, the last chapter offers a comparison of protest movements in the territories: some 
appeared to be less politically motivated and more concerned with land rights and economic 
grievances; other movements, such as the march in 1949 in the BVI, openly called for greater 
political rights and autonomy. Furthermore, none of the campaigns by local pro-autonomy 
activists managed to achieve widespread public support or electoral success. This final chapter will 
explore local independence groups, their political discourse, and their interactions with the local 
population, existing political structures, and regional anticolonial movements. It is inaccurate to 
suggest that the non-sovereign status of these territories was a result of a lack of popular protest 
or a total absence of nationalism. Rather, through the relationship between popular protest 
movements, local politics, clandestine independence activists and the colonial response to protest, 






























Political Futures after the Second World War 
 
 
The Second World War is frequently cited as a catalyst for political change in colonies around the 
globe, and a determining factor in the nature and timing of decolonisation. While later chapters 
will deal more broadly with the period from 1945 to 1980, this chapter will focus on the initial 
postwar political changes in Martinique, Guadeloupe, BVI and Cayman. It will show that the 
overseas Caribbean territories participated in the regional and global debate about decolonisation 
in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, but negotiated new political statuses linking 
them more closely to the metropolitan powers. 
 
World War II is, for many scholars, a crucial moment in twentieth century decolonisation, causing 
changes in colonial dynamics which accelerated decolonisation. The ‘cataclysmic events’ of the 
war are seen as ushering in ‘the beginning of the end of empire’.169 Darwin, for example, places 
emphasis on the importance of the Second World War in the timing of decolonisation, especially 
in South Asia.170 He argues that the war ‘produced a dangerous conjuncture of international, 
domestic and colonial pressures’ which combined to undermine British colonialism.171 In the 
French Caribbean, Childers argues that the Second World War was a turning point, as Vichy rule 
forced Antilleans to reconsider their future relationship with France.172 For the British overseas 
territories, experiences during the war prompted islanders to reevaluate their position in the region 
and within the British Empire. 
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However, historians of the British Caribbean and the West Indies Federation commonly root 
postwar Federation developments in the labour unrest of the 1930s and the subsequent Moyne 
Commission.173 According to this interpretation, the Second World War is less significant than the 
interwar period for Caribbean decolonisation. It is important to note that, while activists began 
agitating for greater representation in the BVI in the 1930s, both Cayman and the BVI did not 
experience the labour unrest which swept across much of the British Caribbean. Studies on 
anticolonial nationalism in capitals like London, Paris and New York in the interwar years also 
suggest that this era was crucial to decolonisation after World War II.174 Furthermore, attempts to 
reinvigorate empire by imperial policymakers in the aftermath of the Second World War 
complicate the notion of decolonisation accelerating after the war. 175 
 
Certainly, while it would be wrong to overlook the changes that were already taking place in the 
1930s, experiences during the Second World War were influential in shaping postwar 
decolonisation. It is evidently more complicated than World War II simply acting as an accelerating 
force in a continuous decolonisation process or as a disruptive turning point. For both the French 
Antilles and the British Virgin Islands, debates about citizenship and autonomy began earlier in 
the twentieth century. However, experiences during the Second World War were crucial. 
Caribbean experiences of the war had a considerable impact on local constructions of identity and 
the way it manifested in political debates. As this chapter will demonstrate, the reconstruction that 
took place in France in the aftermath of the Occupation was essential for facilitating 
departmentalisation. The regional negotiations on the West Indies Federation which began in 1947 
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prompted the BVI and Cayman to engage in debates about self-determination and governance 
that were not possible at a local level. Thus, the Second World War was critical for 
departmentalisation and the crown colony status that were adopted in the postwar years. 
 
This chapter will argue that these initial postwar changes were fundamental to the later 
development of decolonisation in these territories. Firstly, it will explore Caribbean experiences 
during World War II, particularly how this altered local expressions of identity. It will then assess 
the adoption of both departmentalisation in the French Antilles and crown colony status in the 
British territories. Crucially, the chapter will analyse the relationship between politics and identity 
during political developments, examining how a sense of identity influenced or was used to justify 
the decisions taken. Finally, it will consider the impact of departmentalisation and crown colony 
status on later decolonisation negotiations.  
 
In an era of decolonisation, when many colonies were moving towards independence, the fact that 
these four territories strengthened their ties to the metropolitan power may seem anachronistic. 
However, it is important to acknowledge the diverse range of debates and political futures 
envisaged in the 1940s and 1950s. Cooper demonstrates that during the earlier stages of 
decolonisation, some African politicians favoured federalism within the French Union rather than 
independence and state sovereignty.176  Similarly, Wilder suggests that intellectuals and political 
leaders like Césaire and Senghor explored the idea of a federation of former colonies governed by 
France as a possible form of decolonisation.177 Furthermore, throughout the West Indies 
Federation negotiations and in the aftermath of the Federation’s dissolution, many small states in 
the Eastern Caribbean remained wary of full independence and wished to maintain ties to 
Britain.178 These studies reveal that, in the midst of decolonisation, the current world of nation-
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states was not a foregone conclusion. The postwar political developments in the case study 
territories are far more closely linked to wider decolonisation in this respect than it may at first 
appear. These postwar changes are important because any future political debates came from a 
position of greater closeness to France or Britain. They shifted the political landscape in the 
territories and, to a certain degree, halted the question of independence. Therefore, the postwar 
political developments were instrumental in subsequent attempts to negotiate greater autonomy.  
 
1. Caribbean Experiences of World War II 
Experiences during the Second World War are essential to understanding the postwar political 
decisions of these territories, particularly in how the war changed their relationship with the 
colonial powers and the US. Many Caribbean colonies experienced economic adversity and 
isolation during World War II.179 However, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands were 
somewhat protected from shortages of food and resources. A US Coast Guard was stationed at 
the American naval base on Grand Cayman from 1942 onwards.180 This brought increased 
amounts of US dollars into circulation on the islands. Additionally, many Caymanian men found 
employment in the Allied Naval Forces or skilled work in the Canal Zone due to their reputation 
as some of the best mariners in the world.181 This allowed them to send money home, increasing 
spending power on the islands. In terms of relations with the US, Craton argues that US forces in 
George Town were closer to the local population than almost any other American forces in the 
Caribbean.182 The Commissioner and the George Town elite warmly welcomed the American 
naval troops. They were invited to weekly dances and ‘moving pictures’ in the town hall of George 
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Town.183 This led to much interaction between locals and Americans, and a new exposure to 
American culture. Although some instances of conflict arose, generally relations were amicable 
and this even led to a couple of marriages, such as that of Lilian Bodden, from one of the founding 
families in Cayman, and an American, Chief Warrant Officer Jack Howard, in 1942.184 
 
The war did not drastically alter Caymanian perceptions of Britain. Notions of serving ‘your King 
and… your country’ motivated many Caymanians to volunteer at the outbreak of war.185 Part of 
the imagined bond with Britain was forged by a similar sense of being a maritime people.186 The 
British encouraged enlistment by giving it religious significance: they issued calls to arms at the 
main church in George Town and presented the war as a holy struggle.187 In his church speech to 
new recruits in 1941, the Captain of HMS Corsair praised the men for offering ‘their services to 
their King for the safety, honour and welfare of the Empire’.188 These church speeches evidently 
influenced volunteers like Conray Forbes who explained that he chose to serve because of what 
‘Commissioner Cardinall said in his speech at the Presbyterian Church… I wanted to play my part 
too’.189 Two thirds of the adult male population of the islands participated in the Allied Forces, 
either in the British Merchant Navy or in the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (TRNVR).190 
Disillusionment with their treatment during the war led some Caymanians to feel either that the 
imperial ‘mother country’ had exploited them, or that ‘Britain needed us more than we needed 
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them’.191 Yet overall Britain managed to maintain loyalty and patriotism among Caymanian troops 
by fostering a sense of cultural pride in their superior maritime skills.192 
 
Like the Cayman Islands, the negative effects of economic underdevelopment in the British Virgin 
Islands were eased during the war by the establishment of a US naval base in the neighbouring 
island of St Thomas.193 A large labour force, predominantly made up of BVIslanders, carried out 
the construction of the base.194 Additionally, the military base increased the demand for livestock. 
These factors transformed the BVI economy and islanders all but abandoned agricultural 
production in favour of livestock rearing and construction work.195 Once they had completed the 
construction of the base, BVIslanders continued to travel to St Thomas for work and to trade 
goods. Many BVIslanders signed up for twenty-nine day work contracts, since this was the longest 
that the US allowed them to work in the USVI without a visa.196 This led to US Virgin Islanders 
using the pejorative term ‘29 dayers’ to refer to the BVI workers.197 Traditionally, BVIslanders 
traded agricultural produce with St Thomas, but their relationship changed when the USVI became 
a provider of employment. This changing relationship brought BVIslanders into closer contact 
with the US, economically and culturally. 
 
The French Antilles, on the other hand, suffered isolation, economic difficulties and political 
repression during the war. In 1940, after the French armistice with Nazi Germany, the colonial 
government in Martinique and Guadeloupe became officially pro-Vichy. This lasted until 1943 
when revolts and unrest in Guadeloupe escalated into an armed resistance in Martinique to 
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overthrow the pro-Vichy leader Admiral Robert.198 During the authoritarian regime of Admiral 
Robert, Antilleans endured food shortages and increased levels of poverty, as well as severe 
political repression.199 This included the abolishing of universal suffrage for men, and restricting 
married women and mothers from working.200  
 
Some French Antilleans feared the situation was akin to a return to slavery and over 5000 escaped 
to nearby Dominica and St Lucia to avoid persecution or to join Free French and British forces.201 
Known as the Dissidence, Antillean intellectuals have likened these acts of rebellion to marronage 
during the era of slavery.202 Charles De Gaulle acknowledged the contribution of Antilleans in a 
1943 radio speech, in which he proclaimed: ‘The National Liberation Committee is pleased to 
welcome the patriotic people of Martinique and Guadeloupe into a French empire unified for the 
Resistance and for the Liberation of the metropole. I know how long you have yearned to join 
us’.203 Since the radio was their primary contact with de Gaulle, or ‘Général Micro’, French 
Antilleans were pleased to hear their efforts acknowledged.204 ‘Général Micro’ was a nickname 
used by Germany and the Vichy regime to mock de Gaulle, yet Antilleans appear to have used it 
as a term of respect and endearment.205 Despite de Gaulle’s rhetoric, after the war France did not 
fully acknowledge the importance of the Dissidence in the Antilles when compared to the Resistance 
in the Hexagon.206 Yet it has gained significance retrospectively among writers and intellectuals as 
a time of self-sufficiency and self-liberation.207  
 
 
198 Jean Cazenave de la Roche, ‘Tension in the French West Indies’, Foreign Affairs, 1943, 564. 
199 Letter from a resident in Fort-de France to a friend in France, March 1941, 1 AFFPOL 767/2, ANOM. 
200 Inspector Devouton to Secretary of State for Colonies, 11 April 1941, 1 AFFPOL 767/2, ANOM. 
201 ‘Délibérations du Conseil général’, Session extraordinaire, 1 July 1940, Basse-Terre, 5-10, ADG. 
202 Glissant, Le discours antillais, 310. 
203 Journal official de la Guadeloupe, 24 July 1943, 379, ADG. 
204 From interviews in Parcours de Dissidents, documentary film by Euzhan Palcy, 2006. 
205 Ibid. 
206 The concept of France as L’Hexagone due to its geographical shape was first suggested during the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870, but the term only became popular as a metonym for France in the 1950s. 
207 E.g. Raphaël Confiant, Le nègre et l’amiral (Paris: Editions Grasset, 1988). 
 60 
The Dissidence also gained significance through the emergence of several influential political leaders. 
Paul Valentino, a key Guadeloupean figure in the resistance movement would become one of the 
most vocal critics of departmentalisation.208 Frantz Fanon was one of many who fled to Dominica 
and later fought among Free French forces in North Africa. This time was crucial to his developing 
ideas on racism and colonialism, and it influenced his later writings on Martinican identity.209 
Furthermore, the authoritarian regime made the matter of political rights and racial equality even 
more pressing for Antilleans. Experiences during the war shaped Antillean notions of France, as 
Admiral Robert, supported by the majority of the Békés, came to represent the old France of slavery 
and authoritarianism, whereas de Gaulle and the Free French symbolised the republican France of 
liberté, égalité, fraternité.210 For example, during a football match in Guadeloupe in 1943, supporters 
began shouting ‘Vive le Goal! Vive la France!’ in a barely disguised cheer for de Gaulle.211 It was 
this idealised notion of France that French Antilleans would choose to join in 1946. Although 
demands for annexation by the US arose during the war, race issues in America encouraged 
Antilleans to look towards France as an opportunity to overcome the power of the white 
plantocracy.212 
 
Women played a pivotal role in the Dissidence in the Antilles. Jennings suggests that it is impossible 
to determine exactly the dynamics of gender roles in the resistance to Admiral Robert’s regime.213 
Women were among those who escaped to Dominica and St Lucia, and they participated in daily 
opposition and clandestine activities within French Antillean society. Female teachers were 
prominent in the resistance movement, after the new government had sacked them en masse.214 
Although acts of resistance by women are less discussed or well documented, one noted example 
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is that of Esmérelda Cotellon who was arrested for publicly broadcasting L’Internationale anthem 
on her phonograph.215 After the war, women gained the vote.216 While Martinicans did not elect 
any female MPs in the 1940s, Guadeloupe elected Eugénie Éboué-Tell and Gerty Archimède.217 
Women’s actions during the pro-Vichy regime influenced political changes and debates after the 
war.  
 
In all four colonies, experiences during the Second World War forced local citizens to reconsider 
their position, status and identity relative to other Caribbean countries, to the colonial power, and 
to the increasing influence of the US. These experiences directly influenced local opinion in the 
postwar political debates. In the Cayman Islands, the cementing of the idea of Caymanians as 
different to other West Indians because of their maritime skills and lighter skin would influence 
later negotiations within the West Indies Federation. For the BVI, the war brought them even 
closer to the US Virgin Islands, a fact that would encourage them to refuse to join the Federation. 
Experiences of the Vichy regime in the French Antilles, strengthened the belief among the 
Antillean political elite that the French Republic offered a potential solution to poverty and 
inequality. 
 
2. Departmentalisation in the French Antilles 
The immediate political impact of the Second World War in the French Antilles manifested in the 
move to departmentalise and integrate into the French Republic in 1946. Much has been written 
on the motivations of local representatives who supported departmentalisation: to improve the 
social and economic situation in the Antilles; to gain greater equality for the black majority; to take 
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a step closer to France after years of assimilation.218 Childers argues that we should interpret 
departmentalisation as a pragmatic move, rather than as a capitulation to French imperialism and 
assimilation, or an irrational seeking of further dependence.219 While it is true that it was viewed as 
an opportunity to solve the economic and social issues in Martinique and Guadeloupe, seeing the 
move as purely pragmatic ignores the impact of decades of assimilationist policies. For the black 
political elite of the Antilles, this decision was also a means to circumvent the power of the white 
oligarchy. 
 
Advocates of departmentalisation articulated and presented the law through the framework of 
French identity. Having benefitted from the French education system, this black middle class 
expressed an affinity to France and French society. However, it is important to remember that 
access to French literature and culture was not widespread across all sectors of Antillean society 
in the 1940s. While it may not have been the principal driving motivation for politicians like 
Césaire, the apparent Frenchness of the vieilles colonies determined their success with the French 
National Assembly.220 This move must be appreciated within the context of the postwar era when 
many French colonies were seeking greater democracy through a closer relationship with France.221 
Ultimately, the perceived French identity of the Antilles, and the other vieilles colonies allowed them 
to push through departmentalisation. Other colonies in Africa and Indochina were unsuccessful 
in their attempts and later turned to independence as a means to better political representation. 
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Between October 1945 and June 1946, France had a short-lived postwar government in which a 
majority of the parliamentary representatives were communist or socialist.222 Members of 
parliament from the French Antilles, and the other two ‘Old Colonies’, used this brief window of 
opportunity to push through the Departmentalisation Law. The issue of the Frenchness of these 
colonies was fundamental to the debate over full integration into the French Republic. Analysing 
the language used during the National Assembly debates reveals the centrality of French identity 
to this issue, and illuminates the way it was used to achieve departmentalisation. Significantly, three 
key themes emphasising French identity appeared in the discourses of politicians during the 
debates: shared history; shared sacrifice; and shared culture. 
 
Firstly, notions of a shared history with France were an important element of the debates. Aimé 
Césaire, a representative for Martinique, highlighted that Guadeloupe and Martinique had been 
French for three centuries. He compared them to other French colonies, suggesting that they ‘have 
never ceased to be part of the civilization of the mère-patrie’.223 Shared ‘historical memories’ are a 
central part of forming a ‘nation’ and national identity.224 As well as stressing the historical 
interconnectedness between metropolitan France and the French Antilles, Césaire exhibited his 
own Frenchness through his use of a characteristically French nationalist phrase mère-patrie.225 The 
importance of French print culture and the spread of French intellectual and political thought is 
evident in Césaire’s participation in the ‘imagined community’ of France.226 Metropolitan 
politicians like Jean-Jacques Juglas reinforced the patriotic message of shared historical experience. 
He reminded the National Assembly that these Old Colonies had in fact been French longer than 
the French regions of Flanders and Alsace Lorraine.227 
 
222 Nesbitt, ‘Departmentalization and the Logic of Decolonization’, 32. 
223 Aimé Césaire, JORF, 13 March 1946, 660. 
224 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 11–15. 
225 Aimé Césaire, JORF, 13 March 1946, 660. 
226 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
227 Jean-Jacques Juglas, JORF, 15 March 1946, 755-56. 
 64 
A second theme apparent in the speeches was the idea of shared sacrifice. Citizens from these 
colonies had participated in many French wars, playing an important role in the First and Second 
World Wars. During World War One, 51 618 soldiers from Martinique, Guadeloupe, French 
Guiana and Réunion went off to fight for France, of which 32 918 died.228 Léopold Bissol, from 
Martinique, reminded the French Assembly that ‘our hearts have beaten in unison with yours, in 
glory as in defeat, in joy as in sorrow’.229 He likened Martinique’s experience of war to that of the 
Nazi Occupation of France with his emotive statement that ‘we have experienced the same fate, 
the same anguish: tenacious resistance, heroic liberation’.230 Generating reciprocal emotions is 
central to constructions of collective identity, and Bissol used highly emotive and patriotic language 
to reinforce the supposed Frenchness of the Antilles.231 His patriotic speech argued ‘in 1870-1871, 
in 1914-1918, in 1939-1945, the sons and daughters of the Old Colonies have always had a 
spontaneous, resolute affection towards an invaded and wounded France’.232  
 
Furthermore, fighting and dying in defence of the nation, as Smith highlights, can be used to 
promote national solidarity.233 This idea of shared sacrifice was particularly potent in France in the 
postwar period, where the Gaullist myth promoted a narrative that the majority of French people 
had supported the Resistance, leaving only a few collaborators.234 Bissol’s speech tapped into this 
narrative and the particular form of postwar patriotism. Members of the communist and socialist 
movements in the colonies, like Bissol, were keen to demonstrate their support for or involvement 
with the Dissidence in the Antilles. Bissol maintained that ‘the list is long of those who have fallen 
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so that France may survive’.235 Through his language, Bissol engaged in a form of ‘sacrificial 
republicanism’, and politicised the memory of those who died.236 He echoed words spoken during 
the French Revolution, participating in a tradition of constructing a heroic memory of the nation’s 
past. Other MPs reinforced the idea of shared sacrifice through reference to an impôt du sang, or 
blood tax, paid by citizens from the Old Colonies during the wars.237 Since the French Revolution, 
fighting for your country was an integral part of being French. MPs used the sacrifice of their 
soldiers to promote masculine notions of French identity. 
 
Thirdly, notions of common language, culture and civilization contributed to the image of 
Frenchness in Martinique and Guadeloupe. Eric Hobsbawm argues that the French Revolution 
established the nature and boundaries of French patriotism and an imagined French national 
culture.238 Thus MPs had to work within the framework of this imagined culture in order to claim 
French identity. Césaire contended that the colonies were French through their outlook, their land, 
their ideas, and their ‘esprit de nationalité’, which forged an enduring link with France.239 The 
significance of these proclamations lies, not just in their claims, but in the specific language used. 
Generations of French politicians and philosophers have espoused nationalist phrases like, esprit 
de nationalité and Vive la République! Vive la France! 240 Césaire demonstrated that he was French, not 
just through his arguments, but by the very words he chose to put across his argument. Similarly, 
Monnerville from French Guiana claimed his country had been ‘molded, formed in the creuset of 
French culture for three centuries’.241 He could not have chosen a more typically French metaphor 
than the creuset, to portray French Guianese culture.242 
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With French identity at the heart of their arguments for departmentalisation, the representatives 
from the Old Colonies were successful in persuading the French National Assembly to agree to 
full integration into the French Republic. Though the Minister for Overseas France and his 
supporters expressed concerns about the possible costs involved, the proposal gained unanimous 
support when it came time to vote.243 On 19th March 1946, France passed the Departmentalisation 
Law, granting departmental status to Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Réunion. 
Article 2 of the Departmentalisation Law stated that all French laws not currently in use in the 
new départements d’outre-mer (DOMs) would be applied by 1st January 1947.244 Furthermore, as laid 
out in Article 3, any new French laws would apply to the overseas departments, unless the law 
specified otherwise.245 When analysing the discourse of national identity, Calhoun advises looking, 
not at specific terms, but at the rhetoric and language used.246 The rhetoric of the 
departmentalisation debates manifests, through the language and imagery used, the very 
Frenchness which the protagonists were claiming. This persuasive discourse demonstrates that 
MPs from the French Antilles used the language of their colonisers to achieve greater power within 
the colonial state. In a time of rebuilding the French nation, Antillean politicians actively 
contributed to this narrative and reconstruction. 
 
Significantly, anticolonial sentiment was noticeably absent from the political discourse of these 
Antillean political leaders during negotiations over departmentalisation. This was not because they 
were not exposed to nationalist, pan-Africanist or anticolonial ideas: Césaire was one of the 
founders of the Négritude movement.247 He would go on to write Discours sur le colonialisme in 1950, 
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condemning the exploitative nature of colonialism.248 Yet Césaire argued that he was elected with 
a mandate to seek departmentalisation and saw it as a means of decolonisation.249 In 1946, the elite 
group of Antilleans who voiced this construction of French identity saw embracing their perceived 
Frenchness as a way to overcome colonialism. This would have significant repercussions for 
constructions of identity within the wider society in the French Antilles. 
 
Nevertheless, there was opposition to departmentalisation in the Caribbean, and not just among 
the Békés. While departmentalisation was generally very popular and seen as a means to improve 
the social and economic situation in the Antilles, many significant political figures opposed it. 
Guyanese Léon-Gontran Damas, another founder of the Négritude movement, asserted that 
departmentalisation would do nothing to address racial prejudice.250 Paul Valentino and Joseph 
Pitat, prominent Guadeloupean socialists, were concerned about the future of the Antilles under 
departmentalisation if it brought greater assimilation and Gallicisation.251 Unfortunately, these 
fears would prove well founded as Martinique and Guadeloupe struggled to cope with the effects 
of departmentalisation in the decades that followed. 
 
Therefore, departmentalisation should not be seen as anachronistic when understood within a 
postwar context that included many French colonies debating the possible benefits of federation 
and maintaining ties to France. The political leaders who sought departmentalisation did so in an 
attempt to solve the major social and economic issues of the postwar Antilles. Influenced by 
wartime experiences under the Vichy regime, the black middle class in Martinique and Guadeloupe 
associated the Békés with most of the ills of colonialism, while they saw the French Republic as 
embodying the ideals of liberté, egalité, fraternité. Years of assimilationist policies undoubtedly had a 
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certain influence on this perspective among the educated middle classes. Nonetheless, 
departmentalisation was a deliberate choice to integrate politically, socially and economically into 
France in order to ease poverty and inequality. Thus, the perceived French identity of Guadeloupe 
and Martinique was not a central motivating factor but a means by which the departmentalisation 
law could be passed. This helps to illuminate why and how the French Antilles aligned themselves 
more closely with France. 
 
3. The West Indies Federation and Crown Colony Status 
Turning now to the West Indies Federation, conferences and consultations on the possibility of a 
Federation began in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The lifespan of the 
Federation coincided with important debates over the political status of the Cayman Islands and 
the British Virgin Islands. Indeed, debates over the issue of Federation prompted Islanders to 
consider their own political status, and their relationship with Britain and the rest of the British 
West Indies. At the start of the 1950s, neither Cayman nor BVI had a direct association with the 
Colonial Office in Britain. The Cayman Islands was a dependency of Jamaica and thus entered the 
West Indies Federation without direct representation.252 BVI, on the other hand, opted to 
exchange its status as a presidency within the Federal Colony of the Leeward Islands, in order to 
become a crown colony in its own right in 1956.253 Anxious to protect its new status, the BVI 
chose not to join the West Indies Federation, prioritising its close ties with the US Virgin Islands 
over its weak connections to the rest of the Eastern Caribbean.254 As the West Indies Federation 
began to break up, with Jamaica moving towards independence, the Cayman Islands also took the 
step to become a crown colony.255 It is intriguing that, at a time when many British colonies were 
moving towards independence, these islands instead chose to solidify their relationship with 
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Britain. This would dictate the position from which they would negotiate any further changes to 
their political status in the following decades, and would be a major factor in their decolonisation 
without independence. 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
From the outset, the West Indies Federation provided both an arena for BVI political actors to 
garner support for local issues, and a benchmark against which to negotiate BVI’s political status. 
Early discussions about the possibility of Federation in the Caribbean in the 1940s became a 
vehicle for BVIslanders to generate support for greater political representation. Howard Penn, a 
Road Town businessman, obtained unanimous approval for his resolution to reinstate the BVI 
Legislative Council at the Closer Union Conference in St Kitts in 1947.256 The Legislative Council 
had been dissolved in 1901, leaving BVIslanders with very little say in the governance of their 
islands.257 Though the Colonial Office and the Commissioner of the BVI did not immediately 
implement these changes, the conference resolution gave greater legitimacy to calls for a legislative 
Council, and paved the way for the 1949 protest march which finally pushed Britain into accepting 
the Virgin Islanders’ demands.258 The Legislative Council was then reinstated in 1950.259 It would 
be more accurate to say that it was ‘instated’ rather than ‘reinstated’ because, as Maurer has pointed 
out, this was the first time that the council included elected BVIslanders.260 Therefore, with few 
outlets for political debate to flourish within the Virgin Islands in the 1940s, the initial West Indies 
Federation negotiations offered an important medium for BVI political actors. 
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As plans were being finalised, in the mid-1950s, for the establishment of the West Indies 
Federation, BVI looked towards Britain, rather than the rest of the Caribbean, for a chance at 
greater political representation. As a presidency governed through the Colony of the Leeward 
Islands, few decision-making powers were held in the BVI itself. In 1956, the Leeward Islands 
defederated in preparation for joining the West Indies Federation. The Government of the BVI 
chose to become a crown colony with a direct link to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Legislative powers previously controlled by the Leeward Islands were now the responsibility of 
the Administrator of the BVI, in consultation with the Executive Council.261 In the following two 
years, local politicians were keen to retain these newfound powers and made it clear that the BVI 
wished to be a crown colony, rather than join the West Indies Federation. Joining the Federation 
would mean accepting ‘such crumbs and sympathy as the larger units might care to give us’, 
according to John Charles Brudnell-Bruce, member of the Legislative Council.262 Fear of giving up 
decision-making powers to an external organisation in the Caribbean was a crucial factor in the 
choice to remain out of the West Indies Federation.263  
 
This decision to abstain was also heavily influenced by economic factors and identity issues, 
particularly relating to the US Virgin Islands. Political endeavours by BVIslanders in the postwar 
period exhibited a desire to negotiate their position relative to the US Virgin Islands, to which they 
felt far more connected than the rest of the British West Indies. This was as a result of their close 
proximity, their history of interconnectedness, and the large number of BVI citizens working in St 
Thomas, USVI. During the 1947 Closer Union Conference, as well as gaining support for a 
reinstated Legislative Council, Penn successfully campaigned for the BVI to receive special 
consideration in Federation arrangements.264 The fact that the islands ‘geographically and 
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economically form one unit with the Virgin Islands of the United States of America’ justified this 
claim.265 Furthermore, following pressure from local politicians, the US dollar became legal tender 
in the BVI in 1950, cementing their economic links to the USVI.266 Some British Virgin Islanders 
saw their connection with the American islands as a valuable economic resource that they were 
unwilling to open up to the rest of the Eastern Caribbean.267 They ‘cast an eye on the potential 
wealth of St Thomas, and said to… less fortunate fellow-colonies “We will not share”’.268 At any 
given moment, more than 10% of British Virgin Islanders were working in St Thomas, where 
wages were reportedly the highest in the Eastern Caribbean.269 Close ties with the USVI continued 
into the 1960s, as ‘the main source of employment for the British Virgin Islanders continued to 
be St. Thomas’.270 
 
These strong links with the USVI, which pulled the BVI away from Federation with other islands, 
involved a sense of shared Virgin Islander identity. The importance of this relationship with the 
USVI resulted in the founding of the Inter-Virgin Islands Conference in 1951.271 This further 
strengthened ties between the two island groups and reinforced calls for political union.272 Debates 
over the unification of the two island groups remained prevalent in local newspapers well into the 
1960s. For example, an article from a St Thomas newspaper, reprinted in the Tortola Times, 
argued that representatives from the BVI hoped ‘some day they would be adopted by the United 
States of America’.273  
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For every account of pro-American sentiment, however, there was another expressing its affinity 
with Britain. Many argued that the BVI would never accept annexation by the US due to a fondness 
for the British system and a refusal to give ‘up their British identity’.274 Brudnell-Bruce, a British 
tobacco planter who had moved to the BVI in 1935, campaigned for the islands to remain outside 
of the Federation to ‘build its own future and identity, not to be lumped into some large group to 
be lost’.275 Brudnell-Bruce is, to date, the only white elected member of the Legislative Council 
since its reinstatement in 1950, a striking difference to the Cayman Islands where the white 
merchant class dominated the Council for most of the twentieth century.276 Neville Duncan argues 
that it was ‘a wish for a separate identity’ that motivated BVI politicians.277 Certainly, as the West 
Indies Federation broke up and many islands moved towards independence, the attitude in the 
BVI was very different: ‘The one exception is the Virgin Islands which stands alone with Britain… 
Reasons for staying out [of the Federation] were logical and based on self-interest, since there was 
hardly any connection between the BVI and their faraway neighbours’.278 Therefore, notions of 
both connection and isolation directed political developments in the BVI, steering the islands 
towards a future of increased separation from the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
 
The Cayman Islands 
Prior to joining the West Indies Federation, Caymanians had similar fears to the BVI: they wished 
to maintain the economic benefit of their links to the US; they were concerned about losing 
legislative powers to another governing body in the Caribbean; and they aspired to retain their 
own separate identity in relation to the other islands. Unlike the economically struggling BVI, the 
Cayman Islands had been relatively prosperous in the 1950s, a situation they were keen to 
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protect.279 Undoubtedly, there was a racial dynamic to Caymanians’ approach to the West Indies 
Federation, which was not apparent in political discourse in the BVI. The white merchant elite in 
Cayman were anxious to retain their control of Caymanian politics and the economy.280 Despite 
clear reservations, the Cayman Islands joined the Federation in 1958, with an ambiguous position 
as a dependency of Jamaica. Shortly after, in 1962, as Jamaica chose independence, the Cayman 
Islands instead elected to become a crown colony and amended their constitution along the lines 
of that of the BVI.281 
 
The attitude of the Caymanian representatives towards Federation reflected both local political 
issues and wider regional developments. Initially, the Cayman Islands appeared happy to join the 
Federation and maintain their association with Jamaica, on the understanding of being allowed 
greater autonomy. On the Governor of Jamaica’s visit to Cayman in 1956, he announced to the 
Assembly that ‘You have local autonomy within your grasp’.282 Furthermore, he encouraged them 
to seek a relationship with other British territories ‘who believe in the same things that you do’, 
promoting Federation as a step towards self-government.283 In response, the ‘Big Four Delegation’, 
of Willie Farrington, Ducan Merren, Ormond Panton and Ernest Panton travelled to Jamaica in 
January 1957 to discuss constitutional change.284 The ‘Big Four’ were all members of the ‘white 
and near-white’ merchant elite, with a conservative, pro-British outlook.285 Ormond Panton was 
the exception: though certainly part of the merchant elite, he was a populist, pro-independence, 
anti-British ‘firebrand’ who earned the nickname ‘Little Busta’ for his reputation for championing 
the interests of the average Caymanian.286  
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As with the British Virgin Islands, the pace of political change in Cayman was accelerated by 
external Federation negotiations.287 The local newspaper announced that the ‘heroic mission’ to 
Jamaica had been a great success and claimed they had ‘not the slightest doubt of the capacity of 
the Caymans and her people to bear the burden of independence’.288 This article may however, 
have overstated Caymanians’ appetite for independence. Most Caymanian representatives 
remained cautious about the Federation and any change to the status quo. In earlier conferences, 
Caymanians had pushed for direct representation as a condition for their joining, but they now 
requested a special status within the Federation.289 However, these issues remained unresolved and 
ultimately the Cayman Islands joined the Federation without direct representation. 290 
 
A vital motivating factor for Caymanians in their approach to the Federation was the wish to retain 
their special relationship to the US. During the war a British commentator in the Cayman Islands 
noted that ‘of recent years many of the islanders have married United States subjects, and in this 
way United States influence is steadily growing’.291 This trend continued after the war when 
improvements in air travel made it easier to fly to and from the US.292 Furthermore, Cayman 
became increasingly dependent on the US for employment opportunities. While the war had 
weakened British naval strength, the American shipping industry thrived. In the 1940s and 1950s 
Caymanians found work with US companies like Daniel K. Ludwig’s shipping line National Bulk 
Carriers.293 Ludwig hired many Caymanians due to their reputation as skilled seamen and because 
they were cheaper than American workers.294  
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Moreover, the US government agreed to a visa waiver concession to anyone with a Caymanian 
passport and no criminal record, strengthening American-Caymanian ties.295 This visa waiver was 
unique to all foreign colonies and is still applicable today.296 Caymanians were anxious not to allow 
anything that would threaten this special status. Hugh Malcolm Coe, a member of the Legislative 
Assembly, wrote vehemently against joining the Federation on the grounds that Cayman’s 
relationship with the US could change.297 But these fears were assuaged when the Governor of 
Jamaica ‘assured that [Cayman’s] "peculiar problems" would receive personal attention and would 
not be lost in the mass of regional problems’, including ‘the special arrangements… for the export 
of… seamen to the US’.298  These major concerns over the Federation did push Caymanian 
political actors to demand a new constitution, which was granted in 1959. For the first time, 
members of the Assembly were elected by universal adult suffrage.299 This was a considerable 
success for women’s rights campaigners who had been agitating for the vote since the end of 
Second World War.300 This new constitution did not, however, resolve Cayman’s ambiguous 
position within the Federation.  
 
The changing relationship between Cayman and Jamaica was another important element in 
Caymanian political discourse. Williams has written extensively on how the Jamaica-Cayman 
Islands relationship changed and developed from the 1940s to the 1960s, as Caymanians who had 
once relied on Jamaica for many essential services and personnel became more hostile.301 These 
sentiments were exacerbated by the popularity of socialism in Jamaica, and leaders like Norman 
Manley and Alexander Bustamante. The Caymanian elite were concerned about the risk of losing 
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their dominance in local politics if socialist ideas became more popular.302 Indeed, when Trinidad 
was announced as the capital of the West Indies Federation in 1957, Caymanians breathed ‘a sigh 
of relief that we will not have the federal centre so close to us that it will intrude upon the 
administration of our affairs’.303 Once the Federation began to separate, the conservative 
Caymanian elite did not like the idea of being a dependency of an independent, socialist Jamaica. 
Significantly, the Administrator Jack Rose only gave Cayman two options: internal self-
government under an independent Jamaica or colony status with Britain.304 Sybil McLaughlin, the 
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, describes how members of the Legislative Assembly were 
presented with the two options, and how this crucial decision was decided by the visiting Governor 
of Jamaica ‘at the longest and loudest clap of hands’.305 Roy McTaggart’s anti-Jamaica speech 
received louder applause than Ormond Panton’s pro-Jamaica speech, sealing Cayman’s fate.306 As 
McLaughlin acknowledges, this was highly irregular and ‘undemocratic, really’.307 The growing 
dislike and suspicion among the Caymanian elite towards Jamaica was therefore crucial in the 
decision to become a crown colony. 
 
The approach of the Caymanian merchant class towards Jamaica and the Federation was greatly 
influenced by racial prejudice. The predominantly white oligarchy feared losing their stranglehold 
on Caymanian politics and the economy if black West Indians from other islands were allowed to 
move freely to the Cayman Islands.308 The political apathy and disenfranchisement of the majority 
of Caymanians allowed the white oligarchy to push their immigration fears to the forefront of 
political debates.309 Their concerns were echoed by Commissioner Andrew Gerrard who told the 
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Assembly in 1955 ‘now is the time to... strengthen the legislation in regard to immigration and 
aliens’.310 Other Caribbean leaders, such as Trinidad’s Chief Minister Eric Williams, made it clear 
that free movement of people was a priority for the Federation, exacerbating unease in the Cayman 
Islands.311 The local newspaper warned of an ‘influx of 100 West Indians into these islands’ if 
Cayman joined the Federation.312 As it was, Cayman’s special status within the Federation meant 
that they retained ‘the right to control entry’ to the islands and full freedom of movement was 
never implemented across the Federation.313 The anti-immigration rhetoric focusing on black 
migrants continued as Cayman renegotiated its relationship with Jamaica. Eldon Kirkconnell, a 
member of the Legislative Assembly, argued that joining an independent Jamaica would have 
meant ‘no protection... we... would have had a free flow of people and couldn’t cope with it, we 
would have been ruined’.314 The underlying suggestion that Jamaican immigrants meant black 
immigrants was evident throughout this political discourse. 
 
Identity issues were significant in Cayman’s approach to the West Indies Federation and decision 
to become a crown colony. In a similar way to the BVI, the Cayman Islands were rather cut off 
from the rest of the British colonies in the Caribbean. Mawby highlights Jamaican isolationism 
after the Second World War.315 Thus it is important to note that Cayman was an isolated outpost 
of an already isolated administrative centre. This is apparent in speeches made at the Cayman 
Legislative Assembly during debates about the Federation. Caymanian politicians expressed their 
fears that the Federation could be a threat to their ‘existence as a distinct entity’.316 In 1961, as it 
became clear that Cayman would have to choose between Britain and Jamaica, this discourse of 
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Caymanian identity became more apparent. Heather McLaughlin, an interviewer for the Cayman 
Islands Memory Bank, suggests that many of the politicians she has spoken to ‘felt that if Cayman 
had gone with Jamaica, that Cayman would have lost its identity’.317 Commissioner Andrew 
Gerrard reinforced this notion, telling the Assembly that the ‘Islands should aim at preserving their 
own identity and their own individuality’.318 
 
Notions of identity expressed during the agreements to cut ties with Jamaica promoted, not only 
the idea of a distinct Caymanian identity, but also an affinity to Britain. This was articulated 
particularly strongly by the Caymanian elite, who saw Cayman as a ‘loyal part of what was once 
the British Empire… not because of any pressure from Great Britain but because the people here 
have always been deeply loyal to the British Crown and would not have it any other way’.319 While 
it remains difficult to establish the strength of this affinity to Britain among the majority of the 
Caymanian population, the powerful sentiments of the white political elite ensured that Cayman’s 
future was directed towards Britain rather than the rest of the Caribbean.320 
 
4. The Legacies of Departmentalisation and Crown Colony Status: A Shift in Focus,  
1947-1969 
Looking ahead to the years after these significant changes, the new political status shaped the 
future decolonisation of these territories. In the decades which followed, these major political 
decisions had three key effects: they further isolated the territories from the rest of the region; they 
shifted political debate away from the question of autonomy; and they encouraged islanders to see 
France and Britain as the solution to current issues. This third factor was evident in pro-French 
and pro-British rhetoric in local newspapers and public debates. Thus, the relationship between 
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identity and politics was central to the processes of decolonisation. These changes were most 
significant for the French Antilles because departmentalisation stalled discussions about 
independence for the following ten to fifteen years. Crown colony status in the BVI and Cayman 
secured British control and shifted the focus towards economic development. 
 
Firstly, their interactions with the West Indies Federation and the timing at which they became 
crown colonies set the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands on a slightly different course 
to most of the British Caribbean colonies. As the West Indies Federation broke up, many of the 
other small states in the Eastern Caribbean were hesitant about full independence and opted 
instead for associated statehood with internal self-government. The 1967 West Indies Act 
formalised this new arrangement for Antigua, Grenada, Saint Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint Lucia 
and Saint Vincent.321 However, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands had only recently 
become crown colonies and were not included in the discussions about a smaller federation in the 
Eastern Caribbean or associated statehood. The British Virgin Islands did establish a ministerial 
system of government in 1967, changing their status from colony to territory, but it was not part 
of the group of associated states.322  
 
A sense of separation from other Caribbean islands influenced BVI and Cayman’s negotiations 
with the West Indies Federation. After becoming crown colonies, this idea of separation was 
amplified. For example, BVI newspapers argued it held a ‘unique position’ in the Eastern 
Caribbean and suggested the BVI ‘stands alone with Britain’.323 Maurer argues that the crown 
colony status ‘helped consolidate BVIslanders as a group distinct from other Caribbean peoples’.324 
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As has been suggested, the Cayman Islands were already geographically isolated from the rest of 
the Caribbean. Becoming a crown colony in the 1960s when independence fervour was spreading 
through the Caribbean exacerbated this isolation from regional political and ideological trends. As 
the French Antilles became increasingly reliant on France for educational and employment 
opportunities, cultural ties with France became ever stronger at the expense of links with the rest 
of the Caribbean. Furthermore, the Antilles became dependent on France for basic foodstuffs and 
external trade was focused almost entirely on metropolitan France.325 Departmentalisation made 
Martinique and Guadeloupe far more economically dependent on France than they had been 
before the Second World War. As a result, all four territories increasingly looked to Europe rather 
than the Caribbean for their future.  
 
Secondly, as well as moving the islands further away from the rest of the British Caribbean, crown 
colony status shifted the political debate in the BVI and Cayman towards a focus on economic 
development. Having gained the perceived greater benefits from closer ties to Britain, many 
politicians and commentators argued that the islands should ensure economic progress before 
further self-government. For example, in a speech in the 1966 constitutional conference, BVI 
politician Ivan Dawson promoted the importance of financial independence, ignoring the question 
of political independence.326 This view was reflected in a Caymanian newspaper editorial in which 
the editor argued ‘We believe the future will be better served by the politicians devoting selfless 
effort to the improvement of these Islands as a Colony of Her Majesty than by trying to selfishly 
bring to themselves more pomp and circumstance and power’.327 Thus crown colony status 
reinforced the idea that economic improvement should come before constitutional development. 
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In the French Antilles, departmentalisation served to shift the debate away from the question of 
autonomy in the 1940s and 1950s. Antillean politicians focused on how best to implement 
departmentalisation and on opposing delays to its application. Though the National Assembly had 
unanimously supported the Assimilation Act and passed it swiftly, implementation was conducted 
with far less haste.328 The Assimilation Act stipulated that all French laws not in effect in the DOMs 
should be applied by 1st January 1947, but policy-makers quickly realised the difficulties apparent 
in applying all French law to these former colonies.329 Furthermore, political changes in 
metropolitan France in the wake of elections in June 1946 meant that achieving greater social and 
economic equality in the DOMs was low on the new government’s list of priorities.330 Legal 
equality was initially delayed until July 1947, and this was then further postponed until January 
1948.331 These deferrals caused increasing unrest and discontent among citizens in the DOMs. 
Once granted equal status through departmentalisation, both the political elite and the general 
public were outraged that as French citizens they were not immediately treated equally. For 
example, in 1948, Césaire told the National Assembly ‘the assimilation which you are offering us 
is but a caricature of that which we demanded’.332 In Martinique, unions demanded pay rises, 
greater social security and employment rights.333 Guadeloupe also saw increased pressure from 
union groups and threats of strike action, prompting the Governors to contact the Secretary of 
State to stress the urgency of the situation.334 
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The fixation on departmentalisation and its implementation was evident in the local press. When 
the government confirmed the second postponement of full legal integration until 1 January 1948, 
local newspapers expressed their dissatisfaction and disillusionment. L’Action newspaper in 
Guadeloupe reported the speech of a local politician, who triumphantly claimed: ‘Nous sommes 
ici en France!’335 To highlight the glaring disparities between the metropole and Guadeloupe, the 
paper responded: ‘Mais quand serons-nous ici… en France, vraiment?’336 The communist 
newspaper, Justice, ran several articles in its Martinique edition bemoaning the delay in 
assimilation.337 Echoing the discourse of the communist speakers in parliament during the March 
debates on departmentalisation, the paper focused on the sacrifices made by Martinican soldiers 
fighting for France in previous wars.338 Having actively contributed to liberating French soil, it 
argued, the people of Martinique had just as much right to the new welfare system as metropolitan 
citizens.339 Once again, the French identity of Martinicans, through shared sacrifice, was central to 
calls for full assimilation. 
 
Departmentalisation also shaped political debates among Antillean students in mainland France. 
Though many expressed anticolonial views and participated in anticolonial campaigns for self-
determination in other colonies, the debate about Martinique and Guadeloupe centred on how 
departmentalisation could be used to ameliorate local issues.340  For example, a 1951 article by 
Louis Achille discussed the duty students had to their communities in the Caribbean to focus on 
improving their islands.341 By the 1960s, students became more radical and the issue of autonomy 
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more pressing, as chapters two and six will discuss. However, the immediate impact of 
departmentalisation was to shift debates away from autonomy. 
 
Thirdly, both departmentalisation and crown colony status were decisive steps involving closer 
association with the colonial power. Naturally, this had implications for local political debates and 
the political discourse relating to France and Britain. In the Cayman Islands, politicians continued 
to promote and espouse pro-British sentiment. For example, a 1965 local newspaper claimed, ‘in 
no other part of the Commonwealth do hearts beat with greater devotion and loyalty for [the 
Queen] who is above all party politics and who stands for the freedom we love and cherish’.342 
This attachment to the Queen and to Britain extended to suggestions that British civil servants 
were better and fairer at governing than any local representatives. Member of the Legislative 
Assembly Annie Bodden argued that ‘there is not one local person... competent, during the past 
ten years, to run the affairs of these Islands... Caymanians should be proud to have someone to 
direct and lead them in the right way without oppression’.343 Similar sentiment was expressed in 
the BVI, with the editor of the only local newspaper maintaining that the ‘presence of the Union 
Jack over us should be a most comforting sight for it is a sign that we are free’.344 It should be 
noted that the managing director of this newspaper was an American who had spent a long time 
in the UK and had a rather paternalistic approach to BVIslanders.345 In certain respects, the closer 
ties to Britain encouraged islanders to see Britain as part of the solution to current issues and this 
was reflected in newspapers and political debates. 
 
Similarly, in Martinique and Guadeloupe, there were many who espoused pro-French rhetoric as 
the islands became more culturally assimilated into the French Republic. For example, the 
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republican Martinican newspaper France Toujours described France as ‘the most noble, the most 
humane and the most generous of Motherlands’.346 It championed the idea of an abolitionist 
France who ‘took care of its Martinican children’.347 More startling is the pro-French discourse of 
anticolonial newspapers like Justice. In one 1958 article on abolitionist Victor Schoelcher, the 
Martinican historian Armand Nicolas defended the importance of the French Republic, arguing 
that Schoelcher was an anticolonialist because he was republican.348 This split position was a 
continuing issue for political activists who were affiliated with French metropolitan political 
parties. These examples highlight how the relationship between identity and politics in the overseas 
territories was transformed by departmentalisation and crown colony status. The legacies of these 
political changes continued to shape the processes of decolonisation for many decades after. 
 
Conclusion 
The Second World War was, of course, a defining moment in Caribbean history. It prompted the 
four territories in question to reconsider their position in the region, relative to the other islands, 
to Europe and to the US. Like most colonies around the world, these islands sought to improve 
their situation through a change in political status in the postwar years. Unusually, perhaps, they 
chose a closer association with France and Britain, rather than greater autonomy. However, as this 
chapter has highlighted, this development was not anachronistic but part of a broader experience 
of decolonisation that encompasses the many options debated at the time, including greater 
political representation through a stronger relationship with the colonial power. 
 
Local politicians were motivated by a desire to alleviate the poverty, inequality and 
underdevelopment in their islands. This is less apparent in the Cayman Islands where the merchant 
elite was anxious to maintain its dominance in the Assembly. In both the British Virgin Islands 
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and the Cayman Islands, fears over immigration made the West Indies Federation seem a less 
appealing option. This was of particular concern for the predominantly white politicians in the 
Cayman Islands, whose racial prejudice made them uneasy about a possible influx of black West 
Indians from other islands. Notions of race were influential in Martinique and Guadeloupe too, 
where the black and mixed-race middle class hoped that departmentalisation would help them to 
thwart the power of the white planter Békés. While Cayman and the BVI were keen to conserve 
their links with the US, politicians in Martinique and Guadeloupe feared annexation by a racially 
segregated United States.  
 
A striking similarity in approaches to political developments across the four territories is noticeable 
in the way discontent with colonialism was directed towards and associated with authority figures 
or organisations in the Caribbean, whilst Britain and France were mostly portrayed as benevolent 
and impartial. Having both been administered by other colonies in the region, the British Virgin 
Islands and the Cayman Islands were eager to establish a direct link with the Colonial Office. 
Dissatisfaction with the colonial government was almost always blamed on local administrators or 
officials on the ground, rather than on Britain. This trend continued after the two territories 
became crown colonies. Meanwhile, in Martinique and Guadeloupe anticolonial sentiment was 
levelled at the Békés, not the French Republic, as one editorial declared: ‘Martinicans can count on 
the people of France, our surest ally, which is not to be confused with the colonialist bandits who 
govern here in the name of France’.349 Fundamentally, this sense of affinity with the metropole 
among the political class of the territories underpinned both departmentalisation and the adoption 
of crown colony status. Though not the most significant motivating factor for local politicians, the 
fact that those with the power to effect change locally expressed a kinship with France or Britain 
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shifted the nature of political debate. The perceived affinity of the local population also influenced 
colonial officials and representatives when they accepted the proposed changes to political status. 
 
A marked conservatism among local politicians was evident, particularly in the British territories. 
In the French Antilles, even socialist representatives seemed wary of cutting ties with France. This 
was intensified by departmentalisation and the move to become crown colonies. Any future 
negotiations towards greater autonomy would involve stepping back from these new political 
statuses and the perceived privileges that they provided. As later chapters will show, in the decades 
following these changes to political status, considerable political energy was spent discussing 
economic and social improvements in light of the new political situation. While debates about self-
determination continued, these early changes had altered the political landscape. Steps towards 
greater autonomy would be increasingly difficult to promote, particularly in the French Antilles. 
 
Crucially, departmentalisation and crown colony status meant that any future political negotiations 
were made from a position of greater closeness to the metropolitan power, and further separation 
from the rest of the Caribbean. As the involvement of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin 
Islands in the West Indies Federation has demonstrated, local political debates were often sparked 
by wider regional and global changes. This will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, 
















Decolonisation and the Global Cold War: 
The US, the Cuban Revolution and Anticolonial Mobilisation 
 
 
The first chapter of this thesis assessed the major changes to political status that occurred in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. This chapter will broaden the perspective out to embrace a 
global context by applying the lens of the Cold War to decolonisation in the overseas territories. 
It will explore to what extent local politics was influenced by global dynamics related to the Cold 
War, such as so-called ‘Third Worldism’.350 This intersection with the Cold War again illustrates 
how the territories were a part of the global history of the twentieth century. 
 
As with many regions of the world that decolonised after the Second World War, the Caribbean 
was affected by the international Cold War environment. Yet, apart from the literature assessing 
the impact of the Cuban Revolution, the Caribbean region receives little attention in traditional 
Cold War studies. Indeed, collections on the Cold War such as The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War 
tend to include a section on Latin America, covering Cuba, but rarely the Caribbean as a region.351 
This appears to be because, for the most part, the Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean did 
not experience significant intervention from the Cold War superpowers before 1980. Though 
outside the scope of this study, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 is frequently cited as the 
defining moment of the Cold War in the Anglophone Caribbean.352 Mawby, in his analysis of 
British policymaking in the West Indies, suggests that the Cold War was not central to decision 
making, with the exception of a brief ‘McCarthyite panic’ in 1952-1953. 353 This was typified by the 
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British response to Ferdinand Smith, a Jamaican communist, and his connections to certain global 
Trade Union organisations.354 This time frame also includes the 1953 overthrowing of Cheddi 
Jagan’s democratically elected government in Guyana, which revealed the lengths to which Britain 
would go to prevent the possibility of a communist state in the Commonwealth Caribbean.355 
Within a traditional top-down understanding of the Cold War, centring around the actions of the 
two superpowers, the Cold War context appears less important for decolonisation in the 
Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean. 
 
However, a more nuanced perspective presents the Cold War as a global process which intersected 
with other twentieth century phenomena, particularly decolonisation and Third Worldism. This is 
reflected in more recent approaches to the global Cold War, which show how the Cold War shaped 
local conflicts over decolonisation and, in some cases, drastically transformed them.356 Indeed, 
Arne Westad argues that local elites in colonies and former colonies often constructed their 
political agendas in response to the development models presented by the United States and the 
Soviet Union.357 Building on Westad’s historiographical intervention, Leslie James and Elizbeth 
Leake have argued for a common history of decolonisation and the Cold War, as part of a ‘broader 
moment of intertwined, if sometimes paradoxical, local and global change’.358 Certainly, the 
dynamics of the Cold War influenced many Caribbean leaders in the fallout from the collapse of 
the West Indies Federation.359 For the overseas territories, the Cold War was not the most 
significant factor shaping political debates, but it did influence metropolitan decision-makers and 
local elites. 
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This chapter will argue that decolonisation in the overseas territories needs to be understood in 
the context of the global Cold War. The significance of the Cold War for local political 
developments was episodic, only occasionally coming to the forefront of debates. However, the 
battle between capitalism and communism remained an ideational spectrum within which local 
elites positioned themselves, and the international environment of the Cold War influenced the 
approach of the metropolitan states.360 In assessing the global political context, this chapter will 
firstly analyse the impact of the US in the Caribbean region. This was not a new phenomenon 
rooted in the Cold War, but instead American interests in the Caribbean had been growing since 
the nineteenth century. However, by the 1950s, US foreign policy in the region was increasingly 
shaped by Cold War concerns. 
 
Secondly, this chapter will consider the impact of the Cuban Revolution, which heightened Cold 
War tensions in the region. The Cold War backdrop influenced decolonisation, most significantly 
through the impact it had on independence groups and activists. Given that most pro-
independence groups were left-wing and often communist, European colonial governments were 
warier and less likely to negotiate with them. As a result, this restricted the debate about 
independence. Advocates of change who seriously challenged the status quo in any way found 
themselves smeared as communist by both local and metropolitan figures. The Cuban Revolution 
was a key moment in the Cold War in the Caribbean, drastically altering US foreign policy in the 
region. The Revolution had a huge impact across the Caribbean and was particularly influential in 
French Antillean local activism in the 1950s and 1960s.361 Furthermore, the non-independent 
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status of these territories assisted efforts on the part of France, Britain and the US to maintain 
strategic control in the region and prevent the emergence of more communist states.  
 
Finally, this chapter will consider a factor linked to the Cold War: anticolonial movements, the 
Non-Aligned Movement and Third Worldism. These interconnected projects reflect the ways that 
colonised and formerly colonised peoples engaged with the processes of decolonisation and the 
Cold War in order to imagine alternative futures. Engagement with these ideas is more apparent 
in the French Antilles, but certain activists and intellectuals in the British territories also 
participated in transnational exchanges of anticolonial thinking. Though projects like the Non-
Aligned Movement directly addressed the Cold War divide, anticolonialism was rooted in interwar 
and earlier intellectual movements and networks. It built on earlier developments, rather than 
simply being a Cold War, post Second World War affair. Thus, although often intertwined with 
Cold War dynamics, these various anticolonial and anti-imperial mobilisations should not be seen 
as a solely Cold War phenomenon. Overall, these different factors reveal how decolonisation in 
the overseas territories was influenced by the global political and ideological context. 
 
Given the importance of the Cuban Revolution and the prevalence of anti-communist rhetoric in 
government reports, local media and political debates, it can be tempting to overemphasise the 
importance of the Cold War in Caribbean decolonisation. As the Anglophone and Francophone 
Caribbean did not experience a major ‘flashpoint’ in the Cold War before 1980, the significance of 
the Cold War will be acknowledged but not overstated.362 Nonetheless, this chapter will 
demonstrate that the overseas territories were part of the twentieth century global history of 
decolonisation and the Cold War. 
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1. The Role of the US in the Caribbean Region 
As a relatively new colonial power in the Caribbean, the US played an important role as a cultural 
and ideological counterpoint to the metropolitan governments of Britain and France. The previous 
chapter detailed how the US was of increasing importance for the Caribbean territories in the 
twentieth century, particularly during the Second World War. US intervention in the Caribbean 
was a historical dynamic rooted in the nineteenth century, rather than a new Cold War 
phenomenon.363 The nature of US interest in the Caribbean changed in 1898 with the Spanish-
American War.364 US victory led to the temporary occupation of Cuba and the acquisition of 
Puerto Rico. American intervention in the region continued with the occupation of Haiti in 1915, 
the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916 and the annexation of the Virgin Islands from 
Denmark in 1917. The purchase of the newly named Virgin Islands of the United States was 
particularly significant for nearby BVI. However, after the Second World War, US foreign policy 
in the Caribbean was primarily influenced by Cold War concerns. The 1954 CIA-backed coup in 
Guatemala marked the first significant US intervention in the Caribbean and Latin American 
region.365 The possibility of annexation by the US was debated in local Caribbean politics, 
sometimes through a Cold War lens, and at other times, especially in the BVI, it was more a 
question of local inter-island relationships. 
 
The French Antilles 
Though much of the historiography of the French Antilles focuses on their relationship with 
France, Childers argues for viewing the Atlantic space as a field of different influences in which 
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the US is a key component.366 In the aftermath of World War II, fear of American encroachment 
persuaded some that departmentalisation was the only way to prevent US annexation.367 After 
departmentalisation, the influence of the US persisted through the number of Antilleans who 
moved there for study or work, and the prospect of annexation continued to feature in political 
debates about the future of Martinique and Guadeloupe. For example, in a 1968 debate about the 
question of autonomy, trade unionists and members of pro-autonomy groups argued that 
‘American imperialism is a present danger’.368 Some commentators expressed the fear that stepping 
away from France completely would leave Guadeloupe open to American interference.369 It 
certainly influenced the debate among the Left in the Antilles about autonomy and independence. 
It exacerbated divisions among different political groups, hindered the chance of a united left-wing 
coalition on the question of political status, and increased fears about the vulnerability of the 
Antilles if they became independent. 
 
Given the popularity of communism in the French Antilles, the fear of US intervention if the 
islands became independent was not unfounded. Indeed, CIA memoranda in 1948 demonstrate 
US concerns about communist activity in Guadeloupe.370 Having gained forty-five percent of the 
votes in the 1946 elections, the Communist Party of Guadeloupe was apparently ‘fully capable of 
creating disorders among the native populace’.371 The US feared that communist agitators would 
use the upcoming West Indian Conference to agitate and discredit the conference.372 Concerns by 
the US about communism, disorder and the possibility of radical action in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe continued throughout the period in question, especially after the Cuban Revolution. 
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CIA reports referred to the islands as ‘France’s discontented stepchildren’ and criticised French 
‘inertia’ over local demands for internal autonomy.373 US intervention in Grenada in 1983 affirmed, 
to a certain extent, claims by the Guadeloupean and Martinican Left that the US might step in if 
France no longer controlled the islands. 
 
The British Territories 
In comparison, the British territories had a closer relationship to the US, geographically, culturally 
and politically. In the Cayman Islands, the geographical proximity of the US and the fact that 
Caymanians had a special visa waiver meant that Cayman-US relations deepened in the 1950s and 
1960s. The significant economic change which made Cayman more prosperous in the 1950s was 
to a considerable degree due to American financing. Caymanian families were increasingly 
dependent on remittances from relatives working on American ships. This cultivated the 
relationship to the US and American culture, as many Caymanians purchased consumer goods 
from the US with their newfound disposable income.374 Cayman became less isolated in this period 
and, by the end of 1954, six passenger services a week had been established, reaching destinations 
such as Kingston and Miami.375 By the late 1960s, the Caymanian economy had transformed from 
the dependence on remittances from workers on US ships to the burgeoning tourism and financial 
sectors.376 Again, these two sectors were heavily reliant on American tourists and businesses, 
strengthening US ties. 
 
Furthermore, this special connection to the US, particularly the visa waiver, was an important 
concern for Caymanian politicians in the 1950s and early 1960s. As the previous chapter revealed, 
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in debates about the West Indies Federation and the future of Cayman’s political status, 
maintaining the special visa waiver was a primary concern for Caymanians. This issue fed into the 
decision to split away from Jamaica as it became independent. Caymanian politician Norman 
Bodden suggested that the visa waiver was central to the decision to become a crown colony in 
1962.377 Harry McCoy, a senior civil servant, concurred with Bodden, arguing ‘we would have lost 
this concession of being able to go to the United States’.378 Thus, the connection with the US 
influenced key political decisions about how to decolonise in the Cayman Islands.  
 
Likewise, the BVI maintained close links to the US throughout the postwar period and into the 
1980s. Despite being distinct political entities for most of the past three hundred years, the BVI 
and USVI, formerly the Danish West Indies, remained interconnected and were often described 
as one larger socioeconomic entity.379 BVIslanders relied on employment opportunities in St 
Thomas, during and after the Second World War, and this dependency continued into the 1960s. 
The tourism boom in the USVI in the 1960s came as a direct result of the Cuban Revolution, as 
American tourists looked elsewhere for beach holidays. In 1960, sixteen percent of BVIslanders 
worked in the USVI, and many found jobs in the expanding tourism sector.380 Furthermore, many 
BVIslanders had family in the US Virgin Islands.381 As a result, amalgamation with the USVI was 
prevalent in political debates throughout the 1960s and 1970s. For example, a 1972 Island Sun 
editorial questioned ‘Will It Ever Jell?’ wondering whether unification would occur in the following 
few years.382 The USVI Senator Earl B. Ottley argued in favour of unification on the basis of 
‘ethnic, geographic and economic factors’.383 The subject was brought up later in 1972 in an 
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editorial on ‘The question of one Virgin Islands’.384 At times, this focus on the question of 
amalgamation in political debates side-lined the issue of independence. 
 
To encourage cooperation between the two groups and to deal with the many matters of mutual 
concern, the Inter-Virgin Islands Conference was established in 1951 and continued through the 
1960s.385 After it was discontinued, there were attempts to revive it in 1970, eventually leading to 
the establishment of the BVI-USVI Friendship Day in 1971.386 During the fourth annual 
Friendship Day celebrations, the Governor of the USVI ‘expressed the hope for greater co-
operation’ suggesting it could ‘ultimately lead to unity of both groups of islands under one flag’.387 
The subject of amalgamation was also raised many times over the decades by British officials as a 
solution to the political status issue. For example, Administrator Thomson described the BVI as 
‘hanging on the coat-tails of St Thomas’ and thought the British Government ‘should open 
negotiations with the United States Government for the disposal of the islands to the United 
States’.388 However, by the end of his administration Thomson believed he had strengthened ties 
to Britain and this should be maintained instead of pushing annexation by the US.389 Through 
encouraging a focus on amalgamation, American influence in the BVI skewed the perspective of 
British officials, as well as local politicians, about the question of independence. 
 
The influence of the US shaped debates about decolonisation across the four overseas territories. 
In the French Antilles, politicians feared the threat of annexation by the US in the 1940s. They 
were concerned that joining a racially segregated US would threaten the rights of black Antilleans. 
This added to the impetus to departmentalise in 1946 in order to avoid this eventuality. In the 
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Cayman Islands, on the other hand, discussions about the political future, especially in relation to 
the West Indies Federation, were shaped by the desire of the Cayman elite to protect the US special 
visa waiver. In the French Antilles and the Cayman Islands, the influence of the US was perceived 
locally through a Cold War lens. This was particularly potent in Martinique and Guadeloupe where 
the popularity of communism encouraged anti-American sentiment. In Cayman, on the other 
hand, anti-communist attitudes strengthened the US connection. 
 
In the BVI, it was not a desire for access to the US economy but the question of political 
amalgamation which generated most debate and speculation. Unlike the French Antilles, the 
possibility of annexation was mostly seen in a positive light in the BVI. It deflected political 
attention away from the subject of independence, as BVIslanders considered merging with the US 
Virgin Islands. This was the most significant factor in the process of decolonisation in the Virgin 
Islands, absorbing considerable political energy. In this instance, the role of the US in local political 
debates was not generally interpreted through a Cold War lens, but was more an issue of BVI-
USVI unity. Therefore, the American influence in the Caribbean territories, though not always 
principally a Cold War phenomenon, was pertinent throughout the period in question and helped 
to shape debates about decolonisation. 
 
2. The Cuban Revolution 
The clearest manifestation of the Cold War in the Caribbean was – of course – the Cuban 
Revolution. The Revolution had a sweeping and drastic impact on the Caribbean region, bringing 
with it the call for rebellion against US-backed governments, anti-Americanism, and Cuba's 
movement toward communism and alliance with the Soviet Union.390 It prompted both awe and 
fear in politicians and officials across the Caribbean. The threat of a similar armed uprising 
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occurring in a French or British colony greatly alarmed colonial officials, particularly in the French 
Antilles where the local communist parties were popular. For independence activists, it stood as a 
beacon of hope that change could be achieved against the odds. The four overseas territories did 
not experience major intervention from the US or Soviet Union and thus could be seen as isolated 
from this Cold War experience of many post-colonial states. However, in reality the Cold War 
crept into policy decisions and debates about the future of the territories, making them very much 
part of this global phenomenon. 
 
The Cayman Islands 
The impact of the Cuban Revolution was not the most decisive factor in explaining the 
decolonisation of the Cayman Islands and their current non-independent status. The monopoly 
of the merchant elite over politics and the economy, and their expressed affinity for British rule 
and Britishness held greater sway over local politics.391 Nonetheless, the proximity of Cuba and 
the Cold War context undoubtedly had a degree of influence. The British monitored the threat of 
communist activity in the Cayman Islands because of its strategic location so close to the US and 
Cuba.392 The US remained concerned about Cuban planes with refugees landing in Cayman 
containing ‘Communist agents heading for Latin America’.393 It has also been suggested that the 
CIA held bank accounts in the Cayman Islands in order to transfer funds anonymously for the 
purchase of arms during the Cold War.394 The Cayman Islands evidently held a certain geographical 
importance for the Cold War in the Caribbean. 
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The Cayman Islands gained greater international significance when several anti-Castro Cuban 
planes landed in Grand Cayman during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by the US.395 This 
created a potentially difficult diplomatic situation between Britain and the US because Britain 
initially seized the planes.396 The suggestion was made that Castro might think Britain was assisting 
with the invasion and allowing Cayman to be used as a launching point.397 The CIA report is 
redacted but implies that the US had the ‘unofficial blessing of the British Government’ to use 
Cayman for emergency landings.398 The British Commissioner at the time, Jack Rose, described 
discovering four American aircraft with Cuban markings at the airport in Grand Cayman with ‘a 
few bullet holes, but nothing serious’.399 Rose was concerned to find the planes loaded with 
‘rockets, bombs and machine guns’ and ‘the rocket and machine gun controls were still on ‘Fire’’.400 
The CIA arrived in the night to assist with the situation and little news of the incident got out.401 
The aircraft were returned to the US without major difficulty.402 The covering up of the incident 
makes it hard to judge its impact at a local level. At an international level, it appears that Britain 
remained wary of openly allowing the US to use British territories in its actions against Cuba, 
though they may have unofficially permitted it. Britain allowed Cold War considerations to 
influence their approach to the Cayman Islands and Caymanian decolonisation. 
 
The proximity of Cuba to the Cayman Islands, just 185 miles away, was of great significance when 
it came to Caymanian approaches to communism. Historically, Cayman had strong links to Cuba, 
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with many Caymanians settling in Cuba when faced with economic hardship in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Cayman maintained particularly close links to the Isle of Pines (now the 
Isle of Youth), where many Caymanians had settled, and there were frequent boats between the 
two in the early twentieth century.403 Following the Cuban Revolution, fear of communist ideas 
spreading to Cayman was prevalent among the merchant elite and British officials. Although 
communism did not appear a natural inclination for the traditional, religious and conservative 
Caymanian society, any hint of communism was attacked and quashed. Branding someone a 
communist was used to discredit political opponents and anyone seen to be disturbing the status 
quo. It was a useful tool for the merchant elite to maintain their power. Roy Bodden, for example, 
a teacher in the 1970s and more recently the President of the University College of the Cayman 
Islands (2009-2018), was subject to considerable opposition and slander when he publicly 
questioned the power of the merchants and the political status of Cayman in 1978.404 At the time, 
he was openly critical of the merchant elite and wrote several articles in the local newspaper 
examining the problems caused by Cayman’s continued colonial status. As a result, he was labelled 
a communist and found it difficult to gain employment, forcing him to move overseas for further 
study and work.405 This was a common experience for those who spoke out against the status quo. 
 
Fear of communism was also used to restrict press activity in the islands. The editors of the 
newspapers The Northwester and The Caymanian Compass found themselves the object of criticism, 
censorship and restrictions because their editorial policies conflicted with that of some of the 
Executive and Legislative Assembly members.406 Firstly, four members of the Executive Council 
wrote to The Caymanian Compass to complain about stories in the paper covering news from 
 
403 Dr. Elsa Cummings, interview, 13 December 2002, 4, CINA; Harwell (Harry) McCoy, Snr, interview, 30 
April 1991, 7-8, CINA; Gloris Rolando, Cherished Island Memories: A History of Cubans and Cayman 
Islanders (2007), documentary film. 
404 Roy Bodden, ‘Colonialism's curbs; party politics' failure, and future problems', The Northwester, September 
1978, 36-42. 
405 Roy Bodden, Caymanian historian, in interview with the author, Grand Cayman, 14 July 2016. 
406 Editorial, The Northwester, October 1978, 5. 
 100 
‘Communist or socialist countries’.407 The members were apparently angry because the paper had 
included reports on Cuba and Guyana which they described as ‘propaganda’.408 The inclusion of 
Roy Bodden’s 1978 article in The Northwester attracted the ire of Executive Council member Haig 
Bodden who labelled the editor ‘socialist’.409 Fellow Executive Council member Truman Bodden 
also attacked the paper, suggesting that ‘evil forces’ were at play in Caymanian society ‘threatening 
to wreck Cayman's peaceful way of life’.410 He later accused The Northwester of being communist 
because they appeared to disagree with his education policy.411 An editorial in the paper in July 
1979 alleged that the persecution of The Northwester had continued and a member of the Executive 
Council, whom they did not name, had blocked the editors from taking a Cayman Airways flight.412 
The use of ‘communist’ as a slur against anyone who disagreed with the political establishment 
was not unique to Cayman during the Cold War. However, Cayman’s close proximity to Cuba 
made accusations particularly potent. 
 
In this context, it is perhaps surprising that Cayman accepted Cuban refugees for two decades 
following the revolution. Indeed, it was one of the few islands in the region to accept Cuban 
refugees in the 1970s.413 In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, some Caymanians found 
themselves stuck in Cuba and struggled to return to the Cayman Islands.414 The Legislative 
Assembly allowed Cubans to continue to arrive in Cayman. This caused a degree of conflict for 
the British Government who chose not to get involved in the issue. Hostility towards communism 
led many Caymanians to object to the arrival of Cuban refugees. They protested at the Grand 
Cayman airport and tried to block flights from Cuba from landing. Yet Cubans continued to arrive 
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in Cayman by boat. The Northwester portrayed this as a victory for anti-communist Cayman, 
suggesting ‘From their island of despair, Cubans come to our isle of hope’.415 For many 
Caymanians, communist Cuba was both an object of fear and a point of comparison used to 
promote and venerate the Cayman Islands. 
 
Furthermore, the spectre of ‘chaotic’ Cuba became significant in debates about self-government 
in Cayman in the 1960s.416 One Caymanian living in Canada warned readers of Tradewinds that 
Cayman was ‘next-door neighbours to a country which is notorious for recklessness and 
irresponsibility - CUBA’.417 She went on to argue that ‘Cuba remains chaotic after generations of 
"self-rule" and political experience’.418 In his quest for self-government in the 1960s, Ormond 
Panton had to be very careful about not seeming too radical for fear of being labelled a 
communist.419 Given that the most significant push for self-government came in 1962, not long 
after the Cuban Revolution, this post-Revolution context may have encouraged Caymanians and 
British officials to be more cautious. 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
Likewise, in the British Virgin Islands, the Cuban Revolution encouraged anti-communist rhetoric 
and this was certainly the clearest impact of the Cold War for decolonisation in the BVI. Anti-
communism was used by local politicians to slander opponents, as well as by British intelligence 
and officials to criticise agitators and pro-independence activists. One contributor to The Island Sun 
suggested that the writer of a piece encouraging independence should be sent ‘to Fidel Castro's 
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land for insulting the intelligence of British Virgin Islanders’.420 Like in Cayman, Cuba was evoked 
in debates about decolonisation and used as a warning of the perils of independence. 
 
The Cuban Revolution was met with interest in the BVI but, like Cayman, BVIslanders tended to 
be conservative and communism was not popular. The local newspaper Tortola Times broke the 
news of the Revolution by contrasting events in Cuba with the ‘peaceful and calm conditions that 
prevail in the British Virgin Islands’.421 The editorial argued ‘We do not have a 'Castro' like Cuba 
for the plain and simple reason no one like that is needed here’.422 Despite the perceived low level 
risk of ‘communist subversion’ in the BVI, the British Government remained wary about relations 
with Cuba.423 For example, the Commonwealth Office refused to allow Cuban tobacco experts to 
visit the islands in 1967.424 The Administrator’s request for the visit was deemed ‘unacceptable’ 
and the visas for the Cuban experts were denied.425 This shows that even in islands where 
communism was not particularly popular, Britain was cautious about allowing contact with Cuba, 
partly as a result of US pressure. 
 
During this period, the British government monitored any ‘radical’ persons or groups through the 
lens of a communist threat, even more so after the Cuban Revolution. For example, one of the 
leaders of the 1968 Positive Action protest movement, Walter Lindy deCastro, was under constant 
surveillance after his involvement in the protests became known. He was a vocal advocate of 
independence and spoke out against the government and British rule. As a result, the British were 
concerned about his ability to generate unrest. Intelligence reports claimed that deCastro was not 
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thought to be communist, ‘though he frequently uses typical communist expressions’.426 He 
apparently did not ‘appear to have any direct links with any subversive or Communist group in the 
US’.427 However, Britain was concerned that he received ‘racialist literature from [the US], and also 
from Africa’.428  
 
The fallout from the Cuban Revolution greatly influenced British approaches to independence 
activists and anyone calling for change. They automatically viewed activists in terms of whether 
they would pose a communist or revolutionary threat, often blurring the lines between these two 
and not making it clear what they defined as ‘subversive’. The Cold War encouraged Britain to be 
even more suspicious and cautious towards advocates of change. The British approach of 
engineering a decolonisation that favoured Britain-friendly, anti-communist governments was 
given greater impetus by the Cold War context. 
 
The French Antilles 
The Cuban Revolution was hugely significant for the French Antilles. Communism was popular 
in the islands well before the Revolution, especially after the Second World War. The Revolution 
had a considerable impact on the quest for independence because all the main pro-independence 
parties and groups which sprang up in the 1960s were openly Marxist. This not only gave France 
a greater excuse to monitor and imprison activists, but it also reduced the likelihood of France 
allowing an open debate or negotiations with these groups. The French intelligence services 
monitored all local political meetings, debates and assemblies. Any communist politicians or 
members were subject to increased scrutiny.429 Furthermore, anti-communist campaigns among 
right-wing groups and the right-wing press were prevalent throughout the postwar period. For 
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example, La Vérité, a Guadeloupean journal established in 1952, dubbed itself the ‘Guadeloupean 
mouthpiece for the fight against communism’.430 Like the British territories, anti-communist 
campaigns were used to smear political opponents. 
 
Before the Cuban Revolution, the Cold War influenced decolonisation in the French Antilles 
through the clashes and conflicts within the local and international communist parties. Aimé 
Césaire famously split from the communist party in 1956 after the Soviet Union crushed the 
Hungarian Revolution.431 In his letter of resignation to Maurice Thorez, the leader of the French 
party, Césaire criticised the party’s ‘unwillingness to condemn Stalin’.432 He highlighted the abuse 
Yugoslavia received from the Soviet Union ‘for the crime of having asserted its will to 
independence’ as another reason for his resignation.433 Césaire further denounced the French 
Communist Party for ‘their inveterate assimilationism’ and ‘their fairly simplistic faith… in the 
omnilateral superiority of the West’.434 Césaire specifically blamed the narrowness of the 
Communist Party and its inability to deal with the particular nature and problems of Martinique 
as a reason for leaving. Unrestricted by the communist determination to remain bound to France, 
this could have been a moment for Césaire to direct Martinique towards greater autonomy or 
independence. It did allow for a widening of the debate, as Césaire’s Martinican Progressive Party, 
established in 1958, aimed to deal with the ‘Martinican situation’ and argued in favour of greater 
autonomy. However, Césaire never went as far as calling for full independence. 
 
Both the Cuban Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split caused further divisions among communist 
politicians and activists in the French Antilles. The communist parties in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe approached these issues with an inflexibility that led to increased tensions among 
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their membership.435 Those who drew inspiration from Mao or Castro felt increasingly alienated, 
as the Martinican and Guadeloupean communist parties continued to toe the Soviet line.436 
GONG (the National Organisation Group of Guadeloupe) was one of the many pro-autonomy 
and pro-independence groups to follow Maoist teachings and, as a result, to clash with the 
Guadeloupean communist party. Some members of GONG travelled to China to meet Mao in 
1964.437 International debates among communists during the Cold War exacerbated divisions in 
the local communist parties in the Antilles, distracting from discussions about autonomy and 
independence. 
 
Out of the four territories, the Cuban Revolution was arguably most significant for Martinique 
and Guadeloupe. Cuba held symbolic importance for communist and pro-independence groups 
like GONG. Their Guadeloupean flag resembled the Cuban flag, with green rather than blue 
stripes. Guadeloupean historian Mérion suggests that it was only after the Tricontinental 
conference in 1966, which members of GONG attended, that Cuba became more central to 
GONG’s message.438 In the 1960s, over half the population of Guadeloupe was under twenty and 
Cuba was hugely influential in this young society.439 Connections to Cuba were reinforced through 
family ties from inter-Caribbean migration, through the popularity of Cuban music and dance, 
and, most significantly, through the romanticisation of the Cuban Revolution by a disenfranchised 
youth seeking to challenge authority.440 The French security services greatly feared the power of 
an organisation like GONG to harness the pro-Cuban sentiment among this important segment 
of the Guadeloupean population. This view was shared by the Prefect of Guadeloupe who 
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perceived the enthusiasm generated by the Tricontinental conference, combined with the 
geographical proximity to Cuba and the growing agitation in Guadeloupe, to be ‘a direct threat to 
the French departments of the Caribbean and to their national status’.441 
 
Cuba had a wider influence on Antillean nationalism and student activism in metropolitan France. 
The events and debates from the Tricontinental conference were discussed with enthusiasm by 
Antillean student organisations in mainland France. Alizés, the anticolonialist Christian journal, 
labelled Havana as the capital of the revolutionary Third World, and highlighted the importance 
of an ‘armed struggle’ for a Cuban style revolution.442 Interestingly, though its coverage mentioned 
the presence of Guadeloupeans and Martinicans at the conference, it did not discuss GONG’s 
resolution on Guadeloupean independence, perhaps for fear of censorship.443 Trade unionists and 
independence activists interviewed by the journal saw Cuba as the example for the French Antilles 
to follow.444 They argued ‘the people see Cuba and they smile’.445 The focus on emulating a Cuban-
style armed struggle caused divisions among Guadeloupean activists in the 1970s. Nationalists 
fragmented into those who pursued more radical violent action, and those who focused on 
generating Maoist-style populism through the politicisation of agricultural workers.446 
 
The French Antilles had a strategic significance for Franco-American and Franco-Cuban relations 
during the Cold War. In the late 1960s, Cuba attempted to forge closer connections in the 
Caribbean region, initially having greatest success with the French departments. Cuban actions in 
the French Antilles corresponds with recent research suggesting a shift in Cuba’s Latin American 
relations in the late 1960s.447 Several Cuban delegations visited Martinique and Guadeloupe, and 
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Cuban merchant ships stopped regularly at the French islands.448 Despite Cuba’s anti-imperialist 
rhetoric, it did not directly challenge France’s control of Martinique and Guadeloupe in the 1960s. 
However, this changed in the late 1970s: a statement by the Cuban delegation to the UN in 1979 
argued that the ‘colonial presence’ in the Caribbean should be eliminated.449 This was accompanied 
by Cuban efforts at strengthening their relationship with left-wing groups in the French Antilles 
and fostering sporting and cultural links, such as the Guadeloupe-Cuba and Martinique-Cuba 
associations. France remained wary of these developments and any activists with ties to Cuba or 
visiting Cuba were carefully monitored.450 
 
Evidently, the Cuban Revolution had an impact on the processes of decolonisation in the overseas 
territories. This was most evident in the French Antilles, as Marxist independence activists were 
directly inspired by the Revolution and some sought to emulate Castro’s armed struggle. However, 
anti-communist fears from the French State intensified the surveillance and restrictions placed on 
pro-independence and left-wing activists. Anti-communism on the part of the state was also 
apparent in the British territories. Moreover, it was employed by local politicians and 
commentators in both the British and French territories to criticise opponents. 
 
3. Anticolonial networks and the ‘Third World’ project 
A third global political dynamic, closely entwined with the Cold War, is the development of 
transnational anticolonial movements, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the various 
strands of Third World solidarity in the second half of the twentieth century. Activists and 
commentators in the overseas territories engaged with these ideas and networks, though their 
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engagement varied considerably and also developed over time. By late 1970s, the increase in living 
standards in these territories compared to other independent states around them, led some to see 
themselves as separate from the so-called Third World. 
 
The French Antilles 
French Antillean students and activists were heavily involved in the development of anticolonial 
networks in the immediate postwar era, particularly in Paris. Martinican intellectuals were central 
to the development of twentieth century anticolonial thought. Aimé Césaire, for example, was one 
of the founders of the interwar intellectual movement Négritude and his 1950 essay Discourse on 
Colonialism was a powerful denunciation of European colonialism and the ‘civilising mission’.451 
Frantz Fanon was also an important figure in twentieth century anticolonialism through his 
writings on decolonisation and his involvement in the Algerian War. He advocated violence as a 
means to achieve decolonisation and inspired independence movements for several decades after 
his death.452 His biographer, David Macey, described him as ‘the most famous spokesman of a 
Third Worldism, which held that the future of socialism… was no longer in the hands of the 
proletariat of the industrialised countries, but in those of the dispossessed wretched of the earth’.453 
Césaire and Fanon are perhaps the two most famous French Caribbean intellectuals who 
participated in the global twentieth century struggle against colonialism, but many other students 
and activists from Martinique and Guadeloupe engaged in transnational Third World campaigns. 
 
Antillean engagement in Third World activism in the 1950s was not straightforward. While some 
students in Paris participated in anticolonial groups calling for independence in other colonies, the 
debate about the future of the Antilles tended to focus on how departmentalisation could be better 
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adapted in order to improve living conditions in the Caribbean.454 Alizés, the newspaper for the 
Antillean-Guianese Federation of Catholic Students (FAGEC) began in 1951 and was published 
throughout the period in question, making it a useful window into perspectives from Antillean 
students in the metropole. In earlier editions of Alizés, many students focused on the best way to 
implement departmentalisation and embraced it as a workable solution to issues in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe.455 Meanwhile, in April 1955, Third World leaders from Asia and Africa met in 
Bandung, Indonesia to promote anticolonialism and Third World cooperation.456 It is difficult to 
judge the impact of Bandung among Antillean students, perhaps because much of the discussion 
remained around how to improve departmentalisation.457 
 
However, the 1960s generation of students were more radical than their predecessors and, as well 
as being more critical of departmentalisation, some engaged more actively in Third World 
movements. The Algerian War was influential in this change of perspective. Just as the horrors of 
decolonisation in Algeria captured global attention and motivated independence struggles 
elsewhere, Antillean perspectives on French colonialism were greatly altered and many began 
seeking alternative solutions to departmentalisation. Accordingly, Alizés contributors in the early 
1960s appeared disillusioned with departmentalisation and sought to emulate other anticolonial 
struggles. For example, a 1962 article on different forms of decolonisation argued that, if France 
failed to act, Martinique and Guadeloupe would ‘inevitably follow African and Caribbean 
examples’.458 Many of the articles in Alizés in this period focused on Antillean issues of migration, 
racial inequality and economic dependency.  
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Looking specifically at nationalist organisations, the development of the Guadeloupean nationalist 
movement in the 1960s highlights the ways Guadeloupeans connected with transnational 
anticolonial networks. There was a strong global dynamic at work in the growth of GONG, the 
first group to call for Guadeloupean independence, most notably through GONG’s connections 
to Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam. GONG attracted students, Guadeloupean workers based in 
mainland France, and conscientious objectors who had refused to serve in the Algerian War. The 
organisation also drew support from veterans, like Ken Kelly, the editor of GONG’s journal, who 
were greatly affected by their experiences of French brutality in Algeria.459 GONG was a Marxist 
organisation which had Maoist leanings and sought inspiration from the Cuban Revolution and 
the war in Vietnam.460 Like other youth and student protest movements in the 1960s, GONG 
focused on the Vietnam War as the embodiment of a revolutionary struggle against imperialism.461 
Furthermore, the leaders of GONG were acutely aware of the risks of working openly, having 
witnessed the swift imprisonment of the Martinican group OJAM (Martinican Anticolonial Youth 
Organisation) in 1961.462  
 
As a result, GONG sought to emulate Algerian and Vietnamese revolutionary tactics, creating cells 
of activists in the main French cities and operating covertly. The group focused mostly on 
propaganda, smuggling nationalist material into Guadeloupe.463 GONG was in direct contact with 
political figures in China, Belgium, Guinea, Albania, Egypt, Vietnam and, most significantly, 
Algeria.464 The government of the newly independent Algeria assisted in the creation of several 
GONG cadres.465 Along with other anticolonial groups from Martinique and Guadeloupe, GONG 
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members attended the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, gaining recognition for 
Guadeloupe’s struggle against colonialism on an international stage.466 This highlights the global 
reach of GONG, who used their international connections to get around restrictions imposed 
upon them by the French state. 
 
Activists in the Antilles, based both in mainland France and in the Caribbean, participated in 
several transnational solidarity campaigns in the 1970s. For example, Guadeloupean communists 
declared their solidarity with Chile after the coup in 1973, while the Victor Schoelcher Circle in 
Martinique also ran a Chilean solidarity campaign.467 The Circle, a Marxist group which was named 
after the famous French abolitionist, campaigned on various global issues, such as the war in 
Vietnam. In 1976, the Circle ran a campaign supporting Desmond Trotter, a Dominican black 
power activist who had been sentenced to hang for killing an American tourist.468 Louis Adrassé, 
the President of  the Victor Schoelcher Circle, wrote to the Prime Minister of  Dominica, Patrick 
John, pleading for Trotter’s release.469 Adrassé argued that as people of  the ‘Caribbean basin’ they 
were particularly sensitive to this kind of  ‘injustice’.470 A Martinican Committee for the Defence 
of  Trotter was established to liaise with groups in Dominica to increase pressure on the Prime 
Minister to release Trotter.471 Trotter’s sentence was eventually commuted and in 1979 he was 
freed, in part thanks to pressure groups from across the Caribbean. Martinicans were particularly 
active in this campaign, staging protest marches and petitioning the Dominican Prime Minister. 
The Trotter case is a striking example of  the success of  the transnational activism of  French 
Antilleans. 
 
466 ‘La Resolution sur la Guadeloupe’, GONG Information: Journal du Patriote Guadeloupéen, no. 14, February 
1966, 18. 
467 L'Etincelle, no. 1276, 27 October 1973; L'Etincelle, no. 1272, 6 October 1973; Letter from Louis Adrassé to 
the ‘Front de Defense des libertés publiques’, 22 November 1973, 36J33, ADM. 
468 See file on ‘Trial of Desmond Trotter’, FCO 63/1314, TNA. 
469 Letter from Louis Adrassé to Patrick John, 19 March 1976, 36J31, ADM. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Flyer from the Martinican Committee for the Defence of Trotter, 36J31, ADM. 
 112 
After the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, Martinican and Guadeloupean groups continued 
to send representatives to Third World meetings and conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
At the 1979 summit in Havana, two Guadeloupean delegations attended, both of which supported 
independence. Pro-autonomy groups had also been invited but had apparently declined to 
attend.472 Reporting on the conference, Le Journal Guadeloupéen, a pro-independence newspaper, 
argued that, ‘faced with the domination of France, the alternative for the people of Guadeloupe is 
to develop solidarity with those nations who currently constitute the Third World’.473 Although 
they were on the margins of the local political scene, these pro-independence groups continued to 
engage in transnational efforts of Third World solidarity. 
 
Evidently, different political groups in the French Antilles had a complicated relationship with 
anticolonialism and the ‘Third World’. For some, integration into the French Republic distanced 
Martinique and Guadeloupe from the rest of the colonised and formerly colonised world, and 
global matters were approached from a French perspective. Other activists, particularly the more 
radical left-wing organisations which split off from the communist parties, identified more clearly 
with the Third World and sought to engage in transnational solidarity campaigns. As the global 
political context changed and developed from 1945 across the decades, so too did the nature of 
engagement in the French Antilles. 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
In comparison to the French islands, it is more difficult to get a sense of the popularity of 
anticolonial ideas in the British Virgin Islands. This is partly due to the much smaller population 
size, as well as the fact that there was no local newspaper until 1959. While BVIslanders who had 
moved to the US to study got involved in student organisations, particularly civil rights campaigns, 
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it is worth bearing in mind that a permanent middle-class intelligentsia did not exist in the BVI 
itself in the 1960s. There was no secondary school in the territory before 1947 and no higher 
education college until 1990. While there were a substantial number of graduates and other 
qualified BVIslanders abroad, most tended to remain away from the islands to pursue employment 
opportunities. Throughout the 1960s, only five BVI graduates resided permanently in the islands: 
two teachers, one civil servant, one lawyer, and one engineer.474 Harrigan suggests that an 
‘emergent intelligentsia’ developed in the territory from those who had gone to school on other 
islands or had cultivated a world view through migrating overseas.475 This emergent intelligentsia 
became more vocal about BVIslander issues, linking them to the global political context. 
 
BVIslander engagement with Third Worldism and anticolonialism is most apparent in the Positive 
Action Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The Movement began as a campaign opposing a land 
development project known as the Batehill Agreement.476 The group’s leader Noel Lloyd displayed 
a pan-Caribbean perspective in his writings. For example, in an Island Sun article entitled ‘One 
People’, Lloyd referred to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricting Commonwealth 
citizens from migrating to the UK.477 He called for ‘West Indian unity’ in response to Britain 
closing ‘her doors in our faces’.478 Lloyd identified ‘foreign exploitation’, as the common issue 
facing all West Indians and suggested the BVI should welcome Caribbean citizens from across the 
region in solidarity and in order to develop the BVI.479  
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Furthermore, an important element of the success of Positive Action Movement came from the 
international support it garnered. Solidarity groups in the US and USVI were a significant part of 
the campaign, resembling other 1968 movements where transnational support was crucial. These 
solidarity groups focused on the Anegada part of the Batehill Agreement and were mostly made 
up of Anegadians living abroad. Two were established in New York: the ‘more extreme’ 
Committee to Save Anegada led by Anegadian Carlyle G. Varlack, and the ‘more moderate’ 
Anegada Progressive League.480 The Anegada Citizens Association headed by Adrian Varlack was 
based in St Thomas, USVI, and had strong links to the Committee to Save Anegada and to BVI 
historian Norwell Harrigan.481 When the BVI Chief Minister visited New York, he spoke to the 
Anegadian groups in an attempt to reassure them that the BVI Government would guarantee that 
Anegadian rights were not curtailed.482  
 
Like other organisations from colonies and former colonies, BVIslanders used the UN to further 
their cause. The USVI group of Anegadians caught the British Government’s attention when they 
lobbied the UN General Assembly regarding the Batehill Agreement. A petition circulated at the 
UN committee on decolonisation requesting an observer be dispatched to monitor the committee 
of enquiry into the Batehill Agreement.483 The petition claimed that the ‘civil liberties of colonial 
peoples’ were ‘seriously threatened’.484 Representatives from these solidarity groups spoke at the 
commission of enquiry into the agreement, adding greater pressure on the enquiry to reach a 
conclusion acceptable to BVIslanders. In 1970, Norwell Harrigan, as well as local politician Ralph 
O’Neal, informed the Administrator that they were prepared to go to the UN and ‘embarrass the 
United Kingdom’ if the Batehill affair was not resolved satisfactorily.485 The British Government 
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were concerned about these American groups, not only because of their threats to involve the UN, 
but also in case it attracted the attention of the US. As a result, the solidarity groups were influential 
in forcing Britain to resolve the dispute. Despite being a relatively small group of islands, actions 
by BVIslanders in the 1960s and 1970s can be seen as part of the global and transnational 
mobilisation against colonialism. 
 
The Cayman Islands 
The conservative nature of Caymanian society and the conditions which prevented the 
development of any substantial left-wing intelligentsia meant that Caymanians appeared less 
engaged in anticolonial movements and Third World activism. The lack of a local newspaper 
before 1956 was both symptomatic of the lack of alternative leadership outside of the merchant 
elite, and a contributing factor. Ormond Panton was perhaps the most influential Caymanian of 
the postwar era who engaged in transnational anticolonial networks, particularly in the Caribbean. 
Panton developed links with other Caribbean leaders like Manley and Williams, partly through 
attending the West Indies Federation meetings and conferences. In 1960, Panton had a run in with 
the British Administrator in Cayman, leading to a court case. Panton pursued the case through two 
higher courts and eventually won. The process brought him into contact with Jamaican lawyers 
who were in the politically active group around Norman Manley, the Premier of Jamaica.486 He 
demonstrated a more pan-Caribbean perspective in his politics which was unusual in Caymanian 
politics. Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz described Panton’s politics as exhibiting an ‘incipient Third 
World awareness’.487 After Panton crashed out of Caymanian politics in 1965, no other political 
leaders emerged who identified with Third World issues. By the 1970s, coverage of global events 
in the local newspaper tended to present an American perspective, reflecting political and 
economic interests in the islands. In 1973, for example, an editorial in The Northwester referred to a 
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‘growing trend for denying that the Cayman Islands are part of the West Indies’.488 This remained 
apparent throughout the 1970s, highlighting the lack of engagement of most Caymanians with 
Third World issues, compared to activists in the French Antilles and the British Virgin Islands. 
 
Among the four territories, Third World solidarity was most popular in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. This was most apparent among students and left-wing activists from 1960 onwards. 
The British Virgin Islands were generally more conservative and concerned with local issues. Yet 
organisations in the 1960s and 1970s, most notably the Positive Action Movement, engaged 
directly in anticolonial and Third World issues. The Cayman Islands were noticeably more 
detached from anticolonial networks and the increasing Americanisation from the 1950s onwards 
was reflected in Caymanian approaches to international events. 
 
Conclusion 
The decolonisation of the French Antilles and the British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean 
cannot be considered without factoring in the global Cold War. The Cold War was an important 
context in which decolonisation took place. At times it was merely a backdrop but in other 
instances it became a crucial part of the political situation. The influence of the US had been 
growing in the Caribbean region since the Spanish-American War in 1898. After the Second World 
War, it escalated and took on new Cold War dimensions. The Cayman Islands and the British 
Virgin Islands became increasingly Americanised in the 1960s and 1970s. The closeness of 
American territories like the USVI and Puerto Rico had a huge impact on debates about the BVI’s 
political status. Amalgamation with the US Virgin Islands remained a political possibility 
throughout the postwar era. Furthermore, the non-independent status of these American islands 
normalised this form of political arrangement. This relationship with the USVI was the most 
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significant influence on the process of decolonisation in the BVI, but cannot be interpreted strictly 
as a Cold War phenomenon. For the French Antilles, the US remained an opportunity for work 
and study, as well as an imperial presence for many left-wing politicians and intellectuals. Cold War 
dynamics were more influential here, and the risk of US intervention if the French Antilles became 
independent was part of the debate about decolonisation, acting as a deterrent to cutting ties with 
France. 
 
The Cuban Revolution had a significant impact on the overseas territories. In the Cayman Islands, 
the landing of anti-Castro Cuban aircraft during the Bay of Pigs invasion caused diplomatic 
tensions between the US and the UK. It highlighted the closeness of Cayman to Cuba and the 
vulnerability of British authority. Communists in the French Antilles were greatly divided over 
issues of the Hungarian Revolution, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban Revolution. These 
divisions hindered chances to provide a united front for autonomy or independence. The Cuban 
Revolution had a symbolic importance for independence movements in the Caribbean. It was held 
up as the example to follow and inspired many activists in the overseas territories. At the same 
time, fear that the Revolution would be reproduced in other Caribbean islands increased the 
restrictions on independence groups. It provided an excuse to monitor and imprison people who 
challenged the colonial status quo. 
 
Finally, engagement in anticolonial politics and Third World movements varied greatly across the 
territories. Students and left-wing activists in the French Caribbean were involved in transnational 
solidarity campaigns and sought inspiration from other anticolonial organisations. In the British 
Virgin Islands, local politics appeared less influenced by international anticolonial thought. 
However, protest movements like the Positive Action Movement did engage with anticolonial 
ideas and black internationalist networks. In the Cayman Islands, however, the domination of the 
conservative merchant elite restricted the development of political alternatives who might engage 
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with anticolonial ideas. Ormond Panton was the exception, but his success was short lived. As the 
islands became increasingly Americanised, the gap between the Cayman Islands and other ‘Third 
World’ countries increased. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the French Antilles in the 
late 1970s. A higher standard of living and the Francisation of society and infrastructure pushed 
anticolonial activism to the fringes of politics. 
 
This chapter has highlighted the interaction of the overseas territories with global trends and 
events, most significantly the Cold War. Yet the Cold War was not the only nor the most important 
factor shaping decolonisation. More significant were the local political dynamics and the responses 
of the two imperial powers. The next chapter will explore how Britain and France approached 
































The Colonial State: Assimilation, Interference and Repression 
 
 
Continuing the broader focus of the previous chapter, this chapter will look at the role of the 
colonial state in the process of decolonisation in these Caribbean islands. Through this, it will 
compare the French and British approaches to their Caribbean colonies and assess the impact this 
had on debates and decisions about decolonisation. Furthermore, it will compare official national 
policy with the actions of colonial representatives on the ground in the Caribbean. 
 
The historiography of British and French decolonisation from the perspective of both official 
metropolitan policy and the role of colonial representatives in the colonies is extensive. Many 
historians of the British Empire have suggested that decolonisation was orderly and relatively 
stable, as Britain took a step back from empire without ‘destabilising consequences’.489 Ronald 
Hyam places greater emphasis on the importance of international pressures leading to the end of 
empire.490 However, like Boyce, he paints a picture of a generally orderly retreat through an 
administrative elite who carried out decolonisation with pragmatism and without being driven by 
ideology.491 Conversely, Darwin argues that British decolonisation was ‘the untidy, chaotic 
outcome of a higgledy-piggledy historical process’.492 Like Darwin, this chapter will demonstrate 
that decolonisation was, at times, improvised and unsystematic. 
 
Certain French historians have suggested that financial support from France is the principal reason 
why decolonisation in the French Antilles did not lead to independence. In this line of thinking, 
French funding has encouraged Martinicans and Guadeloupeans to live beyond their means, 
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making cutting ties with France not desirable.493 However, the situation is far more complex than 
this simplified notion suggests. Accounts of both British and French decolonisation usually omit 
the non-independent territories, which get treated separately in histories explaining their 
anomalous political development and the colonial approach to them.494 Unlike these accounts, this 
chapter will consider colonial policy and the approach of the colonial state towards the overseas 
territories in the context of decolonisation in other colonies. 
 
This chapter will argue that Britain and France influenced decolonisation in three important ways. 
Firstly, through restrictive measures like repression and censorship, the colonial state, to some 
extent, controlled aspects of the debate over independence. Pro-independence activists found it 
difficult to mount legitimate political campaigns without restrictions and intimidation. Secondly, 
both France and Britain employed certain policies which encouraged assimilation and a sense of 
loyalty to the metropole from colonial subjects. Thirdly, this chapter will examine colonial attitudes 
and approaches more generally, including the influential migration policies in the French Antilles 
which encouraged citizens to move to France to work and study. Colonial policy changed and 
developed over the postwar decades. French approaches towards Caribbean nationalists hardened 
considerably from 1960 onwards. British policy also transformed from initially favouring 
federation, to gradually allowing independence. Constructions of race evidently influenced colonial 
approaches in both the French and British Caribbean. In the French and British territories, closer 
ties to the metropole were seen as a way to improve economic development. The influence of the 
colonial state acted to slow down any pushes towards independence, especially in the French 
Caribbean. 
 
493 Pervillé, ‘Qu’est-Ce Que La Décolonisation? Pour Une Réhabilitation Des Facteurs Démographiques’, 84–
94. 
494 For example, John P. Augelli, ‘The British Virgin Islands: A West Indian Anomaly’, Geographical Review 
46, no. 1 (1 January 1956): 43–58; Miles, Elections and Ethnicity in French Martinique; de Jong and Kruijt, 
Extended Statehood in the Caribbean; Miles, ‘Democracy Without Sovereignty’. 
 121 
Ultimately, this chapter will demonstrate that contradictory colonial policies shaped decolonisation 
in the overseas territories. Rather than a carefully directed approach which encouraged colonies to 
choose independence when they were ready, France and Britain meddled in the decolonisation 
process in inconsistent and uneven ways, adding conflicting influences to local political debates. 
By 1980, the colonial state had not lost its grip on power in these Caribbean islands. 
 
1. Direct Interference and Repression 
Evidently, interference and repression by the colonial state were common in colonies across the 
world and were not unique to these non-independent territories. Violence was an ‘essential element 
in the management’ of modern empires.495 Moreover, the development of state intelligence was 
closely tied to empire in Britain and France.496 The overlap between intelligence gathering and 
repression was evident in the British and French colonial states.497 In discussing the high levels of 
interference and repression, this chapter is not suggesting that repression was greater and more 
violent than anywhere else in order to explain why these territories could not push for 
independence. However, the interference and repression of the French and British states, 
combined with the factors discussed in other chapters, contributed to the way decolonisation 
developed and is an important part of understanding the present political status of these territories. 
 
The British Territories 
The British representative, either the Administrator or Governor, held considerable power in the 
British territories. Throughout the period in question, despite gradual constitutional reform, the 
British Governor could intervene in local issues, overrule the Legislative Assembly, and veto any 
local decisions. One of the most striking instances of colonial interference in decolonisation in the 
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territories occurred in the Cayman Islands in 1962. Ormond Panton and the NDP won a majority 
in the elections on the platform of pushing for greater self-government. However, the 
Commissioner Jack Rose, who had an ongoing feud with Panton, deliberately blocked attempts at 
self-government and prevented the NDP from gaining power in the Executive Council. Firstly, 
Commissioner Rose promoted the idea that Caymanians only had two choices on leaving the West 
Indies Federation: internal self-government under an independent Jamaica or crown colony status 
with Britain. In reality, several different options were available to be negotiated. Yet Rose claimed 
that there ‘was no third alternative’.498 This had a significant impact on restricting the debate about 
self-government and narrowing the options available.  
 
Furthermore, Rose blocked Ormond Panton from obtaining a seat in the Executive Council, after 
the election of the NDP. As Commissioner, Rose was responsible for choosing the three 
nominated members to the Legislative Assembly. As leader of the majority party, Panton ought to 
have been consulted about the nominations. However, Rose chose three new members who were 
all strongly opposed to Panton. As a result, when it came to electing members to the Executive 
Council, Panton was not chosen. This tactical move by Commissioner Rose ensured that Panton 
and the NDP, despite gaining the most seats in the election, did not have the political power to 
implement any policies which would lead Cayman towards self-government. Senior civil servant, 
Sybil McLaughlin, suggested that Rose blocked Panton because he thought Panton would impede 
Rose’s plans in the Council.499 Panton argued that Rose was against the NDP from the outset and 
did ‘everything in the world to attack it’.500 He even suggested that Rose had encouraged people to 
use violence against the NDP to break up their meetings.501 As chapter five will explore in more 
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detail, this step by Commissioner Rose marked a turning point in the fortunes of the NDP and 
the quest for self-government in the Cayman Islands. 
 
The most significant example of a British Government overreaction to unrest occurred after the 
1970 demonstration over land issues in Cayman.502 On 20th April, more than 500 people marched 
through George Town in protest at the recent Land Development Law.503 During the emergency 
meeting of the Legislative Assembly which was called shortly after, the Administrator took 
unprecedented measures to demonstrate that Britain would not tolerate any form of protest. The 
windows of the meeting room were boarded up and armed police were called to protect the 
Administrator during the meeting. Furthermore, the Administrator had arranged for a British 
warship to wait in Caymanian waters in case of need. This was a significant overreaction, aimed at 
proving Britain would not countenance even minor disruption to the peace in the increasingly 
prosperous territory. This was a common tactic by British officials in the Caribbean to discourage 
further protest. In Grenada during agrarian unrest in 1950, the British Governor requested a 
warship as part of the authorities’ campaign to restore order.504 
 
In the BVI, the interference of British officials in local affairs was often the cause of major protests. 
In 1967, at a time of increased xenophobia and fear about the pace of change in the islands, the 
Administrator, Martin Staveley, agreed to lease large parts of the BVI to the development company 
Batehill Ltd.505 This controversial move prompted a wave of protests in the islands and eventually 
led to the development project being overturned at great expense to the BVI Government.506 Some 
 
502 The protest itself is dealt with in greater depth in chapter six. 
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claimed that Staveley was, to a certain degree, anti-American and favoured the Batehill company 
because of its British partners.507 Regardless, the agreement offered Batehill Ltd a huge amount of 
land for a 199-year lease without properly consulting the Legislative Assembly or the local people. 
It demonstrated a complete disregard for local opinion by the Administrator. 
 
When locals demanded a BVIslander as Governor, in response to British interference, their 
appeals were ignored. In 1978, BVIslanders took to the streets when the British Governor 
commuted the death sentence of Sylvester Gaston, who had been convicted of murdering a 67-
year old shopkeeper.508 Protestors demanded the resignation of the Governor and the option to 
choose a BVIslander for the role. Throughout the 1970s, requests for a BVIslander as Governor 
were repeatedly rejected by the FCO.509 Britain further interfered in the development of self-
government in the overseas territories by setting conditions on the granting of internal self-
government. Britain suggested that BVIslanders would have to commit to independence within 
two years if they wanted full internal self-government.510 With politicians cautious about making 
any major changes to the status quo, forcing a commitment to future change was a disincentive 
for internal self-government. 
 
Officially, Britain claimed that it was happy to arrange self-government and independence with 
any territory who wished it.511 In reality, however, British officials undermined this policy. The 
Administrators of the BVI in the 1960s and 1970s blocked calls for greater autonomy, advising 
the FCO that it would be wise to ignore anyone advocating independence. In his outgoing report 
in 1967, Administrator Staveley expressed the hope that British sovereignty would not only be 
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maintained in the BVI, but that the British influence would be increased.512 He suggested that, 
while there appeared to be a less strong connection to Britishness and the Queen among the 
younger generation, the connection with Britain ought to be strengthened.513 He argued that ‘the 
British Virgin Islands will be best off if they stay British’.514 Administrator Thomson, who 
succeeded Staveley, echoed these sentiments in his last report as Administrator.515 These 
comments contradicted official British policy, as well as the sentiments expressed by the 
Administrators in communication to BVIslanders. In a 1969 speech to the Legislative Assembly, 
Thomson claimed ‘Britain continues to adhere to the cardinal principle that the wishes of the 
people concerned must be the main guide to action’.516 
 
At the end of the 1970s, British policy towards the remaining overseas territories changed. In 1979, 
Ted Rowlands the Minister of State for the FCO, argued that British official policy of moving 
colonies towards independence may no longer be viable.517 He suggested that, for the remaining 
territories, links with Britain would be maintained for as long as this was the preferred option of 
local people. In the case of the Cayman Islands, Britain was aware of the undemocratic dominance 
of the white merchant elite in local politics, but was disinclined to challenge it. If the merchants 
expressed a wish to remain British, Britain appeared happy to go along with this arrangement. 
Thus, consulting the ‘local people’ in the Cayman Islands amounted to consulting the merchant 
elite. British actions did little to democratise power in the overseas territories, especially in the 
Cayman Islands. 
The French Antilles 
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In Martinique and Guadeloupe, surveillance and censorship were pervasive throughout the post-
Second World War era and well into the 1980s. The local branch of the ‘Renseignements 
Généraux’ (RG), the French intelligence service, monitored all general council meetings and 
regulated all published newspapers and journals. The RG were responsible for defending the 
French state against threats from social and political movements, making their work undoubtedly 
‘political’.518 They paid particular attention to contributions during general council meetings by 
communist politicians.519 Furthermore, any anti-French or anticolonial rhetoric was recorded and 
relayed to the intelligence service in Paris, as well as to the prefect. They also monitored all union 
activity, including any meetings and motions by the Antillean unions.520 
 
Interference by the police increased after changes to the constitution in 1960 allowed for the arrest 
of anyone seen to threaten the ‘territorial integrity’ of the French Republic.521 A decree in October 
1960 gave the Prefects of the Overseas Departments further powers to scrutinise and even deport 
civil servants.522 The restrictions placed on civil servants were apparent in the treatment of Alain 
Plenel, the Vice-Rector of Martinique. As Vice-Rector, Plenel was the most senior person in the 
administration of education in Martinique, reporting directly to a rector in mainland France. In the 
aftermath of the 1959 riots in Fort-de-France, métropolitain Plenel became increasingly outspoken 
about Martinican autonomy.523 As a result, he was summoned to Paris, subject to an investigation 
and banned from returning to Martinique.524 In 1965, De Gaulle officially revoked his status as 
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‘Academy Inspector’ and demoted him to teacher status through a presidential decree.525 Writing 
in the left-wing metropolitan magazine, France Observateur, Plenel called for autonomy for the 
Antilles and suggested that there was a growing consciousness in the Antilles which the French 
would be foolish to ignore.526 Plenel was not fully exonerated until 1982.527 
 
Monitoring and restrictions on political engagement extended to teachers in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. The Ministry for the overseas departments and territories kept an eye on all 
metropolitan teachers placed in schools in the French Antilles. They were particularly concerned 
about any politically active teachers and anyone teaching about decolonisation or colonialism in 
lessons. Any teachers found to be teaching anticolonial material were considered to be ‘openly 
hostile’ to the government and were forced to relocate back to metropolitan France, as was anyone 
involved in political meetings and marches.528 For example, in 1971, a primary school teacher in 
Martinique was forced to move back to mainland France after being arrested by police at a political 
protest meeting.529 Another teacher was forced out of his job for ‘anti-French behaviour’ which 
included setting an essay that asked students to discuss a quotation by Kwame Nkrumah on 
colonial exploitation.530 The department of national education appears to have had a zero tolerance 
policy on any teachers showing an interest in anticolonial politics inside and outside the classroom. 
This suggests that, throughout the period in question, the French state remained fearful of 
anything that could encourage political awareness or activity among young people in the Antilles. 
 
 
525 ‘M. Alain Plenel, de nouveau frappé pour son action en faveur de la décolonisation aux Antilles’, Justice 
(Martinique), 25 February 1965, 1-2. 
526  Alain Plenel, ‘Autonomie pour les Antilles’, France Observateur, 6 April 1961, 36J33, ADM. 
527 Alain Plenel in interview with France-Antilles, Martinique, 22 November 2013, 
http://www.martinique.franceantilles.fr/actualite/une/alain-plenel-j-etais-vu-comme-un-representant-des-
revoltes-coloniales-230464.php. 
528 See folder on ‘Demande de mutation en metropole de professeurs d’origine metropolitaine exercant dans les 
D.O.M.’, 19940180/20, AN. 
529 Letter from Minister of overseas departments and territories to the Minister of national education, 11 
February 1971, 19940180/20, AN. 
530 Ibid. 
 128 
The close, oppressive surveillance of Antillean students in metropolitan France supports this 
conclusion that the French state perceived young people to be the most likely cause of pro-
independence sentiment and dissent. All students were monitored and the intelligence service kept 
lists of students’ addresses, their parents’ details, their university courses and any student 
associations that they joined.531 A 1959 report on students from the overseas departments 
concluded that, although many were not communist or pro-independence, they could quickly 
become so and therefore a ‘counter-propaganda’ campaign was needed to prevent this from 
happening.532 The paranoia about students had a considerable impact on the ability of students 
from Martinique and Guadeloupe to get funding for their studies and for travel during their time 
at university. Sixteen years on from the report, students from the overseas departments were still 
being investigated by the intelligence service and were blocked from receiving any financial aid if 
they had any connections to student associations or political organisations. For example, Danila 
Biabiany, a medical student from Guadeloupe, had her request for a travel bursary denied simply 
because she was the secretary of the General Association of Students from Guadeloupe 
(AGEG).533 Likewise, Liliane Viviane Devassoigne, a Martinican student studying in Nanterre, was 
blocked from having access to travel funding because the intelligence service suspected that she 
may be part of a left-wing group that favoured Antillean independence.534 Students returning from 
the metropole to Martinique and Guadeloupe were seen as one of the biggest threats to security 
and a likely cause of unrest, as highlighted in a 1970 police report.535 The considerable monitoring 
of students from Martinique and Guadeloupe limited their ability to openly discuss the political 
status of their islands and to agitate for political change. 
 
531 See the 1959 study on ‘Les Etudiants des departments d’outre mer dans le metropole’ by the Directorate of 
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Restrictions on debates about autonomy were also established through press censorship. The 
police monitored all newspapers and journals, and banned any Marxist literature. They prohibited 
articles which had a critical view of France and anything with a revolutionary pan-Africanist 
perspective, particularly if it was from North Africa.536 Le Progrès Social, a Guadeloupean newspaper 
with a pro-independence stance, was frequently censored or banned.537 The communist 
newspapers L’Etincelle (Guadeloupe) and Justice (Martinique) were often censored.538 Other 
publications which produced anything deemed anti-France or inflammatory were suppressed, such 
as a 1961 article which was critical of the actions of the army.539 Censorship made it increasingly 
difficult to have an open discussion about political futures in the local press. 
 
Censorship extended across many aspects of public life and popular culture in the Caribbean. 
Using Creole instead of French was discouraged in public spaces, in the press, and in music. 
Restrictions on expressions of local culture continued until the decentralisation reforms in the 
1980s. Radio and television, once it was introduced in the 1960s, were heavily restricted to pro-
departmentalisation channels only. Anyone who wished to broadcast on the radio had to pass a 
detailed police check which included their political affiliations and perceived ‘loyalty’ to France.540 
One broadcaster, Daniel Philene, was permitted a licence because he had no political affiliations 
and ‘his loyalty seemed assured’.541 A 1965 report on Guadeloupean television highlighted concern 
that a news report showing protest in the Dominican Republic could be ‘a bad example for a 
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Guadeloupean youth already impinged upon and under the influence of the political leaders of the 
Communist Party and other satellite groups’.542  
 
Preventing an open dialogue about autonomy was a central aspect of policing in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. An inspection report on police forces in the French Antilles is revealing of the 
police’s attitudes towards Martinicans and Guadeloupeans, as well as highlighting more general 
assumptions common across the French administration. The police commander Jacques Richard 
identified four key issues facing the French Antilles: ‘dangerously explosive’ demographic 
expansion; high unemployment; ‘subversive propaganda’; and clashes between police and crowds 
stirred up by ‘professionals of disorder’.543 Richard also argued that the influence of Cuba and of 
Black Power in the US could contribute to disturbances and make policing more difficult. It is 
clear from the report that Richard viewed the police’s primary role in the Antilles to be the 
prevention of any pro-autonomy activity and of any unrest from citizens calling for change. 
 
In order to maintain control, the French state often went further than surveillance and censorship, 
using violence to assert their authority. Violent repression of dissent was used regularly to 
discourage challenges to the status quo. In the twentieth century, the police frequently opened fire 
on demonstrators. In Guadeloupe, for example, violence during protests included: Saint-François 
in 1900 (three killed); Saint-François in 1910 (five killed); Capesterre in 1910 (nine killed); Petit-
Canal in 1925 (five killed); Lamentin and Abymes in 1930 (three killed); Marie-Galante in 1936 
(two killed); Basse-Terre and Port-Louis in 1943 (two killed); Le Moule in 1952 (four killed).544 In 
all of these cases, the protests involved striking sugar labourers in a dispute with plantation and 
factory owners. The police violence in 1959 in Martinique and in 1967 in Guadeloupe are the most 
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famous incidents of violent repression in the twentieth century, but are evidently not isolated 
examples.545  
 
Both the French and British colonial states used considerable surveillance to monitor local 
activists, students and the press. In all four territories, newspaper articles and protest marches were 
censored or banned if they were deemed too critical of the government. States are more likely to 
employ violence when their power is ‘in jeopardy’.546 Thus, state violence was much greater and 
more frequent in the French Antilles, with protests and strikes broken up by police violence. 
Protests were much rarer in the British territories and the police forces much smaller. On the 
unusual occasions where unrest did bubble up, such as in 1968, protestors did complain of beatings 
from the police. Yet this was evidently on a much smaller scale than in the French Caribbean. In 
both the British and French territories, intimidation, surveillance and violence acted to discourage 
advocates of change. 
 
2. Assimilation 
Policies of assimilation, which sought to propagate the culture of the colonial power in the 
colonies, had a significant impact on decolonisation. Echoing many other historians, Westad 
describes France as ‘the most assimilationist of empires’, suggesting that it was for this reason that 
it tried ‘longer than others to cling on to its colonies by force’.547 Certainly, assimilation through 
education, culture and language had a significant impact in the French Antilles and greatly shaped 
how Antilleans saw their future.548 Yet this was not wholly unique to the French Empire and 
policies which encouraged imperial subjects to identify with the British Empire and notions of 
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Britishness were also employed by the British colonial state. In Cayman and the BVI, British 
officials endeavoured to encourage a sense of loyalty to the Queen and the Empire. This was most 
successful in the Cayman Islands, where an ‘affinity’ to Britishness developed, particularly among 
the merchant elite.549 
 
The French Antilles 
Much has been written on the ‘mission civilisatrice’ and the way France sought to spread French 
culture and language in its empire.550 Martinique and Guadeloupe were seen as part of the ‘Old 
Colonies’, having been part of France before the French Revolution. As such, they had been 
subjected to centuries of this assimilationist project. The ‘mixed-race’ middle class which 
developed in the nineteenth century were encouraged, through education and certain 
opportunities, to see France as the embodiment of freedom and progress. The French Republic 
was presented as a solution to the problems of the Antilles and a way out from the racism and 
restrictiveness of colonial Caribbean society. As a result, by the twentieth century, the political elite 
which had developed greatly identified with Frenchness and had a vested interest in retaining ties 
to France. 
 
As detailed in the first chapter of this thesis, assimilationism on the part of France considerably 
influenced the decision to make the French Antilles departments in 1946. Childers argues that the 
‘citizens of Martinique voted for assimilation because they genuinely identified with a France of 
transcendent culture and humane principles’ which was ‘above the regime of "colonialist jackals" 
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who claimed to represent France in Martinique’.551 While this may have been true for the educated 
middle class who had benefitted, to a degree, from the French education system, it is difficult to 
claim that all Martinicans, across all sectors of society, clearly identified with this notion of France 
in the 1940s. Once the change in political status was achieved, greater assimilation was 
implemented to draw the Antilles closer to France. It should be noted that politicians like Césaire 
who had campaigned for departmentalisation, wished to see the Antilles assimilated politically and 
legally into France, but not culturally. This was gradual at first, and many complained about the 
continued neglect of Martinique and Guadeloupe in the 1950s. However, after protests and 
nationalism threatened to escalate in the 1960s, the Antilles were subject to increased 
assimilationist policies. This was particularly evident in the centralised education system which 
aimed to give a pupil in the Antilles an identical education to a metropolitan child. This had a huge 
impact on the way Antillean children were encouraged to view the world, studying European maps 
and history rather than the Caribbean. 
 
The pace of assimilation intensified in the 1970s, as more funding was directed to Martinique and 
Guadeloupe in order to develop the infrastructure and tourism industry. Price has highlighted the 
‘Francisation’ which accompanied this development, aimed at restructuring and integrating the 
Antilles further into the French system.552 Antillean elites were particularly wedded to the idea of 
Frenchness and the promotion of France as a liberating force. Victor Schoelcher, the Parisian 
abolitionist was idolised, especially in Martinique, and portrayed as the epitome of French 
republican values. A group led by communist activist Louis Adrassé who were dedicated to fighting 
instances of police brutality, colonial violence and injustice, named themselves the ‘Victor 
Schoelcher Circle’ and repeatedly invoked the ‘memory of the great French abolitionist’ in their 
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correspondence and writings.553 A 1968 conference in Martinique on the subject of assimilation 
highlighted that this ‘act of faith’ in Frenchness and the French republic was crucial to the support 
for departmentalisation in the 1940s.554  
 
Another assimilationist tendency manifested through the local press. France-Antilles was established 
in 1964 and was linked to the right-wing, pro-departmentalisation parties. It quickly became the 
most widely read daily newspaper in the Antilles. It is firmly pro-France and contributed to the 
continuing cultural assimilation of Martinique and Guadeloupe. The paper frequently featured 
speeches and interviews with French ministers, the prefect and members of the Gaullist party 
(RPR) which reinforced the idea of Martinique and Guadeloupe being intrinsically French. A 1974 
interview with the Minister for the overseas departments and territories, Bernard Stasi, promoted 
the idea that it was impossible to be in favour of ‘independence and social security’ at the same 
time.555 This was a common argument that the social security offered by France was the only viable 
option for the Antilles. France-Antilles firmly discouraged protests, strikes and any challenge to 
France’s authority in the Caribbean. For example, the paper was highly critical of unrest in Fort-
de-France in 1974, suggesting that those involved were well-versed in causing trouble in the city.556 
Other newspapers make their affiliations clear with names like France Émeraude, France Immortelle, 
France Toujours and La Petite Patrie.557 
 
The office of prefect, established in 1947 after departmentalisation, was also used to implement 
French assimilationism. The prefect, appointed in Paris, had extensive powers in the Antilles as 
the state’s principal representative in the department. The prefects encouraged and maintained 
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close ties to France, and the rhetoric of Frenchness was common in prefectural speeches. In one 
of the first prefectural speeches, the Guadeloupean Prefect Henry Pougnet referred to Guadeloupe 
as the ‘jewel of Republican France, of a democratic and humane France’.558 In a radio speech at 
the end of 1947, the new prefect Gilbert Philipson described the French community as the ‘symbol 
of human fraternity and freedom’.559 This rhetoric was used by prefects throughout the postwar 
period to encourage a sense of Frenchness among Antilleans citizens. 
 
The British Territories 
Across the British Caribbean, colonialism was accompanied by a culture of Britishness that 
encouraged Caribbean peoples to identify with Britain, the Empire and the monarchy.560 The 
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands were no different. Visits from members of the Royal 
family were huge events, designed to generate enthusiasm and excitement from local people. These 
moments were highlighted and exaggerated in colonial reports. For example, a 1973 visit to the 
Cayman Islands by Prince Charles was apparently ‘the most pleasurable event’.561 In his report, the 
Administrator emphasised that the ‘people of the islands, being very loyal to the Crown, were 
happy to have this opportunity’.562 This was part of the British administration’s emphasis on loyalty 
to the Queen and Britain. When the Queen visited the BVI in 1966, children were encouraged to 
stand in the streets waving union jacks and were given souvenir coins to commemorate the day.563 
 
In the Cayman Islands, British officials commented on the loyalty and affinity to Britain expressed 
by Caymanians, particularly the merchant elite. This was further encouraged by the administration 
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as those who appeared sympathetic to Britain were more likely to gain civil service positions. In 
the British Virgin Islands, British officials in the postwar years commented on the relative 
weakness of loyalty to Britain compared to many other West Indian islands.564 Administrator 
Staveley described the ‘cynicism and disillusionment’ of BVIslanders in their approach towards 
British rule.565 Staveley undertook certain measures to counteract the ‘absence of normal respect’ 
toward the office of British Administrator which he observed on his arrival.566 
 
He felt that the state of disrepair of Government House, the Administrator’s official residence, 
was emblematic of this apparent lack of respect and so took measures to alter this. He was horrified 
to find that ‘pigs belonging to domestic staff’ were left to ‘scuttle into the drawing room’ of 
Government House.567 As well as refurbishing the residence, Staveley put in place a full-time police 
orderly to accompany the Administrator and drive his official car. Having undertaken various 
measures to make the British Administrator appear more important, Staveley was happy that ‘the 
dignity of the office and its accoutrements’ were, on his departure, ‘more widely appreciated than 
previously’.568 These steps to boost the apparent importance and formality of the role of British 
officials in colonies were common across the British Empire, in an effort to make British rule 
appear more important and necessary. It seems to have worked to a certain degree in the British 
Virgin Islands, and evidently was very successful in the Cayman Islands. In Cayman, local 
commentators and journalists frequently remarked on the impressive attire and manner of British 
officials and the royal family.569 
 
 
564 Martin Staveley in letter to Commonwealth Office, 27 April 1967, FCO 44/104, 1-16, TNA. 
565 Ibid., 1-2. 
566 Ibid., 13. 
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569 For example, ‘Royal elegance - off the peg', The Northwester, July 1974, 16-19. 
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Like the use of education in the French Antilles to encourage assimilation into French culture, in 
the BVI and Cayman, the British used the education system to generate feelings of loyalty to the 
Queen and Empire. BVI poet Andria Flax recalls how children were required to attend school on 
the morning of Empire Day, an annual public holiday, and encouraged to dress up for an official 
ceremony.570 The children were then made to march in the hot sun and sing ‘Land Of Our Birth 
We Pledge To Thee’, ‘My Country ’Tis of Thee’ and of course, ‘God Save Our Gracious Queen’’.571 
Virgin Islands historian Norwell Harrigan described this process at school as a ‘political 
socialisation’ in which he was made to understand that he ‘was a British subject first, last and 
always’.572 He remembered ‘children who fainted from standing in the blazing sun listening to 
some English Commissioner or parson citing Nelson's duty and the enterprise of Drake’.573 
 
Throughout the colonial era in the British and French Caribbean, policies encouraged the 
assimilation of islanders, promoting a sense of French or Britishness. This was more apparent in 
the French Caribbean where Antilleans could acquire certain citizenship rights by adopting French 
language and culture. Assimilationism undoubtedly influenced the political elite who promoted 
departmentalisation in 1946. Following more intense unrest, the pace of ‘Francisation’ in 
Martinique and Guadeloupe greatly increased in the 1970s, through development schemes which 
restructured and further integrated the islands into the French Republic.574 This greater economic 
integration with the metropole increased the dependency on France and made it harder to argue 
for independence. In the Cayman Islands, the sense of affinity with Britain was particularly strong 
among the merchant elite, greatly shaping decisions about decolonisation. Assimilation was least 
evident in the BVI, given its isolated position within the British Empire, but efforts to foster 
Britishness were undertaken by the British administration. 
 
570 Flax, The Way We Were: Treasured Childhood Memories and Poetry of Earlier BVI Times, 181. 
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572 Norwell Harrigan, 'On Being A Virgin Islander', The Island Sun, 11 November 1967, 3. 
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574 Price, ‘Modernity, Memory, Martinique’, 76. 
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3. Colonial Attitudes and Approaches 
The approaches and attitudes of colonial representatives had an impact on the processes of 
decolonisation. Attitudes were evident in correspondence and reports, showing that both French 
and British officials saw themselves as superior to the local population. The belief that European 
bureaucrats were better at running the government than local representatives was widespread. This 
affected local confidence in governing capabilities, and appeared in discussions about 
independence and decolonisation. This section will discuss the variety of colonial approaches 
which shaped decolonisation including: neglect, underfunding, migration policies, social security, 
racism, and the belittling of local politicians.  
 
The French Antilles 
Between 1945 and 1980, French policies towards the Antilles varied between neglect and tactical 
funding to reduce discontent. This helped to cement the idea that France was the solution to the 
Antilles’ problems and the source of wealth and opportunity. Economic policies over the decades 
increased the dependency of the Antilles on France. As one article in Alizés argued, ‘commercial 
exclusivity with France, just like the rest of the Caribbean with their old colonial powers, prevents 
all attempts at inter-Caribbean exchanges and even more so at an international level’.575 At 
moments when there was significant unrest, such as December 1959 in Martinique, the French 
government responded with a combination of repression and economic intervention. Immediately 
after, they increased the SMIG (salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti), the minimum wage, 
in the Antilles to pacify opposition. 
 
The migration policies of the French state in the postwar years had a significant social, economic 
and political impact. It contributed to discontent towards France, but at the same time reduced 
 
575 ‘La nation guadeloupéenne: pour ou contre?’, Alizés, January 1968, PA 37, 7, ADG. 
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the concentration of unemployed and unhappy youth in the Antilles, thus decreasing the 
population likely to push for independence. The policy of encouraging young workers from the 
Antilles and the other overseas departments to migrate to France for employment was known as 
BUMIDOM, as it was run by the Bureau pour le développement des migrations dans les départements d'outre-
mer (Office for the Development of Migration in the Overseas Departments). There is extensive 
literature on the impact of BUMIDOM.576 It garnered considerable opposition due to its socio-
economic impact on the Antilles, as they lost much of the young workforce.577 Furthermore, many 
Antilleans encountered significant difficulties, prejudice and racism in mainland France once they 
arrived.578 BUMIDOM was proposed by the government as a solution to unemployment in the 
Caribbean.579 However, it failed to address the real economic issues facing the Martinican and 
Guadeloupean economies, instead making them even more dependent on the metropole.  
 
At the same time as ‘BUMIDOM’ encouraged young Antilleans to move to mainland France, 
métros, from the metropole, were encouraged to work in the growing French bureaucracy in 
Martinique and Guadeloupe.580 They were offered pay incentives and other bonuses to facilitate 
the move. This caused increasing tension in Martinique and Guadeloupe as the newly arrived white 
metropolitan workers often brought colonial, racist attitudes and failed to integrate into Antillean 
society. The civil service was a crucial resource for local employment and the recruitment of so 
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many metropolitan bureaucrats angered Antilleans.581 The tensions between the children of these 
métros and Antillean children led to clashes at schools. One infamous incident in Guadeloupe in 
1979 led to violent conflict between metropolitan and Guadeloupean students at the Lycée 
Baimbridge.582 A metropolitan student reportedly proclaimed ‘Je suis raciste, vive le racisme’ 
outside the school.583 Several incidents between Guadeloupean and metropolitan students 
occurred over the following months, including some metropolitan students apparently wearing t-
shirts bearing the slogan ‘Je suis raciste’. After heavy clashes one day, the scooters outside the 
school were set alight. A strike was held by the Guadeloupean students calling for the expulsion 
of any racist white students, leading to several expulsions and suspensions. Through its migration 
policies, France increased tensions between the Antilles and France, disrupting existing class and 
racial hierarchies, but also increasing the economic dependency of the Antilles on France. 
 
In order to prevent independence movements from gaining ground, the French State combined 
the restrictive and repressive measures of the police and intelligence services with a gradual 
extension of social rights to bring Martinique and Guadeloupe in line with metropolitan France. 
A 1970 report acknowledged that this had been official policy since 1962.584 It is worth noting that 
emphasis was placed on achieving greater parity, not when departmentalisation was introduced in 
1946, but later in 1962 after nationalism and general unrest increased. Some historians have 
suggested that this policy of increasing funding to Martinique and Guadeloupe to help with social 
welfare is the main reason independence has never been popular with most Antilleans.585 However, 
the improvement of social welfare only really began after unrest had increased in the Antilles, in 
response to the rise in nationalism. Furthermore, the lack of a mainstream nationalist party is as a 
 
581 ‘La question des fonctionnaires’, Justice, Martinique, 15 November 1951, 1-3. 
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result of a variety of factors, not least the repression of anticolonial activity, as well as the other 
elements discussed throughout this thesis. 
 
Although ideas about race were less openly or explicitly discussed in French reports, compared to 
in British correspondence, racism and constructions of race undoubtedly influenced French 
approaches. For example, the intelligence service carefully monitored and reported on a cultural 
festival in Fort-de-France, Martinique in 1979 purely because it was dedicated to the struggle of 
African-Americans. A range of intellectuals and campaigners from the US and the Caribbean spoke 
at the festival, including Yolande King, the daughter of Martin Luther King.586 The festival was 
portrayed as a security issue by the police and the speakers were treated with suspicion. It is clear 
that, in the eyes of the intelligence service, the fact that the speakers were African-American 
instantly made them a potential threat to local security and public order. Notions of race evidently 
shaped approaches by French officials to the French Antilles and its citizens. 
 
Finally, the French state were anxious that the issue of autonomy could become more popular 
among the general public. The Ministry of the Interior kept tabs on the popularity of autonomy in 
the French Antilles. In 1977, a report acknowledged that the idea of autonomy was gaining ground, 
even in moderate circles.587 This fed into the increased pressure on the need for decentralisation, 
which was eventually introduced in 1982. Though decentralisation was also a response to problems 
in metropolitan French departments, for the French Antilles, it was hoped it would put to bed the 
question of greater autonomy. Therefore, a variety of attitudes and approaches were employed by 
the state in the French Antilles. Most notably, migration policies, which aimed at relocating young 
Antilleans to mainland France to tackle unemployment in the Caribbean, had mixed results. These 
policies hampered the development of nationalist groups in the Caribbean, as so many young 
 
586 Directorate of General Intelligence in Martinique, ‘Ouverture de la 8ème Festival Culturel de Fort-de-
France’, 4 July 1979, 19940180/84, AN. 
587 Report from Ministry of the Interior, 12 July 1977, 19940180/84, AN. 
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Martinicans and Guadeloupeans moved to the metropole, but they also increased tensions between 
Antilleans and metropolitans. 
 
The British Territories 
Due to their isolated positions within the British Empire, the BVI and Cayman suffered significant 
neglect and underfunding from the metropole. This was particularly apparent in the first half of 
the twentieth century because, as dependencies of other colonies, these territories were more 
isolated from the metropole than other Caribbean colonies. As a result, resentment at the lack of 
funding and support was directed towards the administration in the other colonies, Antigua and 
Jamaica respectively, rather than at the distant metropole. The islands only became more 
prosperous once the tourism and financial services sectors had developed, which occurred earlier 
in the Cayman Islands compared to the BVI. 
 
Colonial reports from the Administrators and Governors of the BVI and Cayman demonstrate 
the extent to which notions of race were a factor in colonial approaches and policy. Anyone who 
raised the issue of racial inequality or racism in the British territories was treated with suspicion 
and seen as potentially subversive. Indeed, the monthly intelligence reports for the British Virgin 
Islands throughout the 1970s contained a section entitled ‘Black power and associated racialism’.588 
When the Attorney General was dismissed in the BVI after she challenged a decision by the British 
Governor not to follow usual procedure following the death of an American in the islands, some 
BVIslanders raised this as an issue of racial discrimination. The Attorney General was a black 
Jamaican civil servant who seemed to have been dismissed for challenging the Governor’s 
authority. She had considerable support from various groups in the BVI who challenged the 
dismissal. However, the Governor’s attitude to this ‘racialist issue’ was disdainful and attempts to 
 
588 For example, BVI Local Intelligence Reports, 1979, FCO 44/2127, TNA. 
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challenge the decision were refused.589 The administration lumped any raising of racial 
discrimination issues into the ‘black power’ box and instantly interpreted it as potentially 
subversive. 
 
The attitude towards Rastafarianism further demonstrates the racist attitudes of the colonial 
administration. Like elsewhere in Caribbean, Rastafarianism was treated with suspicion and was 
referred to as ‘the Rastafarian cult’ in reports.590 The Governor of the BVI argued that ‘the presence 
of a Rastafarian element in the British Virgin Islands is a matter of some concern’.591 This statement 
was made with little concrete evidence other than the association of Rastafarianism with criminality 
by many Caribbean governments. Similarly, in the Cayman Islands, it was treated as a potential 
criminal issue and a report was issued to investigate the ‘so-called Rastafarian problem’.592 The 
report argued that ‘many criminals have invaded their ranks using the cult as a cloak’.593 It suggested 
that an increase in Rastafarians in Cayman had led to reports of housebreakings, and included a 
list of all suspected Rastafarians in the islands. The report recommended two actions as a response: 
increased immigration controls on ‘obvious Rastafarians’; and further police harassment of any 
gatherings of people who looked like Rastafarians.594 
 
As well as prejudice towards Rastafarians, Governors in the BVI and Cayman were wary of 
politically active people from other Caribbean islands. The British administration showed far 
greater concern when it came to Afro-Caribbean visitors to the islands, compared to white 
immigrants. James Davidson, the Governor in 1979, argued that people from other Caribbean 
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islands ought to be monitored as they ‘may incite tiresome activity’.595 He was concerned that a 
lawyer from St Kitts who had been assisting the BVI Civil Service Association would stir up 
trouble.596 The government went as far as deporting people, such as Noel Henwood, an Antiguan 
man who supported BVI independence and was deported for being ‘an undesirable character’.597 
In terms of the impact on decolonisation, colonial approaches to people from other Caribbean 
islands reinforced the divisions between BVIslanders and the rest of the Caribbean. This curbed 
the potential for political activists in the BVI to engage with decolonisation discussions elsewhere 
and to strengthen their protest movements through the experiences and advice of other Caribbean 
activists. 
 
The British Governors and the civil servants at the FCO exhibited a dismissive, patronising 
attitude towards local politicians and ministers in the BVI and Cayman. Mawby argues that this 
disdainful attitude is evidence of British bigotry, as the ‘quotidian belittlement of Caribbean 
sensibilities which litter the minutes and memoranda of the day certainly evince an innate sense of 
superiority’.598 This was evident in correspondence from the BVI, such as the description of the 
Deputy Governor, a BVIslander, by Governor Davidson as ‘a good fellow… though they may not 
be the world’s best wordsmith’.599 This attitude could have had a knock-on effect on constitutional 
development, as Governors assumed local politicians were not competent enough to be offered 
greater responsibilities. For example, in 1972 constitutional reform was delayed because the 
Governor believed ‘HMG is unlikely to accept proposals which will hand over financial 
responsibility to a minister’.600 Colonial officials were even more dismissive when it came to female 
politicians. A 1962 report which announced the election of the first female representative in the 
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Cayman Islands suggested that her ‘choice as a candidate by the winning National Democratic 
Party was more an indication of the paucity of suitable candidates in the area than appreciation of 
her ability in public life’.601 This lack of belief in the capabilities of the representatives and civil 
servants of the islands filtered through to local opinion. It manifested in local politicians declaring 
that the islands should not become independent because there were no local people capable of 
managing government effectively.602 This colonial attitude clearly had an impact on the process of 
decolonisation. 
 
Finally, the British Government was mistrustful of any trade union activity in the overseas 
territories. Unions were slow to develop in the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, but 
once they did emerge in the 1970s, Governors treated them with suspicion. Correspondence from 
Governors presented unions and their members as potential trouble makers. Monthly intelligence 
reports in the 1970s contained a separate section to detail any suspicious or troublesome union 
activity by the newly established Civil Service Associations in both groups of islands.603 These 
associations were used to challenge government policies, issues of racial discrimination, and to 
push for change.604 However, the colonial approach to unions limited their ability to harness local 
sentiment and advocate change. 
 
Therefore, in both the French and British territories, the colonial approaches and attitudes shaped 
the processes of decolonisation. In the French Antilles, the state gradually increased social security 
to the Caribbean in response to unrest. This increased the economic dependency of the Antilles 
on France and made it more difficult for advocates of independence to successfully argue in favour 
 
601 Cayman Islands Monthly Intelligence Report, November 1962, CO 1031/3733, TNA. 
602 Annie Bodden, Minutes of Legislative Assembly Meeting, 4 January 1963, Legislative Assembly Storeroom, 
Box 31, CINA. 
603 See Reports of the Cayman Islands Intelligence Committee, 1979, FCO 44/2011, TNA; BVI Local 
Intelligence Reports, 1979, FCO 44/2127, TNA. 
604 For example, BVI Local Intelligence Report, October 1979, FCO 44/2127, TNA. 
 146 
of cutting ties to France. In the British territories, the dismissive approach of colonial officials 
towards the local population was evident in correspondence and reports. This trickled down into 
public opinion in the islands, reducing the confidence in local representatives and their ability to 
manage governmental responsibilities. Both British and French colonial officials were influenced 
by notions of race and exhibited greater suspicion towards black Caribbean citizens. This was 
particularly influential in the policing of the territories and was evident in the criminalisation of 
black citizens and new arrivals. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the different ways colonial policy influenced the process of 
decolonisation in the overseas territories. The actions of officials on the ground often differed 
from official policy, adding conflicting influences to local debates and experiences. Acts of 
monitoring, repression and interference reduced the likelihood of open discussion about 
independence. Advocates of autonomy and independence were often placed under surveillance or 
subjected to censorship and violence if they campaigned or spoke openly. The massacre of May 
1967 in Guadeloupe is a startling and disturbing example of the lengths the French state went to 
in order to maintain control and put an end to unrest. The imprisonment of independence activists 
unfairly blamed for the violent nature of this incident highlights the desire of the state to prevent 
nationalist activity. This demonstrates that France feared losing the French Antilles after the 
trauma of the Algerian War of Independence. Colonial rule in the British territories in the twentieth 
century was less violent, perhaps due to the relative lack of protest and unrest. The British state 
closely monitored local newspapers, political activists and unions to ensure British control. 
 
Centuries of assimilation in the French Antilles encouraged many Antilleans, especially the middle-
class, to see France as the solution to their problems. It gave local political elites a vested interest 
in maintaining links to France. In the British territories, islanders were encouraged to feel a sense 
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of loyalty to the Queen and the British Empire through the education system, public holidays and 
celebrations, as well as the veneration of royal visits. This was particularly successful in the Cayman 
Islands where the merchant elite expressed a real sense of affinity to Britain and Britishness. In 
the British Virgin Islands, whilst many expressed a fondness for the Queen, the proximity of the 
US Virgin Islands countered the British influence. 
 
Finally, colonial rule in the Caribbean involved a variety of arrangements and approaches. French 
and British attitudes towards the overseas territories were contradictory and inconsistent. Prefects 
and governors had considerable power to manipulate local debates and to direct developments 
according to their beliefs rather than official policy. Although attitudes towards race are less 
explicitly discussed in French correspondence, racial discrimination influenced both colonial states 
and the reporting of issues in the islands. In all four territories, the islands were generally neglected 
by the colonial state in terms of economic assistance and support. Nonetheless, rather than seeking 
independence as an antidote to this, many islanders expressed the opinion, reinforced by France 
and Britain, that the islands were not economically prosperous enough to become independent.  
 
As this chapter has highlighted, colonial policies and approaches changed and developed during 
the period under consideration. The French state became more restrictive after the changes to the 
constitution in 1960 effectively prohibited campaigning for Antillean independence. British 
negotiators initially favoured federation, especially for the smaller states in the Caribbean. By the 
mid-1960s Britain was encouraging gradual independence, even for smaller states. Yet, in 1979, 
the Foreign Office acknowledged that not all territories desired independence. Despite this 
changing policy, Administrators and Governors in the British territories encouraged and fostered 
the territories’ continued connection to Britain throughout this period. Crucially, this chapter has 
discredited the argument that these territories were given the opportunity to choose their own 
manner of decolonisation, unconstrained by metropolitan influences and restrictions, and simply 
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never wished to become independent. A fair and open debate on the subject was never permitted 
throughout the postwar era and into the 1980s.  
 
Colonial policies and attitudes, combined with the different influences discussed in the other 
chapters of this thesis, contributed to how the process of decolonisation developed in these 
territories. The actions of the colonial state slowed down the pace of change and reduced any 
momentum gained by anticolonial movements. Having explored developments from a macro 
level, this thesis will turn next to the local dimensions of decolonisation. The ways local elites 



































Local Elites: Economic and Political Power Factions 
 
 
While the previous chapter demonstrated the importance of the colonial state in the process of 
decolonisation in Martinique, Guadeloupe, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands, this 
chapter will turn to the role of local elites. Some elite groups collaborated with the colonial state 
to maintain these territories’ links to Britain and France. The role of local elite groups in the 
Caribbean islands is central to explaining the nature of decolonisation. Their impact reveals the 
long-term historical transformations in local society which shaped twentieth century events. 
 
Local elites played a crucial part in negotiating and directing decolonisation, as a recent collection 
by Dülffer and Frey has highlighted.605 Across the Caribbean region, islands chose different forms 
of decolonisation and varying relationships with the former colonial power.606 These relationships 
cannot be understood without delving into the intricacies of local society and the way debates 
about political status were shaped and communicated in the islands. In their approaches to 
decolonisation, historians are moving past the traditional focus on the actions and intentions of 
colonial politicians, policy-makers and civil servants, to understand the local context and how local 
political actors engaged with the colonial state.607 However, studies of local politics in either the 
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French or British Caribbean rarely take a comparative perspective and often remain within the 
linguistic boundaries of the region.608 Unlike previous studies of local elites in the Caribbean, this 
chapter will adopt a comparative lens, drawing out the links and differences between powerful 
groups and their impact on the process of decolonisation in these non-independent territories. 
 
Power in these territories operated in a manner that was specific to the Caribbean. Caribbean 
societies are often structured in a three-tiered framework which Premdas has labelled a ‘colour-
class system of stratification’.609 Whilst Caribbean societies vary from island to island, this typically 
produces a white planter minority at the top, a métis or mixed-race middle class, and a black working 
class.610 The case study territories adhere to these trends to some extent, with Martinique fitting 
most clearly into this regional pattern. The British Virgin Islands, on the other hand, are quite 
unusual in that land redistribution after abolition created a relatively equal society, compared to 
the land and inequality issues in Jamaica, for example.611 At the same time, as this chapter will 
highlight, local elites in these islands engaged in transnational and global exchanges and networks 
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in the twentieth century. Therefore, the role of local elites demonstrates that the processes of 
decolonisation in these territories must be understood within a local, regional and global context. 
 
This chapter will argue that local elites had a disproportionate influence on decolonisation debates 
and negotiations through their privileged positions in society. Local elites are defined as any ‘social 
groups who command certain resources in a given social entity’.612 As such, this chapter will 
demonstrate how different elites exercised power through three key means of leverage: economic 
dominance; control of the political scene; and the influence certain educated elites had due to their 
elevated status in society as intellectuals. The rhetoric of local elites on decolonisation was 
influenced by the racial and gender dynamics of these societies and had leverage over 
decolonisation developments. In line with recent works on women in the Caribbean, the analysis 
of elite power will also adopt a gendered lens.613 In the case study territories, women’s struggles to 
gain the right to vote were caught up in attempts by political elites to maintain the status quo. This 
chapter will demonstrate that local elites are central to our understanding of how decolonisation 
was negotiated and developed in the Caribbean. 
 
This research on local elites has adopted a range of sources, with a particular focus on individual 
life stories and histories. Many of the politicians discussed in this chapter wrote memoirs offering 
a useful insight into their lives and their impressions of other political figures. When compared as 
a collection of memoirs, they offer a window into political dynamics, allegiances and tensions 
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between different leaders and factions. While the nature of political elites and political power is 
more apparent in archival sources, it can be more difficult to investigate the ways in which 
economic elites influenced political decisions. This is particularly the case with the economic elite 
in Martinique. As a result, I have had to rely on a combination of newspapers, documentary films 
and secondary sources for parts of this chapter on Martinique’s white planter elite. Furthermore, 
given the nature of the historical record, it is often more straightforward to build up a picture of 
the economic and political elites in a colony, whereas the voices of other groups can remain elusive.  
However, as Villaverde et al. suggest, there are certain dangers to elite-focused research.614 Elites 
were certainly not the only local group to shape debates around decolonisation and chapter six will 
explore in more detail the role of other local actors involved in public protests and other non-state 
action. Nevertheless, a clearer understanding of local elites reveals how power manifested in these 
societies and how those with power were able to influence political changes to their benefit. As 
many have suggested, decolonisation did not completely disrupt the power structures of colonial 
societies. This is particularly apparent in states that have maintained political ties with the 
metropolitan power. The non-independent status of these territories cannot be understood 
without exploring how the self-interest of local elites led them to strive to maintain ties with the 
metropole. 
 
1. Economic Power Groups 
Economic dominance allowed certain elites to wield disproportionate influence over local debates 
about political status, often for perceived personal gains. Like many Caribbean societies, in 
Martinique and the Cayman Islands a white elite which had established its power and wealth during 
the era of slavery, maintained a significant level of economic power throughout the twentieth 
century. Revolutions and rebellions in Guadeloupe and BVI during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
 
614 Leila A. Villaverde, Joe L. Kincheloe, and Frances Helyar, ‘Historical Research in Education’, in Doing 
Educational Research, ed. Kenneth Tobin and Joe L. Kincheloe (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2006), 325. 
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centuries disrupted this white minority monopoly of the economy, complicating the structures of 
economic power. 
 
The Cayman Islands 
Among the case study territories, the Cayman Islands is particularly striking in that a mostly white 
minority managed to retain both political and economic dominance. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, an elite group of white merchant families controlled the economy and the 
Legislative Assembly. This group is often referred to as the merchant class, because they owned 
the main merchant businesses, which gave them command over imports and exports in the islands, 
as well as over any passengers wishing to leave or return to Cayman. The power of the merchant 
class created a vertical societal structure, where most Caymanians were dependent on the 
merchants for goods, supplies and if they wished to travel. Hannerz aptly refers to this social elite 
as ‘gatekeepers of the wider world’.615 In the 1950s, the impoverished Cayman Islands became 
wealthier, as the reputation of Caymanians as skilled mariners helped many to find jobs in the 
Canal Zone and in American shipping companies.616 During this crucial period in Cayman’s 
economic history, the merchants cemented their position within politics and the economy. As one 
George Town politician put it, ‘all the ships was owned by white men’.617 Families like the 
McTaggarts and the Merrens solidified their positions of power during this decade, and their 
hegemony remained largely unchallenged. As there were no newspapers in the Cayman Islands, 
until Cayman Times in 1956, it is hard to get an idea of local opinion outside of discussions in the 
Cayman Assembly. However, this very fact helps to demonstrate the lack of alternative intellectual 
leadership in the islands, highlighting the power of the merchant oligarchy and the indifference 
and disenfranchisement of the rest of the population.618 
 
615 Hannerz, Caymanian Politics, 42. 
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Ducan Merren is central to understanding the Caymanian elite, as one of the most influential 
figures among the merchant class in the 1950s. Descended from a Liverpudlian mariner 
shipwrecked in Cayman in the early 1800s, Ducan Merren began his career working for an oil 
company in Louisiana.619 On his return to Cayman to run the family business, he maintained key 
contacts in the US and was keen to protect Cayman’s special visa relationship. The Merren family 
ran the biggest trading company in the Cayman Islands, fixed ‘all retail prices in the Caymans and 
there is no other merchant strong enough to stand against them’.620 Their dominance in the 
shipping industry was to such an extent that they could effectively control all traffic between the 
Cayman Islands and the US. The Merrens also moved into the developing tourism sector, starting 
off by running the Pageant Beach Hotel.621 Their continued wealth and position in society 
throughout the period in question was highlighted in a 1975 Northwester special supplement which 
detailed their success in shipping and tourism.622  
 
Alongside Merren, Roy McTaggart wielded considerable influence over Cayman’s decolonisation 
in the postwar decades. McTaggart was Merren’s business rival, though his family were more 
recent additions to the Caymanian elite. McTaggart’s father, a white Jamaican, had come to 
Cayman in 1862 as a preacher and teacher.623 Roy McTaggart gained a unique education for a 
Caymanian of that time, going to school in Jamaica and then studying dentistry in the US.624 He 
returned to Cayman to work as a dentist, run a general store and also to build up a shipping fleet 
involved in fishing, passengers and freight.625 Merren, McTaggart and other members of this 
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merchant elite had a vested interest in maintaining their position at the top of Caymanian society. 
Through their dominance in the Caymanian Assembly, they promoted the benefits of no taxation, 
Cayman’s profitable links with the US and were actively ‘opposed to anything which will raise the 
standard of living of the poorer people’.626 Although political changes in the 1960s and the 
increasing number of wealthy foreign residents in Cayman somewhat diluted the monopoly of the 
merchant class, by the end of the 1970s they remained dominant figures in the Cayman economy, 
society and political arena. 
 
Martinique 
In Martinique, like in many other Caribbean islands, a well-established white planter class 
descended from plantation owners during the era of slavery owned a majority of the island’s 
economy throughout the twentieth century.627 Known as the Békés, they used their economic 
power to exercise a certain degree of political influence.628 During the era of slavery, the plantation 
owners held a strong grip on local politics. However, after abolition in 1848, an educated métis 
middle class developed which became increasingly involved in the local councils. As certain 
citizenship rights were extended to black Antilleans, the domination of the white planter class in 
the political sphere was somewhat diminished. However, as many historians of the French Antilles 
have noted, the Békés have been remarkably persistent and successful in maintaining their power, 
wealth and influence well into the twenty-first century.629 
 
626 Hugh Foot to Philip Rogers, 17 November 1955, 31. 
627 For other Caribbean islands see Howard Johnson and Karl S. Watson, eds., The White Minority in the 
Caribbean (Kingston: Ian Randle, 1998). 
628 Laurent Coste and Sylvie Guillaume, eds., Élites et crises du XVIe au XXIe siècle: Europe et Outre-mer 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 2014), 21–27. 
629 See Jean Benoist and Edith Kováts-Beaudoux, ‘Les Blancs Créoles de La Martinique’, in L’Archipel 
Inachevé. Culture et Société Aux Antilles Françaises, ed. Jean Benoist (Montreal: Presses Université de 
Montréal, 1972), 106–32; Jean-Luc Jamard, ‘Les Békés Sont Des Judokas...’, Les Temps Modernes 39, no. 441 
(1983): 1872–94; Guy Cabort-Masson, Les Puissances d’argent En Martinique (Martinique: Laboratoire de 
recherches de l’A.M.E.P., 1984); Fred Constant, ‘French Republicanism under Challenge: White Minority 
(Béké) Power in Martinique and Guadeloupe’, in The White Minority in the Caribbean, ed. Howard Johnson 
and Karl S. Watson (Kingston: Ian Randle, 1998), 168–77; Edith Kováts-Beaudoux, Les blancs créoles de la 
Martinique: une minorité dominante (Paris, 2002). 
 156 
 
After abolition, the Martinican white elite cemented their economic position, adapting to any 
changes in the economic and political environment. As the technologies of sugar processing 
changed towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Békés maintained control of the industry 
through ownership of the new sugar refineries, as well as the old sugar plantations.630 In the 1930s, 
they diversified from solely sugar and rum, to banana production. Once bananas became a more 
significant part of the Martinican economy, many of the most influential banana growers were 
Béké businessmen.631 The Békés have also entrenched their power in the banking system through 
shareholdings and directorships.632 The bank Crédit Martiniquais, established in 1924, is mostly 
owned by Béké members and it forms a central part of their continued economic success.633 
 
The Martinican elite were strongly against the move to departmentalise in 1946, as they feared this 
would place greater power in the hands of the black majority.634 However, once the 
departmentalisation law was passed, they successfully delayed the extension of social benefits to 
Antillean citizens. Since the 1940s, the Békés have adeptly taken advantage of the intervention of 
the French state in the new Caribbean departments, particularly in terms of the transfer of funds 
for development. A 1953 decree aimed at helping local businesses directly benefitted the white 
elite as it gave tax exemptions to earnings from housing construction and new businesses, which 
were mostly run by Békés.635 Furthermore, a 1960 decree which appeared to offer Martinicans a 
greater influence in local affairs, in fact permitted the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber 
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of Agriculture to advise the Minister of State on local economic and social matters.636 As these two 
chambers were predominantly made up of Békés, it allowed them to bypass the local General 
Council and negotiate directly with ministers in Paris.637 
 
The Martinican Békés have benefitted from the campaigning of both right-wing and left-wing local 
politicians, making the most of subsidies designed the protect and improve the agricultural 
industry.638 Like other economic elites in the Caribbean, such as Jamaica and Barbados, the Békés’ 
control of land has been instrumental in their maintaining power and influence.639 As the debate 
over involvement in the European Community hit the French Antilles in the 1970s, the Békés 
initially opposed integration.640 However, they soon recognised the possibilities for obtaining 
subsidies from Europe and have become a powerful lobby within the European Union.641 Through 
lobbying in local and national assemblies, through their power locally as major employers and 
landowners, and through funding politicians on both sides of the political spectrum, the Békés 
wielded considerable political influence throughout the twentieth century. Since 
departmentalisation, they opposed any major change to political status that would upset their 
position and the benefits they gain from the French state. Their power was well established in 
Martinique, but they also exerted substantial influence in Guadeloupe. 
 
Guadeloupe 
Since the French Revolution, Guadeloupean society has developed differently from Martinique. 
Whereas the Békés had managed to maintain control in Martinique during the Revolution through 
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British protection, most of the white planters in Guadeloupe fled or were killed during the regime 
of Victor Hugues from 1794 to 1798.642 Without such a powerful white minority and without the 
development of such a significant métis middle class, Guadeloupean society became less starkly 
stratified in terms of race and class than Martinique. Once slavery was reinforced in 1802, 
Martinican Békés began taking over plantations and businesses abandoned by Guadeloupean 
planters, but they did not have such a cemented economic foothold as in Martinique and were in 
smaller numbers.643 Nonetheless, by the Second World War, the Guadeloupean economy was 
mostly controlled by this small group of Martinican Békés, along with metropolitan business 
interests. Following Algerian independence in 1962, several important businesses were taken over 
or developed by Algerian pied-noirs.644 This disrupted the structures of Guadeloupean society and 
caused new forms of racial tension, which were particularly apparent during the major unrest of 
1967. In terms of ethnicity and class, Guadeloupe was more similar to the British Virgin Islands, 
as both had a larger black working-class population than the other islands. 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
Unlike the French Antilles and the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands did not have a 
distinct economic elite in the first half of the twentieth century. Frequent severe hurricanes in the 
early nineteenth century, followed by emancipation in 1834, and the 1853 uprising against 
oppressive taxation on cattle led most white plantation owners to leave the islands.645 By the 1901 
census, the permanent white population was recorded as just two persons, compared to 1300 in 
1805.646 From the post-emancipation era until the Second World War, the BVI struggled 
economically and most BVIslanders emigrated to the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and the 
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US Virgin Islands in search of work.647 Contemporary commentators often suggest that this led to 
a ‘classless’ society developing in the BVI.648 Whilst it is true that society was not stratified quite as 
strictly as in Martinique or the Cayman Islands, or indeed in many Caribbean islands, class 
distinctions did develop in the twentieth century. Noel Lloyd argued that ‘most people in Road 
Town were the descendants of slave masters’, which resulted in the development of a lighter-
skinned elite in the capital.649 He acknowledged that there ‘were attempts to make class distinctions 
but all of us were poor’.650 Maurer highlights the period of migration before World War Two as 
key to the development of a small merchant class.651 Those who emigrated to the Hispanic islands, 
particularly the Dominican Republic returned with sufficient capital to set up or run the main 
businesses in Road Town. Many of the Road Town elite profited from smuggling during the 
Prohibition era.652 Meanwhile, the islanders who worked in the US Virgin Islands during the war 
developed a sense of proletariat consciousness and were mobilised by the merchant class in 
postwar demonstrations for local autonomy.653 
 
This Road Town elite instigated the first major local political organisation in the twentieth century, 
establishing the Civic League in 1938. They continued to influence debates about political status 
throughout the period in question.654 Once the Legislative Assembly was re-established in 1950, it 
was dominated by Road Town businessmen. It was not until the 1960s with the battles between 
the ‘Town Boys’ and the ‘Country Boys’ that political power became less concentrated in Road 
Town.655 Maurer argues that early conflicts between the Road Town elite and workers who had 
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emigrated to the USVI ‘later translated into political factions’.656 Though it would not be accurate 
to suggest that a wealthy exclusive elite group held economic power in the BVI in the twentieth 
century, it is certainly clear that a burgeoning group of Road Town businessmen dominated BVI 
politics from 1940, and well into the 1960s.  
 
In the British Virgin Islands and across the other territories, economic elites played a major part 
in influencing the process of decolonisation and ensuring the political status of their islands suited 
the continuation of their economic dominance. This was most apparent in the Cayman Islands, 
where a white merchant oligarchy pursued a political status which would suit both their business 
interests and their sense of affinity with Britain. In Martinique, on the other hand, the Békés initially 
opposed integration with France. However, once departmentalisation became inevitable, they 
proved highly adaptable, using local and national assemblies to lobby and promote their own 
agenda. These Martinican Békés also established a foothold in the Guadeloupean economy, where 
they similarly work to obstruct any major change to the status quo or any threat to the subsidies 
their businesses received from France. Rather differently to the other territories, the BVI did not 
retain a wealthy white minority after abolition. It is perhaps more surprising then, that the 
burgeoning group of local businessmen promoted a rhetoric of respectability and conservativism, 
and sought greater political representation within rather than outside the colonial state.657 The lines 
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2. Elite Political Power 
Whilst in Martinique, Guadeloupe and the BVI, politics became dominated by a black and métis 
middle class in the twentieth century, in Cayman the white minority maintained a hold over 
political power. The influence that political elites had in debates about political status and 
decolonisation is the most obvious and easy to trace among the different forms of local elite power. 
As the colonial state negotiated with local political leaders to determine the future political status 
of the islands, elected and nominated representatives held a privileged position and could promote 
their own interests. 
 
The Cayman Islands 
In some Caribbean islands, political and economic power was held among different social groups, 
whereas in the Cayman Islands it lay firmly with one faction. Politics in Cayman was dominated 
by the merchant elite from the very first meeting to discuss the establishment of a local Assembly 
in 1831. It is striking that those most influential families of the merchant class highlighted by Hirst, 
the Commissioner of the Cayman Islands, in 1910 were still important figures in Caymanian 
politics between 1945 and 1980.658 Furthermore, once a politician was elected they were likely to 
continue to be elected until retirement, a phenomenon Bodden has described as ‘hegemonic 
dynasties’.659 This tendency is common in many small island states. Both Merren and McTaggart 
played active roles in the Legislative Assembly, shaping debates about the West Indies Federation 
and decolonisation. As a key member of Cayman’s Federation delegation, Merren was open in 
declaring he saw ‘no benefit derived from the Federation’.660 McTaggart was similarly vocal in his 
scepticism of the Federation, claiming ‘nothing could be gained’ from Cayman’s joining.661 
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Throughout the Federation negotiations, the Caymanian elite promoted the idea of ‘racial 
harmony’ within the Cayman Islands and they brought anti-immigration issues to the top of the 
agenda.662 They feared anything that might disrupt the societal structures which benefitted them 
so well. As a result, Cayman’s relationship with the Federation and Jamaica was greatly influenced 
by the self-interest of the merchant class.  
 
McTaggart’s most decisive role came during the disintegration of the West Indies Federation in 
1961. Vehemently opposed to Cayman adopting self-government under Jamaica’s tutelage, 
McTaggart used his influential position in society to obtain a petition signed by over three 
thousand Caymanians in favour of crown colony status under Britain.663 The petition and his 
speech in the Legislative Assembly helped to swing the vote in favour of crown colony status.664 
McTaggart later intervened in constitutional matters in similar fashion in 1967, putting together a 
petition opposing any constitutional change that would move Cayman towards greater 
autonomy.665 As an influential, conservative, pro-British businessman, McTaggart had a huge 
impact on the course of Caymanian decolonisation. Greatly admired by many Caymanians, he has 
been referred to as ‘the Winston Churchill of the Cayman Islands’.666 
 
At the opposite end of Caymanian politics was Ormond Panton, a ‘firebrand populist’ who 
favoured independence.667 He broke the mould of the white, conservative merchant politician. 
Panton is a fascinating figure within the Caymanian elite: both a merchant insider and yet treated 
as an outsider by many merchants due to his family’s black heritage.668 In many ways, Panton had 
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a similar background to McTaggart, as his father, a Jamaican preacher, arrived in Cayman in 1862. 
A key difference, however, was that the Pantons were known in Cayman as a ‘coloured’ family.669 
Despite Ormond Panton ‘passing’ for white, the merchants regarded his family as clients rather 
than equals within Caymanian business circles. Panton frequently clashed with the British 
administration, first in 1954 when he accused Commissioner Gerrard of a conflict of interest 
during an Assembly debate about the Commissioner’s salary and pension.670 A later legal case 
against the colonial administration in 1960 brought Panton into contact with the politically active 
lawyers in Norman Manley’s circle of associates.671 Greatly influenced by these connections, 
Panton was alone among the merchant elite in advocating politics which involved incipient Third 
World awareness and in debating issues of imperialism affecting other postcolonial nations.672 As 
the next chapter on party politics will discuss in more detail, Panton created the NDP (National 
Democratic Party) in 1961 and pushed for greater autonomy. Although he was ultimately 
unsuccessful in achieving the independence that he desired, Panton is a crucial figure for 
understanding Caymanian politics and decolonisation. Through his engagement with wider issues 
of anticolonialism, he demonstrates that decolonisation in the Cayman Islands did not develop in 
an isolated bubble away from global, anticolonial trends. Notions of Caribbean nationalism and 
anticolonialism did spread to the Cayman Islands in the 1960s. Their suppression and Panton’s 
political failure highlights how powerful the white merchant elite were within Caymanian society 
and politics.  
 
The ways in which the merchant oligarchy used their power and influence reveals, not just the 
racial dynamics, but also the gender dimensions of local society and power structures. The 
Caymanian elite were fearful that extending the right to vote to women would disrupt their 
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monopoly over the political system. After the Second World War, only men voted for the local 
Assembly, which angered many women who had played prominent roles in society while men were 
away at sea. British officials imposed a British patriarchal understanding of society onto the very 
different framework of Caymanian daily life, which Bodden has described as ‘matriarchal’.673 In 
their reports, colonial officials suggested that, although legislation did not explicitly restrict women 
from voting, it was traditional for only the men to vote.674 Caymanian women began protesting 
against this injustice in the postwar elections in 1948. They wrote to the Commissioner and argued 
that, having checked the Constitution, it did not mention anything which denied women the 
‘fundamental Human Right of taking part in deciding who shall govern us’.675  
 
However, the women’s demand for the right to vote became tied up in the merchant oligarchy’s 
concerns about maintaining their power in a changing society.676 The women were supported in 
their campaign by Jamaican pharmacist, Dr Rose, a founding member of the Cayman Vanguard 
Progressive Party, who also campaigned to allow greater political representation for black 
Caymanians.677 The merchant elite, particularly Ducan Merren, were fearful of Rose and went to 
great lengths to slander his reputation. Merren and his associates were concerned that if women 
had the right to vote they might support more liberal candidates like Dr Rose. Commissioner 
Donald participated in this vilification of Dr Rose, reporting to the Governor of Jamaica, ‘You 
have…heard mention of the notorious “Dr.” Rose… He has a shocking reputation here… He is 
a leading light in the Vanguard Progressive Party… He is said to be very anti-white’.678 As a result 
of the obstructions of the merchant elite and the Commissioner, women had to wait until 1958 to 
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gain the right to vote. Like Panton’s failure, the difficulties women faced in gaining the right to 
vote demonstrate the lengths the merchants would go to to maintain the status quo. 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
Unlike Cayman, the principal political actors in the British Virgin Islands in the twentieth century 
were from a recently developed group of businessmen. Whilst unrest broke out across much of 
the British West Indies in the 1930s, in the BVI no major protest or trade union action arose.679 ⁠ 
However, the emerging merchant class did begin to place increased pressure on the Commissioner 
to reinstate the legislative council. Hope Stevens, a Tortolian lawyer, established the Civic League 
in 1938 in an attempt to generate political change.680 Stevens set up the League along with the 
Road Town merchants and businessmen, Howard Penn, David Fonseca, Charles Georges and 
Joseph O’Neal. Some League members, like Stevens, had worked or studied in New York, and 
had been influenced by the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920s.681 ⁠ Others had gained experience in 
political organisation by attending labour congresses in other Caribbean islands.682 Though this 
burgeoning political class were influenced by American and other Caribbean political movements, 
they remained conservative in approach. The Civic League prepared a petition with hundreds of 
signatures from BVIslanders calling for a legislative council, but it was rejected by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies.683 
 
Civic League member Howard Penn was emblematic of this generation of political leaders who 
advocated a certain degree of change without directly challenging the colony status of the BVI. 
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Penn ran a groceries store in Road Town and had begun his career working for Fonseca in his 
liquor shop, profiting from the smuggling networks in the region during the Prohibition era. Penn 
was initially reluctant to get involved in politics, arguing that he was only concerned with the 
economic prosperity of the islands.684 His memoir demonstrates a conservative outlook and 
emphasises his white ancestry, celebrating his forefather, the Englishman William Penn who gave 
his name to Pennsylvania.685 Following the reinstatement of the Legislative Council in 1950, Penn 
served as an elected representative until 1960 and then as a nominated member until 1975.686 Like 
many other conservative BVI politicians of his age, Penn promoted a rhetoric of independent 
spirit without actual independence, portraying BVIslanders as ‘law-abiding, land-owning people, 
in control of our own destiny’.687 As was common in politics across the case study territories, family 
connections were important and political families tended to have several members in the local 
assemblies. Penn’s cousin Andre became a representative in the Assembly in 1995 and another 
cousin Dancia became BVI’s first female Attorney General.688  
 
Other influential figures remained ambiguous when it came to decolonisation. Fellow Civic League 
founder, Joseph O’Neal, known as J. R., ran the family general store in Road Town in the 1930s 
and 40s, having first trained as a pharmacist in St Kitts. He too had benefitted from the economic 
opportunities of the Prohibition era. At the same time as becoming involved in the Civic League, 
O’Neal launched the short-lived newspaper The Torch because there was no local newspaper in the 
islands.689 He was later nominated to the Executive Council in 1948 and then served as a nominated 
member in the Legislative Assembly from 1950 to 1970. O’Neal did not advocate independence 
whilst on the Legislative Assembly, promoting the economic development of the islands as 
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paramount. He was vague in his approach to BVI’s political status, suggesting in 1992 that 
independence may occur in the future but that he did ‘not recommend following directly in the 
path of some of our Caribbean neighbours, but selecting carefully what is best for the BVI’.690 
 
Several key BVIslanders were involved in Caribbean regional conferences and discussions about 
federation and independence. Following David Fonseca’s involvement in the Civic League, his 
son Glanny, or I. G. Fonseca, represented the BVI at the 1947 Caribbean Labour Conference in 
Jamaica. It is striking that sharing a platform with Jamaican and other Caribbean anticolonialists 
did not encourage Fonseca to call for outright independence. Although it is important to 
remember that, at this stage, many Caribbean leaders were focused on federation rather than 
independence. Fonseca’s long political career saw him elected to the Legislative Assembly from 
1950 to 1971. Glanny Fonseca became Penn’s political rival and he favoured greater constitutional 
change.691 Whilst he campaigned for ‘further recognition of the BVI’s rights for improved self-
government’, he did not push for full independence.692 As the dominance of the Road Town 
politicians began to be challenged by the ‘Country Boys’, Fonseca formed the ‘United Three’ in 
1965 with Arnando Scatliffe and Dr Qwominer William Osborne. Scatliffe, owner of the oldest 
laundry and dry-cleaning service in Road Town, served in the Legislative Assembly from 1963 to 
1967. He later acted as a Justice of the Peace and was actively involved in the local Rotary Club.693 
Osborne, originally from Montserrat, began working as a medical officer in the BVI in 1955 and 
was frequently the only doctor residing in Tortola. He ran businesses across Tortola and Virgin 
Gorda, and was seen as part of the Road Town elite.694 He later split from Fonseca to form the 
BVI Democratic Party, and also supported the Positive Action Movement (PAM) protesting 
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against neo-colonialism and racism in 1968.695 It is striking that this circle of respected Road Town 
businessmen dominated the local political scene until the mid 1960s and promoted notions of 
respectability, the Church, the British monarchy and abiding by the law.696 Furthermore, their 
awareness that the majority of BVI workers emigrated to or had previously worked in the USVI 
meant that BVI’s relationship with the US islands remained prominent in political debates. 
 
Countering the dominance of the Road Town elite, the ‘Country Boys’ emerged as a political force 
in the 1960s. Most significant among them, Hamilton Lavity Stoutt was the BVI’s first Chief 
Minister and was the longest serving parliamentarian in the Caribbean on his death in 1995.697 
Stoutt was born in Long Bay, Tortola and left school early to work in boat building, later 
establishing a career in wholesale and retail.698 Common to many BVI politicians, he was a 
Methodist and lay preacher.699 Noel Lloyd describes him as an ordinary BVIslander who ‘tried hard 
to speak like an educated Englishman’.700 In his later years, Stoutt argued in favour of eventual 
independence, but took a more conservative view for most of his political career.701 As one of the 
most influential politicians in BVI history, his birthday is now a public holiday. Alongside Stoutt 
in the 1960s, another lay preacher, Terrance Lettsome, became a local Assembly representative as 
one of the ‘Country Boys’. As a child, Lettsome was fostered by extended family in Long Look, 
Tortola, and he later set up a block plant in the island after learning block laying in the USVI.702 
Lettsome was vocal in his disapproval of any form of protest or dissent that he perceived as 
unlawful or disruptive, such as the Positive Action Movement.703 Through their privileged 
positions in BVI society, representatives like Lettsome discouraged protest and fostered an 
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environment where major anticolonial movements would be seen as radical and illegitimate. Like 
Stoutt, Lettsome did not push for independence during his time in office but did advocate greater 
autonomy for the future, arguing in 1992 that ‘it is time the we prepare ourselves to run, fully, our 
own affairs’.704  
 
Even politicians who were deemed to be more in touch with local people, like Ivan Dawson, 
discouraged protest and dissent. The third ‘Country Boy’, Dawson was a carpenter and preacher 
from Cane Garden Bay. Despite having ‘no interest in politics’, he stood for office in 1957 after 
the incumbent member of the assembly, Brudnell-Bruce, invited Dawson to take his place on 
stepping down.705 Dawson was educated in St Thomas and, like many BVIslanders, worked on the 
USVI Defence Project in 1941.706 Noel Lloyd described him as ‘the only politician that everyone 
trusted’.707 Dawson focused on economic development, particularly for his district, during his time 
in office and, although he was not opposed to the PAM, he argued ‘peaceful means should be 
followed’.708 Most BVI politicians were opposed to any disruptive protests or agitation that would 
push for political change, such as those adopted in many colonies to fight for independence. 
 
Noticeable across the political spectrum in the BVI was the importance of respectability. 
Politicians almost always came from a respected position in society, either as doctors, the owners 
of the local shop or most commonly as a lay preacher. The Church was hugely important in BVI 
society and politics, and was seen as legitimising the role and importance of a public figure. The 
early years of the Legislative Assembly were dominated by a conservative Road Town elite. These 
crucial years in the 1950s and early 1960s, were hugely influential in terms of decolonisation. 
Through figures like Penn and O’Neal, local debates about the West Indies Federation centred on 
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fears of immigration and economic concerns. With politicians well aware that their support base 
came from islanders working in the USVI, the relationship with the American islands took centre 
stage and greatly influenced the decision not to join the Federation. 
 
Some politicians claimed they were ready to campaign for greater autonomy but were held back 
by the fact that most of the voting public were not ready. However, other commentators have 
suggested that, in reality, politicians acting in self-interest narrowed the political debate to 
economic development and away from independence.709 Once a politician had been elected, it was 
common for them to get re-elected several times. For example, in the elections of 1960, all the 
seats were gained by politicians up for re-election.710 The only exception was Theodore Faulkner, 
who was hardly a newcomer, having been involved in the reestablishment of the Assembly back 
in 1949.711 This phenomenon was common across the territories in the Caribbean, including in the 
French Antilles. 
 
As in the Cayman Islands, the nascent political elite of the BVI were keen to maintain current 
power structures and to prevent women from engaging in politics. A 1950 meeting of the ‘leading 
men from every large village in Tortola’, including Howard Penn, recommended that only men 
over 21 years old should be allowed to vote.712 Nonetheless, as part of the Leeward Islands, 
suffrage was extended to include women in 1950.713 However, due to property restrictions which 
disproportionately affected women, given that they were more likely to occupy lower paid 
positions, many women were still restricted from voting. Despite women’s major role in local 
society, while many men worked abroad, those who sought to maintain BVI’s links to Britain also 
attempted to prevent female suffrage. Even as politics diversified away from the Road Town elite 
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in the 1960s, politicians in the BVI did not advocate major constitutional change during the period 
in question. In the French Caribbean, the political elite similarly pursued a continued constitutional 
relationship with the colonial state. 
 
Martinique 
Politics in the French Antilles in the decades following the Second World War was dominated by 
Aimé Césaire, one of the architects of departmentalisation. As a founder of the Négritude 
movement, as a deputy in the French National Assembly and as a mayor of the Martinican capital 
Fort-de-France, Césaire directed much of the debate about political status and identity in both 
intellectual and political spheres. As discussed in chapter one, Césaire advocated and successfully 
secured the departmentalisation of Martinique and Guadeloupe in 1946. Historians and literary 
critics have long debated the seeming contradiction between Césaire the writer, who railed against 
colonialism, and Césaire the politician who opposed full independence.714 However, as Bishop 
argues, we should not see Césaire as two distinct figures: the writer and the politician. Instead, 
these two positions can be partly reconciled through the understanding that Césaire viewed French 
colonialism as continuing to manifest within the cultural sphere, but not in the political arena.715 It 
is important to remember that Césaire’s position in the 1940s and his support for integration with 
France was not unusual either for a Caribbean politician or within the French Empire.716 Many of 
his counterparts in the Anglophone Caribbean were not yet advocating full independence due to 
concerns about the viability of small states.717 
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After 1946, Césaire became increasingly critical of departmentalisation, as implementation was 
slow and did not bring the equality which he desired.718 Cesaire’s confusing relationship with 
French assimilationism and the universalist principles of the French Republic was visible in his 
famous 1956 letter to Maurice Thorez, the leader of the French Communist Party. Declaring his 
rejection of the Communist Party, partly because of its assimilationist tendencies, Césaire argued: 
‘My conception of the universal is that of a universal rich with all particularity, enriched by all the 
details, a deepening and a coexistence of all individualities’.719 Césaire viewed the French Antilles 
as politically part of France, but sought greater recognition of Antillean cultural differences. Thus, 
he envisaged the future of Martinique within the French Republic but with an acceptance of 
Caribbean cultural differences, rather than continued French cultural assimilationism. Two years 
after leaving the Communist Party, Césaire established the Martinican Progressive Party (PPM), 
through which he advocated greater political autonomy for Martinique, though never 
independence. Césaire was a vocal proponent of the decentralisation policies of Mitterrand, which 
he believed would help to transfer some decision making powers from Paris to Martinique.720 
Following Mitterrand’s election in 1981, Césaire, in a speech in Fort-de-France, declared a 
moratorium on the question of Martinique’s political status.721 He argued that continuing to dwell 
on the issue of political status was a distraction from engaging with decentralisation and 
campaigning for the economic development of the Antilles. Through the PPM, Césaire continued 
to uphold departmentalisation and the political and economic benefits this brought, whilst also 
creating a space to advocate a unique Martinican cultural identity.722 Césaire should be seen as a 
product of his time: surrounded by other federalists like Senghor, and perceiving his elevated status 
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Given the close ties between Guadeloupe and Martinique, Césaire’s position as the most well-
known and respected Antillean politician greatly shaped debate in Guadeloupe. Nonetheless, 
several key Guadeloupean politicians had powerful roles in political status negotiations. The most 
influential of Guadeloupe’s political elite in the postwar years came from middle class black 
families and tended to be members of the communist or socialist parties. A few influential 
politicians had participated in the Dissidence during the Vichy years and had gained legitimacy 
through their role in liberating the French Antilles.723 Gerty Archimède represented the 
Communist Party in the National Assembly from 1946 to 1951 and supported the move to 
departmentalise Guadeloupe. Archimède was a lawyer from a middle class political family in 
Morne-à-l’Eau. Her father had been mayor of their town and therefore she was involved in politics 
from an early age.724 Archimède followed Eugénie Éboué-Tell, widow of the famous Guianese 
politician Felix Éboué, to become the second black woman elected to the French National 
Assembly. Archimède was a pioneer for women’s rights, as the first female lawyer in Guadeloupe 
and the founder of the Union of Guadeloupean Women.725  
 
Though firmly anticolonial, Archimède, like many Antillean women activists of her time, viewed 
France as the defender of women’s rights after it extended suffrage to women, including Antillean 
women, in 1945. Through her role as political director of the Guadeloupean Communist Party’s 
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Newspaper L’Etincelle, Archimède promoted an anticolonial but pro-French ideology.726 She was 
part of an international feminist communist network, and even housed and defended US Civil 
Rights activist Angela Davis when Davis had her passport confiscated on arriving in Guadeloupe 
on a boat from Cuba in 1969.727 Archimède was part of a global network of anticolonial black 
activists but remained, nonetheless, firmly devoted to remaining French. Crucially, like so many 
Antillean politicians, she adopted a seemingly contradictory anticolonial stance without advocating 
independence. 
 
Even communist politician Rosan Girard remained ambiguous in his approach to decolonisation. 
Like Archimède, Girard came from a middle class black family; his father was a teacher and Girard 
became a doctor. Girard fought actively against the Vichy regime in Guadeloupe during the war 
and was imprisoned for his activism. After the war, he served in the National Assembly between 
1946 and 1958, as well as being elected mayor of Moule several times between 1945 and 1971. 
Girard’s position on Guadeloupe’s political status was ambiguous: when departmentalisation failed 
to deliver, he called for autonomy with continued association to France.728 In his 1979 book on 
the state of affairs in Guadeloupe, Girard argued: ‘Independence is a decoy, just like 
departmentalisation was…the people do not want independence, and do not want to be excluded 
from the French community’.729 
 
One of the few in the political elite to argue against departmentalisation in 1946, Paul Valentino 
emerged as an influential political figure during the Dissidence.730 Valentino was imprisoned under 
the Vichy regime, and sent to the infamous prison in French Guiana. Valentino got involved in 
politics at an early age, when he was twenty-six, and was a member of the socialist party, the French 
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Section of the Workers' International (SFIO), and director of the official journal of the SFIO, 
Fraternité. After being released from prison, Valentino was elected to the National Assembly in 
1945 and argued strongly against integrating with France.731 Due to his position on 
departmentalisation, Valentino’s influence decreased in the mid 1950s.732 By 1967, Valentino 
switched parties, joining the right-wing Union of Democrats for the Fifth Republic (UDR). Having 
spent so much time away from Guadeloupe, Valentino did not wield significant political clout in 
the 1960s, but he remained a respected political figure due to his involvement in the wartime 
resistance. He is an important reminder that not all mainstream politicians in the Antilles were in 
favour of departmentalisation in 1946. 
 
Later additions to the political scene in Guadeloupe continued this seeming contradictory stance 
in advocating anticolonialism whilst wishing to maintain the departmental status. Henri Bangou 
served as the communist mayor of Guadeloupe’s largest city, Pointe-à- Pitre, from 1965 until his 
retirement in 2008, when his son Jacques took over. The Bangou family exemplify the ‘political 
family’ trend in Guadeloupean politics, one that is common across the territories in question and 
in many small island states. Bangou was a well-respected doctor and, like Girard, he maintained an 
ambiguous stance on departmentalisation, calling for self-determination but within a continued 
association with France.733 Bangou has been criticised by independence activists for collaborating 
with the French authorities and assisting with the criminalisation of nationalists.734 He typifies the 
difficult relationship between the Communist Party and nationalist political activists.735 For 
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Bangou, like most politicians in the French Antilles, his legitimacy was based on French 
Republican ideals of equality, and so he remained tied to the idea of being part of France.736 
 
In Guadeloupe and Martinique, local politicians continued to promote the benefits of remaining 
part of France and suggested that independence would be detrimental to the political and 
economic stability of the Antilles. Similarly, many Caymanian and BVI political leaders expressed 
a sense of affinity with Britain and opposed any major threats to the status quo. Political elites 
played a major role in discouraging dissent and disorder which might generate pressure for 
independence. They had gained their positions and legitimacy in a colonial system which partly 
benefitted them, and thus they were hesitant to radically challenge that system. Across the case 
study territories, men with considerable political power opposed women’s engagement in politics. 
Restrictions on women voting and the dominance of men in the local political arena meant that 
those in a position to articulate island identity in relation to decolonisation were mostly men. Like 
much of the nationalist rhetoric of this era in the Caribbean, this resulted in a very masculine 
portrayal of local identity.737 Most women who did manage to get elected or who wielded a certain 
amount of influence in the political debates in the territories, displayed a sense of affinity with 
Britain or France and were opposed to major changes to political status. 
 
3. The Role of Local Intellectuals 
Obviously, economic and political control were the two most significant ways elites held power 
and dominated the conversation about political status. Nonetheless, particularly in the French 
Antilles, an elite educated group influenced the debate through their respected positions as 
intellectuals. Most notable among these was Martinican writer Aimé Césaire. Though often 
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overlooked, many women intellectuals contributed to the discussions about decolonisation. Across 
the four territories, intellectuals and historians played an active role in shaping political status 
debates. As with much of the Caribbean, prominent intellectuals tended to be from the black or 
métis educated middle class. 
 
Martinique 
French Antillean intellectuals enjoyed an elevated position in society and often engaged directly in 
politics, most evident with figures like Aimé Césaire. Martinican intellectuals Césaire, Glissant and 
Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant can be seen to represent three generations of the development 
of Martinican political thought on Antillean identity. Firstly, through his writings on the notion of 
Négritude, Césaire promoted the ‘valorization of the African connection, the rediscovery of the 
African connection, of African consciousness, of African personality, of African cultural 
traditions’.738 The term Négritude was coined by Césaire in his journal L’Étudiant Noir in 1935.739 
Césaire’s writings emphasised taking pride in African heritage and exposed the racial construction 
of the colonial relationship in the Antilles.740 
 
The significant role of women intellectuals in French Antillean thought is often overlooked. 
Alongside Césaire, Léon-Gontran Damas and Léopold Senghor, the founding figures of Négritude, 
Martinican writer Paulette Nardal made a crucial contribution to the movement.741 Nardal grew up 
in a large middle-class family with seven sisters and was the first black person to study at the 
Sorbonne. Living in 1930s Paris, she co-founded La Revue Du Monde Noir and ran a salon with her 
sisters Jane and Andrée in which writers, students and artists from across the African diaspora met 
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to discuss politics, current affairs and issues affecting men and women of colour in France.742 
Nardal’s writings demonstrate how crucial women’s perspectives were to the development of 
Négritude.743 In the postwar years, Nardal was actively engaged in raising women’s participation in 
Martinican politics. She remained a resolute Gaullist and firmly supported the departmentalisation 
of the French Antilles. Like Archimède, she saw the French Republic as ‘raising [women] to the 
dignified level of citizens’.744 Though pioneering, in many ways Nardal did not escape the politics 
of respectability of her social class. Her writings about the roles of men and women were heavily 
influenced by her social conservatism and her Catholicism.745 Nardal was an important voice in 
shaping Martinican debates around departmentalisation and the role of black women in French 
and specifically French Antillean society. 
 
Edouard Glissant was more radical than Césaire and Nardal, and supported Antillean 
independence. Glissant is often portrayed as the intellectual son of Césaire, in that he built on and 
moved past Césaire’s notion of Négritude. Glissant studied at the same school in Martinique which 
Césaire had previously attended. In his youth, Glissant was far more radical than Césaire in his 
engagement with French colonialism. He co-founded the Antillean and Guianese Front for 
Autonomy (FAGA) in 1961 and openly advocated independence.746 As a result, he was banned 
from Martinique in the 1960s by de Gaulle’s government.747 Other founding members of the 
FAGA included Albert Béville, a Guadeloupean advocate of Négritude who adopted the name Paul 
Niger and was killed in the notorious 1962 aeroplane accident in which several Antillean and 
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Guianese nationalists died.748 Like Martinican Frantz Fanon, Glissant openly supported the FLN 
and Algerian independence, which garnered criticism from the Antillean elite because the French 
Antilles, as part of France, fought on the French side in the Algerian War. In his 1981 Le Discours 
Antillais, Glissant built on Césaire’s ideas of Antillean difference and criticised French 
assimilationism.749 He coined the term Antillanité and highlighted the hybridity of Caribbean 
culture.750 The global nature of his later writings in the 1990s, such as Poétique de la relation, made 
some critics claim that he had given up on the pursuit of independence for Martinique.751 However, 
Glissant remained engaged in local politics and continued to criticise French policies towards 
Martinique and Guadeloupe. He was particularly critical of local political elites who he saw as 
colluding in a reproduction of the colonial relationship.752 
 
Frantz Fanon, though not as influential in the French Antilles during his lifetime, also explored 
the complex, dual identity of being Martinican and French. Fanon is more commonly examined 
in the context of postcolonial studies, rather than French Antillean politics. As Macey has 
suggested, the figure of Fanon is frequently dehistoricised in postcolonial studies, ignoring how 
Fanon’s life experiences influenced his writing.753 Fanon’s Peau Noire, Masques Blancs explores the 
difficulties and complexities of life specifically as an Antillean student in postwar France, not 
simply a black Frenchman.754 Like many Antillean students, Fanon experienced alienation, racism 
and condescension when he moved to metropolitan France. This called into question the universal 
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principles of the French Republic, of which Martinique and Guadeloupe were now an integral 
part.755 Fanon advocated violence as the solution to end colonialism and was greatly disappointed 
when riots following an incident in Fort-de-France, Martinique failed to develop into a major 
resistance to French colonialism.756 Fanon supported Glissant’s FAGA and remained dedicated to 
independence for both Martinique and Algeria until his untimely death in 1961. 
 
Though somewhat outside the scope of this study, it is worth noting that Martinican intellectuals 
since Glissant have maintained an ambiguous position towards independence. In their 1989 Éloge 
de la Créolité, Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant moved beyond the African-focused Négritude and 
the unique Caribbean identity promoted by the Antillanité movement.757 Instead, they stressed the 
heterogeneity of Martinican and Guadeloupean identity and culture, and promoted the Creole 
language.758 Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant have sometimes been vague about their views on 
independence, with Chamoiseau recently arguing ‘Concepts like liberty, sovereignty, and 
responsibility can only be articulated once you’ve taken the ongoing process of globalisation into 
consideration’.759 These Martinican intellectuals have all contributed to notions of Antillean 
identity and to the debate over Martinique’s political status. 
 
Guadeloupe 
In Guadeloupe, intellectuals also played a part in the public debate over departmentalisation. The 
most notable Guadeloupean intellectuals of the postwar era are the women writers Dany Bébel-
Gisler, Maryse Condé and Simone Schwarz-Bart. Bébel-Gisler was born to a plantation owner and 
an agricultural worker in 1935, and studied under ethnographer Michel Leiris. She was among the 
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first to promote the Creole language as a way to protect Antillean culture.760 Bébel-Gisler 
advocated independence for Guadeloupe and saw the recovery and promotion of Creole as a way 
to achieve independence in the future.761 Similarly, Maryse Condé has advocated independence for 
the French Antilles.762 She has distanced herself from the Négritude and Créolité movements, 
working in the US and focusing on feminist issues. Condé’s writing often explores issues of race, 
gender and identity in Caribbean society.763 Schwarz-Bart writes about issues of male domination 
over women in Caribbean culture and explores the sense of alienation common to Antilleans 
emigrating to the metropole.764 These Guadeloupean women have often been understudied in 
favour of the famous male intellectuals of Martinique. However, their writings and engagement 
with the debate over political status of the French Antilles are just as important. 
 
The British Territories 
The impact of intellectual commentators in the British territories was far less significant, compared 
to the French Antilles. In the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, there were few 
opportunities for the development of an educated middle class in the early twentieth century. This 
is evident in the lack of local newspapers until the late 1950s and the absence of serious challenges 
to the status quo until after the Second World War. In the Cayman Islands, the dominant position 
of the merchant class in society made it very difficult for any academics or commentators to openly 
criticise the white elite until the end of the twentieth century.765 In the 1970s, a young Roy Bodden 
spoke out against the dominance of the Caymanian merchants but was labelled a communist 
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radical and found it difficult to secure employment as a result.766 His 1978 article in The Northwester 
encouraged Caymanians to think of alternatives beyond their status as a dependent territory of the 
UK.767 Yet, as an editorial in the subsequent issue highlighted, most Caymanians were fearful of 
speaking out ‘often for fear of economic retribution’.768 As Bodden has argued, the issue of 
patronage, which restricted the development of an educated middle class to counter the power of 
the merchants, continues in some form to this day.769 
 
It is difficult to ascertain the influence of the local intelligentsia in decolonisation debates in the 
British Virgin Islands. As the local political scene expanded and public debate widened with the 
establishment of The Island Sun newspaper in the 1960s, local historians began writing about the 
islands’ history and its relationship with Britain. In 1975, Harrigan and Varlack labelled the BVI a 
‘West Indian Anomaly’, and whilst arguing that the territory had not yet found a constitution that 
suited it, they did not advocate full independence.770 Pearl Varlack worked at the University of the 
Virgin Islands in the USVI and, like many commentators and writers from the BVI, she promoted 
inter-Virgin Islands cooperation. The Island Sun offered an opportunity for political commentators 
to debate major island issues. Whilst some contributors suggested independence could be a future 
possibility, the overall tone of the paper was conservative, royalist and did not overtly challenge 
the status quo.771  
 
Therefore, whilst intellectuals greatly shaped debate about political status in the French Antilles, 
their power and influence were much less significant in the British territories. Postwar Antillean 
intellectuals, like Césaire and Nardal, tended to favour departmentalisation, whilst later generations 
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were more radical and openly supported independence. Nonetheless, with many of these figures 
working in mainland France or abroad, they had limited influence on local politics. 
 
Conclusion 
Local elites in the Caribbean were crucial negotiators of the non-independent status of their 
islands. Influential groups and individuals exercised power through their positions as economic 
elites, through political dominance, and through prominence in intellectual circles. Whilst other 
local citizens engaged in the debates about decolonisation, these elite groups held disproportionate 
influence in the small island societies. Following the histories of prominent individuals in these 
societies reveals the strong connections they fostered with other colonies and anticolonial activists. 
Many of the politicians discussed in this chapter participated in anticolonial networks in the 
Caribbean region and in the metropolitan capitals, coming into contact with nationalist leaders 
who would guide their own countries to independence. Elites in the Caribbean territories were 
evidently not isolated from the decolonisation debates of the time. However, within the context 
of their own society’s political and economic structures, they did not push for independence. 
 
Only by comparing across the four territories can we properly understand how different power 
structures and local political leaders influenced decolonisation. This comparative analysis has 
revealed how historically embedded elite groups colluded with the colonial state in order to 
maintain their positions of power. Racial and class inequality had a significant impact in Martinique 
and the Cayman Islands. Although inequality was less pronounced in Guadeloupe and the BVI, 
individuals and groups who did manage to gain a degree of power in local politics appeared 
disinclined to rock the boat and they focused on economic improvement, rather than 
constitutional change. Most significantly, a strong nationalist political elite with a popular support 
base did not develop in these territories. 
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The manner in which some local elites collaborated with the colonial power is central to our 
understanding of why certain states pushed for independence and others negotiated integration or 
dependence. In the British territories, this manifested in a display of ‘affinity’ with Britain. Bodden 
has highlighted the affinity expressed by the Caymanian merchant oligarchy as they sought to retain 
ties with Britain at all cost.772 Maurer has suggested that while a strengthened sense of Virgin 
Islander identity developed after the Second World War, BVI politicians remained fearful of losing 
their colonial relationship with Britain.773 Likewise, elites in the French Antilles on both sides of 
the political spectrum demonstrated a continuing loyalty to the French Republic, despite the 
failings of departmentalisation. The political elite in the Antilles, perceiving their position and 
legitimacy to have been gained through the egalitarian principles of the French Republic, continued 
to uphold and reinforce the dependent status of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Whilst the Békés 
gradually lost a certain amount of political power after abolition, they continued to wield a degree 
of influence over the political status debates through economic might and lobbying. They carefully 
guarded against an independence that might see their economic monopoly challenged.  
 
The collaboration between local elites and colonial powers is not unique to these territories. 
Historians have highlighted the ways in which elites collaborated with colonial officials during the 
transition of power, ensuring a degree of continuity post-independence.774 Indeed, elite groups 
continue to collaborate with former colonial powers in many postcolonial states. This is 
particularly noticeable in the Caribbean, to the extent that Bonilla argues that no Caribbean state 
has really achieved full independence from Western powers.775 However, in these non-independent 
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Caribbean states, local elites expressed such a sense of affinity with the colonial power that they 
could not envisage independence in any form. 
 
Yet questions remain as to how these powerful groups interacted in local politics and to what 
extent the nature of party politics was instrumental in decolonisation. An exploration of local 
political dynamics reveals the mechanisms used by elites to exercise leverage in the decolonisation 
process. Could local political parties channel nationalist sentiment and disrupt the conservative 






































Local Politics: The Dynamics and Failures of Political Parties 
 
 
Building on the local focus of the previous chapter, this chapter will shift the analysis to party 
politics. Political parties in the overseas territories were closely linked to powerful elite groups. 
This chapter will highlight the instances where political parties included, acted in the interest of, 
or opposed local elites. It will demonstrate how the nature of party politics in each of the territories 
restricted proper debate about the political status and future of the islands. 
 
For many former colonies, political parties were a dynamic vessel for anticolonial nationalism and 
a crucial way to channel the fight for independence. From Ghana to Guinea to Jamaica, nationalists 
used political parties to unify the struggle against colonialism.776 In the Caribbean, the development 
of political parties and trade union activity ‘provided much of the driving force for constitutional 
change’.777 However, in the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, distinct political parties 
with any clear political ideology failed to develop. Furthermore, nationalists were unable to build 
a campaign for greater autonomy through a unified political party. These two British territories 
have a form of the ‘Westminster model’, common across former British colonies in the Caribbean. 
As Kate Quinn has highlighted, in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars tended to see this model as a 
positive influence, ensuring stability in Caribbean democracies.778 More recent scholarship has 
highlighted the more complex impact of the Westminster model. Henrice Atlink suggests that the 
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‘concentration of executive power in one party and dominance of the cabinet’ can restrict progress 
by allowing the incumbent government to disregard proposals made by ‘the opposition, civil 
society organisations and international bodies’.779 Furthermore, the Westminster model has been 
observed to promote and reinforce the status quo in many post-colonial Caribbean nations.780 
Hannerz’ Caymanian Politics is a detailed and useful account of changing political trends in the 
Cayman Islands in the postwar years through to the early 1970s.781 Building on this literature, this 
chapter will show how attempts to follow a Westminster model restricted the ability to push for 
change in the BVI and the Cayman Islands. 
 
Meanwhile, the literature on political developments in the French Antilles, from an institutional 
perspective, is extensive.782 The 1981 presidential elections, though outside the scope of this study, 
proved a particularly fruitful lens for exploring party dynamics in the Antilles, and the relationship 
between local and metropolitan parties.783 In the French Caribbean, most political parties were 
affiliated to metropolitan groups, making them subordinate to metropolitan concerns and policies. 
This chapter will go further by assessing how metropolitan links actively restricted political debate. 
 
This chapter will argue that the nature and development of party politics are central to 
understanding the process of decolonisation and its outcomes in the case study territories. Firstly, 
in the Cayman Islands, the failure of party politics coincided with the breakdown of the first party 
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to push for self-government. Secondly, in the British Virgin Islands, political parties failed to 
develop clear ideological foundations and were unable to vocalise or channel discontent with 
British rule. Thirdly, the affiliations of political parties in the French Antilles to their metropolitan 
counterparts restricted the conversation about political futures and encouraged divisions among 
those seeking greater autonomy. In different ways, the implementation of a European political 
party model hampered efforts to accomplish change. 
 
It would be a mistake to see the failure of conventional party politics as the sole explanation for 
the seeming inability of these islands to develop as viable nation states. The elements of 
modernisation theory which emphasised the necessity of European-style political systems for the 
sustainability of nation states have been criticised by contemporary scholarship.784 Nonetheless, it 
is important to explore the ways in which party politics, or the lack thereof, restricted other forms 
of political organisation and influenced decolonisation debates. Party politics also intersected with 
local constructions of race and the dominance of certain elite groups in society. The study of local 
politics in this chapter is important for demonstrating that the nature of political parties in each of 
the territories was closely tied to the development of nationalism and the process of 
decolonisation. 
 
1. The Cayman Islands: The Failure of Political Parties 
Unlike the other case study territories, in the Cayman Islands, a system of political parties did not 
successfully develop until the twenty-first century. Attempts to establish parties were closely tied 
to both moves towards more populist, mass politics and debates over internal self-government. 
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The most significant of these endeavours was the National Democratic Party (NDP) established 
by Ormond Panton in 1961 to push for greater self-determination. The period from the NDP’s 
creation to its demise in 1965 marked a crucial political moment in Caymanian decolonisation. The 
breakdown of party politics in this era also represented the failure of pushes for constitutional 
change. Thus, party politics in the Cayman Islands tells us a great deal about the nature of 
decolonisation in the territory. 
 
Prior to the NDP, the first attempt to establish a political party in the Cayman Islands was 
undertaken by the Cayman Vanguard Progressive Party (CVPP) in 1958.785 It was made up mostly 
of black and ‘coloured’ Caymanians from George Town and it represented the first significant 
opposition to the political dominance of the white merchant elite.786 Warren Conolly, the son of 
an influential merchant, was the president of the CVPP.787 Though Conolly was from a prominent 
merchant family, he came from East End, not the capital George Town, and he was a firm 
supporter of internal self-government.788 The members of the CVPP tended to be well educated 
and well travelled. The party’s policies presented a clear challenge to the merchant oligarchy, as 
they sought to expand labour legislation, introduce universal suffrage and re-examine Cayman’s 
tax system. The Commissioner at the time discerned the merchants’ concern, claiming the 
‘merchants know that if they do not control the Assembly they will be in danger of being affected 
seriously by new measures of taxation’.789 The idea of a political party seeking to appeal directly to 
the masses and dominated by black Caymanians posed a serious threat to the traditional hierarchies 
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of society based on patronage. As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘patronage’ in Caymanian 
society and politics manifested in the merchant elite maintaining power through their position as 
patrons and leaders in society.790 Most Caymanians were dependent on them for supplies, transport 
and financial assistance. 
 
In order to undermine the CVPP, the merchants focused on the presence of Jamaicans within the 
party. This came at a time when Cayman’s relationship with Jamaica was changing, and 
conservative Caymanians were suspicious of the possibility of socialist or populist ideas spreading 
to Cayman from Jamaica.791 The Commissioner colluded in this narrative, propagating rumours 
about a Jamaican member of the CVPP, Dr Rose. The Commissioner described him as ‘the 
notorious “Dr.” Rose’ who was apparently ‘supremely competent as a demagogue and speaker, 
charming and respectful to meet, utterly unscrupulous and disreputable’.792 In his correspondence 
to the Governor in Jamaica, the Commissioner echoed the racial prejudice and suspicion of black 
Jamaicans displayed by the merchant elite, depicting Dr Rose as having ‘a shocking reputation’, 
and suggesting he was ‘very anti-white’.793 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the great opposition to 
the CVPP from the merchant elite, when it came to election day the CVPP failed to win any 
seats.794 Candidates argued that the defeat was due to corruption and electoral fraud, but no action 
was taken to investigate this by the British administration. Following election failure, the CVPP 
disbanded.795 The subduing of the CVPP demonstrates the significant power of the merchant 
oligarchy in the 1950s and the lengths they would go to to prevent any challenge to their 
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dominance. This ‘vindictive and crushing’ reaction, according to Bodden, was unsurprising given 
the merchants’ determination to maintain the status quo.796 
 
The merchant elite responded in a similarly repressive manner to the next attempt to form a 
political party and connect with disenfranchised Caymanians. In 1961, Ormond Panton established 
the Cayman National Democratic Party and, within a few months, membership had grown to over 
1100.797 Panton made use of international connections to develop the NDP by approaching 
Norman Manley, the Premier of Jamaica, for advice about party politics.798 On a visit to Jamaica 
in 1961, Panton even crossed paths with Eric Williams, the Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, who 
was also in Manley’s office to discuss political party mobilisation.799 The founding members of the 
NDP were from a range of backgrounds, including middle class black Caymanians from George 
Town, a few merchants from outside the capital, and some civil servants who kept their 
membership a secret. Initially, members met covertly due to the fear of repercussions from the 
merchant elite. Rumours spread of people losing their jobs as a result of their NDP membership.800 
Though some members of the NDP did not support greater autonomy, the party as a whole 
promoted internal self-government through the maintenance of ties to Jamaica once it became 
independent.801 The NDP continued to support internal self-government even after the Jamaica 
link was off the table.802 This aspect of NDP policies, in particular, drew concerns from the 
merchant elite who feared that greater autonomy and stronger links to Jamaica would restrict their 
power and influence. 
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Therefore, in response to the creation of the NDP, prominent merchant politicians founded the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDP). The party’s sole purpose was to oppose the NDP. It 
emphasised its links with the Church to reinforce its legitimacy and respectability.803 It was also 
strongly against internal self-government and supported a closer constitutional relationship with 
Britain.804 The party was strongly opposed to any change in taxation laws and claimed any move 
towards greater autonomy would force Caymanians to pay higher taxes.805 Furthermore, it 
expressly opposed the introduction of a ministerial system in the Cayman Islands because it argued 
that Cayman did not have sufficient trained public servants available to prevent this resulting in an 
unstable government.806 Other than opposing self-government, the CDP did not put forward any 
clear policies, instead pledging the maintenance of Christian traditions and loyalty to the Queen. 
 
Despite this manoeuvre by the merchant oligarchy and their CDP, the NDP gained a majority in 
the 1962 elections, winning 7 out of 12 seats.807 Panton saw this as a great victory for more open 
politics and a shift towards internal self-government.808 As chapter one outlined, euphoria at the 
NDP’s success was dampened by the ‘undemocratic’ decision by the Governor of Jamaica for 
Cayman to become a crown colony and cut ties with Jamaica.809 The NDP’s ability to build on 
their electoral success was further hampered by the Commissioner, Jack Rose, who took the 
unprecedented step of nominating three of Panton’s rivals to the Legislative Assembly. These 
nominations were a huge blow for Panton and his hopes to generate change in Caymanian politics. 
Caymanian historian, Roy Bodden, has expressed his surprise that Panton did not challenge this 
move, given that he had the momentum from the successful election and the political backing to 
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make a legitimate complaint against the Commissioner. The repercussions of the Commissioner’s 
undemocratic action were felt when the Legislative Assembly met to elect two members to the 
Executive Council. Traditionally, nominated members would be expected to vote for the majority 
party, with the leader of this party being chosen for the Executive Council. However, the three 
nominated members voted for CDP candidates and, as a result, Ormond Panton was not elected 
to the Executive Council.  
 
Panton responded to this injustice swiftly, but ineffectively. In an emergency meeting of the NDP 
that evening, Panton encouraged the other members to all resign to prompt a second election.810 
However, he failed to go to sufficient lengths to persuade the other NDP members that it was in 
their interest to do so. In the end, he was the only one to resign in protest, limiting the impact. 
Roy McTaggart also resigned, though not out of sympathy with Panton.811 According to Panton, 
McTaggart ‘was simply no longer interested in politics because he had achieved his aim of blocking 
me and blocking the party that advocated Jamaica links’.812 A by-election followed in which Panton 
was reelected. However, he again failed to get a seat on the Executive Council as the NDP member 
for Cayman Brac voted for a CDP candidate. The sister islands, Cayman Brac and Little Cayman, 
were particularly fearful of internal self-government out of concern for too much power being 
held in Grand Cayman.813 This final blow knocked Panton’s motivation and confidence, marking 
the end of his political ambitions. 
 
Panton’s actions were limited and futile, despite the alternative options available to him to fight 
his case.814 Eric Williams encountered a similar scenario in 1956 when he found he was not 
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permitted a say in the nominations of members to the Legislative Council in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Williams complained to the Secretary of State for the Colonies who overruled the Governor, 
facilitating a majority for Williams’ People’s National Movement. It is surprising that Panton did 
not attempt to do the same, but perhaps this demonstrates his suspicion of and unwillingness to 
work within the British colonial system. 
 
The 1965 elections signalled the end of this short era of party politics. While five NDP and five 
CDP candidates ran, many reverted to standing as independents. These independent candidates 
exploited the weaknesses in the two parties and played members off against each other. During 
the election campaign, rivals resorted to personal attacks in an effort to discredit each other.815 
This had been part of previous election campaigns, but at a local level, not on the territory-wide 
stage in which these attacks were now broadcast. For example, Willie Farrington claimed that John 
Bothwell, a butcher who was running against him, had pulled a dead cow out of a well and sold 
the meat.816 Three years later, Farrington was finally forced to apologise for the false claim after a 
legal battle.817 To his dismay, Ormond Panton failed to be re-elected and only one NDP member, 
Warren Conolly, succeeded in gaining a place on the Legislative Assembly.818 Four CDP members 
were elected and the rest were independents. The results were covered in the local press as a 
‘decisive anti-self government vote’.819 However, it is worth noting that, at its height, the NDP had 
the highest membership of any political party or movement in Caymanian history.820 Thus it is not 
fair to suggest that Panton and the NDP’s policies were simply unpopular. These 1965 elections 
were the last in which political parties participated for the rest of the twentieth century. 
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After the failure of party politics in the 1960s, Caymanian politicians abandoned attempts to form 
parties and instead turned to ‘teams’ as a way to organise. Yet again, the issue of self-government 
became central to the emergence of this new political phenomenon. Political ‘teams’ were looser 
collections of candidates who joined together ahead of an election. In the 1972 elections, relatively 
informal teams of candidates with ‘common aims’ ran for election together. 821 Jim Bodden, a 
property developer who would go on to create the first significant successful political team, ran 
for the first time in 1972. Bodden was a Caymanian from a modest background who had worked 
as a salesman in the US and acquired US citizenship. 822 Bodden eventually returned to the Cayman 
Islands and established a property development company. Early on in the 1972 election campaign, 
Bodden reportedly called for full internal self-government.823 He later clarified his position, arguing 
that ‘I probably have more to lose than anyone else in making a rash step’ towards independence.824 
He instead suggested that he was ‘in favour of further constitutional advancement which will 
enable the elected members to have a majority in the Legislature’.825 On this platform of 
constitutional advancement Bodden was elected that year to the Legislative Assembly. 
 
Dissatisfaction with the incumbent political class provided Bodden with an opportunity to increase 
his influence in the next elections. After a period of unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
discontent continued into the mid-1970s, as the recession in the US affected the Caymanian 
economy.826 In 1975 another demonstration was held in protest against the development plans of 
the Executive Council.827 When it came to the 1976 election, Jim Bodden saw a chance to unseat 
 
821 ‘Election round-up’, The Northwester, November 1972, 29-36. 
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826 This period of unrest is discussed in greater detail in chapter six. 
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the established group in power in the Executive Council. Along with fellow Legislative Assembly 
member for Bodden Town, Haig Bodden, he created the ‘Unity Team’, a collection of politicians 
with a manifesto for constitutional change and an end to the political issues supposedly plaguing 
the Executive Council. Crucially, Jim Bodden and the Unity Team used the local newspaper to 
their advantage, while existing Executive Council members continued with the traditional 
campaigning of town hall meetings.828 The Unity Team campaign was a huge success and they 
gained a majority in the Legislative Assembly.829 However, as soon as the Unity Team were in 
power, they backtracked on the promise for constitutional change. They declared ‘their disavowal 
of any plans either for constitutional advance or for changes in policies on the offshore financial 
industry’.830 Though the introduction of political teams, like political parties before them, appeared 
to signal a move towards internal self-government, the teams continued with business as usual 
once in power. 
 
The failure of party politics suggests that Cayman’s non-independent status today was not 
inevitable and highlights the obstruction of progress by the merchant elite. Before the 1950s, the 
nearby Bahamas had a similar political environment, with a white merchant elite controlling the 
Council. However, in 1967 the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) under Lynden Pindling managed 
to establish a black majority government for the first time. The PLP then moved the Bahamas 
gradually towards independence in 1973.831 The striking similarities between the Cayman Islands 
and the Bahamas in the early twentieth century poses the question of whether Panton would have 
led Cayman to eventual independence, had his legitimate claim to control the Executive Council 
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not been blocked. This turning point is crucial to understanding the process of decolonisation in 
the Cayman Islands. 
 
2. The British Virgin Islands: Political Parties in Name Only 
The development of political parties in the British Virgin Islands was greatly influenced by events 
in the nineteenth century. Most white plantation owners left the islands after abolition and 
formerly enslaved people were able to acquire land as it became available on abandoned estates. 
As a result, most BVIslanders worked individually, rather than on large estates, preventing the 
development of workers’ collective action and unions. Furthermore, society as a whole was 
impoverished and relatively classless, lacking the stark class and racial inequality of other colonies. 
With a lack of clear political foe, the roots of party politics evident in other Caribbean islands did 
not develop in the BVI.832 Nonetheless, following the reinstatement of the Legislative Council in 
1950, the BVI’s first political party was established. The Progressive League included men already 
on the Executive Council, as well as those who had been involved in the 1949 protest march.833 
As such, it was made up of members of the Road Town elite and was solely created for the 
purposes of the elections. It did not have any clear cohesive political ideology linking its members. 
Unsurprisingly, the Progressive League became redundant immediately after the elections. This 
would become a pattern in BVI politics, where political parties would exist exclusively for 
elections. 
 
Subsequent attempts to form political parties failed to generate much enthusiasm from politicians 
or voters. In the 1950s, various loose groupings of politicians developed around election time but 
 
832 Elihu Rhymer, ‘Political Development of the British Virgin Islands’, in Twenty-Five Years of Ministerial 
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833 This protest march is discussed in greater detail in chapter six. 
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no political parties formed.834 In the following decade, however, efforts were made to establish 
more meaningful, politically focused parties. Firstly, in 1963, Terrance Lettsome set up the 
Progressive Party in the east of Tortola.835 The party declared its intention to ‘bring unity and 
development in the Colony’.836 Furthermore, it criticised the Legislative Council, suggesting it did 
not accurately represent the views of BVIslanders.837 Though it called for BVIslanders to ‘be the 
master of their destiny’, it did so in the context of a perceived lack of representation in the 
government, rather than any promotion of independence.838 The Progressive Party had close ties 
to the Methodist Church.839 The party received a disparaging response from local newspaper, The 
Island Sun, which suggested that progress could only be achieved through financial support from 
outside of the BVI.840 The paper’s American editor, Carlos Downing, regarded this attempt at 
establishing political parties as futile.841 The Progressive Party did not last for more than a few 
months and when Lettsome was elected to the Legislative Council in the 1963 elections, it was as 
an independent candidate.842 The party lacked any clear ideological direction and failed to generate 
sufficient support. 
 
Similarly, an attempt to create a nationalist party in 1966 also ended in failure. Noel Lloyd, who 
would go on to lead the Positive Action protest movement two years later, announced the start of 
the British Virgin Islands Party in the local newspaper.843 The scope of Lloyd’s party was far more 
ambitious than Lettsome’s and Lloyd intended to bring BVI politics in line with other West Indian 
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islands. Having travelled widely, Lloyd brought a pan-Africanist view to his political endeavours.844 
The party was openly nationalist and sought to bring about internal self-government.845 Lloyd 
offered an inclusive message of equality, calling for men and women to join a party which would 
represent their views.846 However, Lloyd struggled to generate interest in the party and put this 
down to the ‘individualism’ of BVIslanders.847 Indeed, individualism was repeatedly identified by 
both British representatives and local politicians as a major impediment to political progress in the 
islands.848 The historical developments which led to widespread land ownership, had encouraged 
a more individualistic outlook among islanders who mostly worked in isolation on their own land, 
rather than in collective endeavours. The failure of Lloyd’s party suggests that a nationalist message 
lacked traction at this time. 
 
In the end, paradoxically, it was British intervention which finally led to a system of political parties 
in the BVI. Though calls for change came from within the BVI, a 1965 investigation into 
governance in the islands attracted resentment from BVIslanders because the decision to conduct 
the review was made in London. The ‘Proudfoot Report’ which resulted from the investigation 
argued that the BVI was ready for a degree of political reform and recommended a ministerial 
system offering a greater level of political representation. In anticipation of the new constitution 
and the elections that would follow, BVI politicians began taking the first steps to establishing 
political parties.849 The United Party was announced in January 1967, with a large crowd gathering 
to celebrate the move.850 The party included Terrance Lettsome, as well as fellow members of the 
 
844 Lloyd, The Positive Action Movement, 15–24. 
845 Noel Lloyd, ‘Political Party - A Presentation’, The Island Sun, 5 February 1966, 2. 
846 Ibid. p. 2-8 
847 'Mr Lloyd Pleads For Interest In Political Parties', The Island Sun, 4 June 1966, 1-5. 
848 For example, Administrator Staveley to Secretary of State, 27 April 1967, FCO 44/104, TNA; Valedictory 
despatch from Administrator Thomson to Secretary of State, 9 January 1971, FCO 44/614, TNA. 
849 'Worthy Of Support', The Island Sun, 8 December 1966, 5. 
850 ‘BVI Political Party Launched With Gusto', The Island Sun, 14 January 1967, 1. 
 200 
Legislative Council, Hamilton Lavity Stoutt and Ivan Dawson.851 The United Party pledged to 
promote the economic development of the BVI and to ‘work for continued good relations with 
our Mother Country’.852 As the first major party in the BVI, its political aims were remarkably 
cautious. Continuing the tradition of politicians from the 1950s onwards, the United Party put 
economic development above other concerns. 
 
As a challenge to the United Party, Dr Qwominer Osborne established the BVI Democratic 
Party.853 Osborne announced the party’s creation over the local radio station, ZBVI.854 Osborne 
argued that ‘I and the party are one’, suggesting the party was about personalities and his 
leadership, not policies.855 He claimed the party was ‘dedicated the development of the Territory’s 
natural resources’.856 Osborne placed a strong emphasis on the importance of training up the BVI 
‘youth’ to develop the territory.857 Among other plans, he outlined: attracting development capital; 
improving the communications system; improving transportation; education; and improving 
agriculture and fishing. Other electoral candidates who joined the party launched attacks on the 
incumbent members of the Legislative Council, again indicating that the party was more about 
personalities and individuals than political ideas.858 
 
This transformation of the political scene resulted in three parties running in the 1967 elections. 
The third was the People’s Own Party, led by Glanny Fonseca. Its policies varied very little from 
the other two parties and its manifesto made no mention of the BVI’s political status.859 During 
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the elections, the United Party gained four seats, making Stoutt the BVI’s first Chief Minister.860 
The Democratic Party secured two seats and the People’s Own Party won just one seat.861 
However, political party activity died down considerably after the elections. The United Party was 
the exception and, led by Conrad Maduro who had failed to get elected, party meetings and 
activities continued. Yet there was a growing divide between elected members of the party and the 
rest, as elected politicians began failing to attend party meetings. One of the founding members, 
Lennie Pickering, took to the local radio to call for the expulsion of any elected members who 
continued to skip meetings.862 By the next elections in 1971, the party had split, with Conrad 
Maduro sticking with the United Party and Stoutt leaving to form the new Virgin Islands Party. 
Party loyalties appeared weak from the outset. 
 
Political parties throughout the 1960s and into the 1980s failed to align with clear ideological or 
political beliefs and remained individualistic. These failings were typified by the 1971 elections and 
ensuing political crisis. In the elections, three Democratic Party candidates were elected, two from 
the Virgin Islands Party, and one candidate from the United Party. As a result, an independent 
candidate, Willard Wheatley became the new Chief Minister, having been invited by the 
Democratic Party to help them achieve a majority.863 Tensions between Wheatley and the leader 
of the Democratic Party, Qwominer Osborne, escalated quickly under the new government.864 
This resulted in Wheatley firing Osborne from his ministerial role in government and stealing the 
loyalty of the rest of the Democratic Party away from Osborne, in order to maintain a majority.865 
This incident highlights the fluidity of party divides and loyalties in the BVI at the time. With little 
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holding them together, BVI parties became only useful and meaningful in the run up to elections. 
Politicians used the party groupings for their own ends in order to get elected, but these loose 
alliances were forgotten once the new government got underway. This continued into the 1980s, 
when some ministers paid off other Legislative Council members to ensure their support and stop 
them swapping sides.866 
 
The determination to pursue a ministerial system of government which included political parties 
and an opposition to the government may have hindered other forms of political organising in the 
BVI. Local commentator Elihu Rhymer suggests that the promotion of the party system harmed 
other more natural forms of community politics.867 The disconnect between political parties and 
the people was demonstrated during the Batehill Affair in 1968.868 The main parties failed to engage 
with the discontent of many BVIslanders and, in the end, it was the Positive Action Movement, a 
community protest group, which channelled that energy and was hugely successful. 
 
The lack of enthusiasm for party politics can be partly attributed to the absence of workers’ unions 
in the BVI. In an effort to change this, Walter ‘Lindy’ deCastro, another Positive Action leader, 
set up the People's Own Workers Union.869 He did so in 1967, as the economic, political and social 
landscape of the BVI was changing. Following the introduction of the ministerial system and the 
advent of party politics, deCastro hoped the union would further engage the public in the local 
political system. The union was linked to the People’s Own Party, the short-lived party established 
by Glanny Fonseca which only lasted a year.870 Before the 1960s, it would have been difficult to 
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with the increase in construction, tourism and public sector jobs, deCastro hoped his union would 
generate interest among BVI workers. The Island Sun, run by deCastro’s brother-in-law, declared 
its support for the new union but suggested that any move to develop a union closely linked to a 
political party would be treated with suspicion.871 DeCastro managed to keep the union going 
despite an unsuccessful attempt to generate a construction workers strike to achieve better working 
conditions.872 He also called for a civil service union to protect and improve this growing sector in 
the BVI economy.873 However, deCastro’s union failed to gain significant support and the general 
workers’ unions which formed in the early 1970s remained relatively small and ineffectual.874 
 
In terms of decolonisation, the transient nature of political parties in the British Virgin Islands 
prevented their being used to generate meaningful change. Without any clear political ideology, 
parties opted for vague policies aimed at economic improvement. In the postwar years, they failed 
to engage with the question of the BVI’s political status and became increasingly detached from 
the concerns of the general public. While the British territories failed to develop clearly defined 
political parties, in the French Caribbean a thriving political party system was hampered by its 
metropolitan connections. 
 
3. The French Antilles: Metropolitan Ties 
In Guadeloupe and Martinique, following departmentalisation in 1946, the ties between local and 
metropolitan political parties complicated, and in many ways obstructed, the conversation about 
the future political status of the Antilles. This was particularly true among the Left, since the 
socialist and communist parties were linked to the main parties in metropolitan France. Partly for 
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this reason, they advocated either remaining an overseas department or pursuing greater autonomy 
within the confines of the French Republic. While there are many similarities between the political 
party dynamics in Guadeloupe and Martinique, it is important to analyse the two separately, as 
events developed differently, especially in terms of debates about independence. 
 
Firstly, in Martinique, most of the parties were linked to or affiliated with a metropolitan party. 
Only Césaire’s Martinican Progressive Party (PPM) did not have a metropolitan counterpart. This 
reinforced the centrality of France in political debate and restricted the ability of some parties to 
deviate from metropolitan party lines. For the right-wing, pro-departmentalisation parties, the 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) and the Rally for the Republic (RPR), this appeared more 
logical. The two very much represented the establishment in Martinique and they controlled the 
General Council from the 1970s onwards, as well as wielding considerable influence in the 
bureaucracy and the police.875 The RPR was the more traditional and conservative of the two, with 
older members and more financial backing from the white elite, the Békés.876 Mirroring 
metropolitan political developments, the RPR had evolved from the Union for the New Republic 
(UNR) and the Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR). Camille Petit, a Martinican politician 
who was a great admirer of de Gaulle, had helped the party to gain prominence in the 1960s.877 
The UDF was a later addition to the political scene, formed in 1978 to support President Giscard 
d’Estaing.878 While there were variances in political approach in the metropolitan UDF and RPR, 
in Martinique the differences were negligible. These right-wing parties were backed by a variety of 
newspapers, including L’Appel, La Flamme, Le Combat, La Concentration and France Toujours.879 
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Furthermore, the largest newspaper in both Martinique and Guadeloupe, France-Antilles, very much 
adhered to the right-wing, pro-department status politics of the UDF and RPR.880 
 
On the Left, the only pro-department party was the Socialist Federation of Martinique (FSM) 
which was affiliated with the mainland French socialist party. In order to justify their pro-
department status line, the socialists blamed any negative aspects of French rule, such as 
colonialism and slavery on the French right, contrasting this to an idealised version of France 
which included the revolution, the abolition of slavery and decolonisation: the France of the 
Left.881 They were equally critical of left-wing groups who called for autonomy or independence.882 
The socialists in Martinique used seemingly radical rhetoric in their statements and speeches but 
failed to accompany this with any radical proposals for Martinique’s future.883 
 
Even the Martinican Communist Party (PCM) did not advocate outright independence. It was the 
longest running political party by 1980, having been founded in 1919. The PCM was originally 
affiliated to the French Communist Party (PCF) and was hugely successful in the postwar years, 
holding a majority in the general council immediately after the war.884 However, by the 1970s, the 
PCM was less powerful and struggled to achieve electoral success.885 It moved away from the PCF 
in 1957, which allowed it a certain degree of freedom.886 In 1960, the PCM announced a new 
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policy, calling for Martinique to become a ‘federated territory’ within the French Republic.887 Yet, 
while it advocated more autonomy for Martinique, it was not in favour of independence. By 1980, 
Martinican society had drastically changed from the majority of people working rurally on 
plantations, to the state bureaucracy acting as the major employer and a third of Martinicans living 
in and around the capital. The PCM failed to adapt its message and its orthodox Marxist approach, 
continuing its focus on ‘the workers’, which prevented it from galvanising more support.888 
Through its official newspaper, Justice, the PCM adopted an anticolonial message while advocating 
greater autonomy but not independence.889 
 
The refusal of the PCM to entertain any idea of independence resulted in splinter groups and more 
radical left-wing parties on the fringes of the political system. This included the Socialist 
Revolutionary Group (GRS), who called for a trans-Caribbean federation and boycotted 
elections.890 Combat Ouvrier (Worker’s Struggle), which was also active in Guadeloupe, promoted a 
pro-independence, pan-Caribbean view and tended to focus on issues of racial inequality.891 The 
most forthright of the legal independence movements was the Martinican Independence 
Movement (MIM) which rejected the Marxist perspective of the other left-wing groups and 
attacked both right and left-wing parties.892 Alfred Marie-Jeanne, the founder of MIM, was the 
mayor of Rivière-Pilote from 1971 to 2000, but his independence party did not have much electoral 
success until the 1990s.893 The role of fringe organisations in major moments of protest will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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The other significant political force in Martinican politics was Aimé Césaire’s PPM, which was not 
linked to any metropolitan party. Prior to 1956, Césaire was a member of the Martinican wing of 
the Communist Party. However, Césaire famously left the Communist Party following the 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet Union.894 He founded the PPM two years 
later and focused on finding solutions to specifically Martinican issues, which Césaire felt the 
Communist Party had failed to do. 895 However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Césaire did 
not use the PPM to push for independence, instead opting for a pro-autonomy line.896 In 1981, 
Césaire declared a moratorium on the question of Martinique’s departmental status.897 
 
Two crucial elements of party politics in Martinique helped to reinforce the departmental status 
of the island after the 1946 law. Firstly, the affiliation of most parties with metropolitan 
organisations encouraged local politicians to approach Martinican politics within a centralised 
French framework and restricted what they could say within the boundaries of their party. This 
caused particular problems for the Communist Party, leading to divisions and the creation of new 
Marxist groups outside the party. This contributed to the second aspect of party politics which 
weakened debates about independence: the divisions among the Left. Left-wing parties were 
greatly divided over the issue of political status, with the socialists supporting French department 
status, the PPM and the communists calling for greater autonomy, and the far-left groups 
advocating independence. These different parties spent as much time, if not more, trying to 
undermine the other left-wing groups than they did challenging the power of the establishment, 
 
894 See ‘Demission de Cesaire du Parti Communiste’, 1956, Fonds Louis Addrassé, 36J19, ADM. 
895 Aimé Césaire, ‘Lettre à Maurice Thorez’, Présence Africaine, 24 October 1956, BR 62, ADG. 
896 Aimé Césaire, ‘Pour la transformation de la Martinique en region dans le cadre d’une Union Française 
fédérée’, Le Progressiste, 5 July 1958, 1-3. 
897 Aimé Césaire, ‘Discours du Moratoire’, 15 June 1981, Fort-de-France, reproduced in Théobald, La Liberté est 
ou n’est pas..., 669–72. 
 208 
right-wing parties. Unlike the UDF and RPR, who often united to jointly support a particular issue 
or a candidate in the presidential elections, the Left failed to provide a united front. This confused 
and undermined the issue of greater autonomy. 
 
Likewise, in Guadeloupe, similar issues were apparent in the dynamics of party politics, due to the 
centralised nature of the French state and political system. Like in Martinique, the UDF, the RPR 
and the Socialist Party were local branches of the main metropolitan parties and all supported the 
departmental status quo. The right-wing parties had greater electoral success from 1974 onwards 
after the President of the General Council Lucien Bernier broke away from the Socialist Party to 
join the presidential campaign of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.898 The Guadeloupean Communist 
Party (PCG) took a pro-autonomy stance and was criticised by other left-wing groups and activists 
for being ‘assimilationist’ in its approach.899 The communists initially supported 
departmentalisation, but soon became disillusioned with the results and, under Rosan Girard, 
pursued greater autonomy for Guadeloupe.900 The party ran into difficulties in the 1960s over the 
question of Guadeloupean independence. At first, they participated in the Guadeloupean Front 
for Autonomy, which united left-wing pro-autonomy and pro-independence groups.901 However, 
by 1966 the party was splintering as pro-independence members resigned. The divisions reached 
a peak in 1967, around the ‘May 67’ massacre in which communist mayor of Pointe-à-Pitre, Henri 
Bangou, sided with the police against protestors and members of the independence movement 
GONG.902 
 
898 Ministry of the Interior report on ‘Situation politique dans les départements d'Outre-Mer: 
départementalisation, décentralisation et autonomie’, 12 July 1977, 19940180/84, 6, AN. 
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1965, 1-3. 
902 ‘Mai 67’ is covered in greater detail in chapter six. 
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Unlike Martinique, pro-independence activists in Guadeloupe were more marginalised from the 
mainstream political system and were more radical. Instead of the legal independence parties like 
MIM, Guadeloupean nationalists became increasingly violent in the 1970s and 1980s, with several 
bombings both in Guadeloupe and in mainland France.903 The failure of party politics to 
adequately cater to currents in left-wing Guadeloupean circles led to a syndicalisme nouveau in the 
1970s which combined cultural nationalism, including promoting the creole language and 
traditional cultural practices, with labour activism.904 New trade unions, not affiliated to a 
metropolitan counterpart, sprang up, the most significant being the General Union of 
Guadeloupean Workers (UGTG). The UGTG has maintained a pro-independence stance since 
its creation in 1973, and remains the largest union in Guadeloupe, with over 7000 members from 
a population of 440 000.905 In many ways, the UGTG has filled the gap left by the mainstream 
parties to channel Guadeloupean cultural identity and nationalist sentiment.906 
 
In Martinique and Guadeloupe, the strong connections between local and metropolitan parties 
hindered the development of a mainstream local nationalist movement. Parties were encouraged 
to adhere to metropolitan party policies, shifting political attention away from local concerns. 
Those which split from their metropolitan counterparts, such as the Communist Party in 
Martinique, pursued greater autonomy rather than outright independence. As a result, the question 
of independence was pushed to the edges of the local political scene, and nationalists became 
increasingly radical. In both Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Left was divided between those who 
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supported departmentalisation, those who favoured some form of greater autonomy, and those 
who advocated independence. As a result, no united voice for independence emerged. 
 
Conclusion 
A comparative approach enables us to see how the dynamics of local politics were central to the 
pattern of decolonisation in the French Antilles, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 
Party politics developed differently in the French compared to the British territories, and was 
closely tied to the maintenance of the political status quo. In the Cayman Islands, the merchant 
elite and the British Commissioner managed to supress Ormond Panton’s NDP and consequently 
prevent the campaign for self-government. Political parties were abandoned in the aftermath of 
the NDP’s demise and not revived until the twenty-first century. Panton’s electoral success 
occurred at a time when other Caribbean colonies were moving towards independence. Had his 
party not been blocked from power, this could have marked the turning point to a black majority 
government and even independence in the Cayman Islands. 
 
In the British Virgin Islands, political parties developed in 1967 but remained weak and 
inconsistent throughout the period in question. They failed to garner significant loyalty and 
support, remained detached from the general public, and swapping sides was common. 
Nonetheless, the British administration continued to encourage a party system which may have 
obstructed other forms of governance from developing. Unlike in many other colonies, BVI 
political parties were never able to unify and channel popular sentiment to effect change. In the 
French islands, political parties developed much earlier, in conjunction with a gradual alignment 
of local politics to the centralised French system. After 1946, most parties were affiliated to 
mainland French organisations, forcing them to adhere to metropolitan interests and to be 
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subordinate to their metropolitan counterparts. This restricted the debate about the political status 
of Martinique and Guadeloupe and caused further divisions among left-wing pro-autonomy 
groups. 
 
The failure of party politics in these territories is significant because it prevented the development 
of a political movement which could have challenged the power of the local elite and overcome 
the restrictions imposed by the colonial state. After departmentalisation in the French Antilles and 
the adoption of crown colony status in the British territories, political momentum favoured the 
status quo and retaining ties to the metropole. An effective, unified political party could have 
challenged this state of affairs, but no such party developed. Political parties were too weak in 
Cayman to challenge the merchant elite and too ineffective in the BVI to channel local political 
energy and sentiment. In the French Antilles, the Left were too divided between pro-autonomy 
and pro-independence groups and thus unable to form a united voice for change. 
 
As this chapter has argued, party politics in the French Antilles forced independence activists to 
operate outside the structure of electoral politics. The role of these nationalist groups will be 
explored the next chapter. Likewise, in the British territories, there were incidents of protest which 
deserve further analysis. It remains to be seen whether these moments of protest could have been 







‘We Got to Take Back Our Country’: 
Popular Protest and Independence Activists 
 
 
Thus far, this thesis has assessed both international and local pressures on the process of 
decolonisation in the overseas territories which help to explain their non-independent status today. 
The crucial question which remains is whether there were any potential turning points that could 
have pushed these territories towards independence. With this in mind, this chapter will analyse 
significant moments of popular protest and the dynamics of nationalist groups in these territories. 
It will analyse the motivations of those protesting and explore their significance for, as well as their 
lack of impact on, decolonisation developments. 
 
Historians have increasingly explored the global nature of social protest in the second half of the 
twentieth century, often focusing on the 1960s as a ‘revolutionary’ decade.907 In line with this trend, 
the period between 1959 and 1972 marks a peak in unrest in the non-sovereign states of the 
Caribbean. Iliffe highlights population growth and urbanisation as key factors behind anticolonial 
protest in Africa.908 Similarly, both an increase in population and the mass movement of Antilleans 
to the urban capitals had a considerable impact on protest in the French Caribbean. Historians of 
the Caribbean have begun to acknowledge the ways activists in non-sovereign territories like the 
US Virgin Islands, Bermuda and Curaçao, engaged with global movements and ideologies.909 
Mérion situates Guadeloupean protest within the context of the Cuban Revolution and the 
Caribbean region in the 1960s.910 This chapter will go further by assessing the local, regional and 
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international dimensions of protest movements in these territories, including the transnational 
exchanges and connections. Clegg argues that militancy and radicalism on the part of French 
Antillean independence activists was due to the moderate party politics in the Antilles.911 While 
party politics was certainly a factor, this suggestion obscures the significant influence French state 
repression had on radicalising nationalists and pushing independence movements underground. 
Maurer has suggested that nascent BVI nationalism, rather than being channelled towards 
independence, was expressed through an assertion of local legal autonomy.912 This chapter will 
demonstrate that, whilst significant nationalism was not evident in the Cayman Islands or British 
Virgin Islands before 1980, there were notable expressions of self-determination and national 
identity linked to the legislative assemblies and land rights. 
 
This chapter will argue that it is inaccurate to suggest that the non-sovereign status of these 
territories is a result of a lack of popular protest or a total absence of nationalism. Rather, through 
the relationship between popular protest movements, local politics, clandestine independence 
activists and the colonial response to protest, no widespread call for independence emerged. 
Firstly, this chapter looks at Martinique and the unrest which occurred in December 1959. 
Secondly, in Guadeloupe, the development of a nationalist organisation coincided with the brutal 
repression of Guadeloupeans in the massacre of May 1967. Thirdly, in the British Virgin Islands, 
protest marches in 1949 and 1968 engaged with notions of self-determination. The fourth section 
explores protest in the Cayman Islands. The islands were incredibly conservative in outlook, 
though protests did erupt over land disputes and, like the BVI, perceived foreign interference. 
Finally, this chapter considers the role of race and internationalism in these protests. A 
comparative analysis of protest movements is important for establishing both the trends and the 
 
911 Clegg, ‘Independence Movements in the Caribbean’, 433. 
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local particularities in the territories, as well as highlighting the diversity of the Caribbean 
experience. 
 
Much of the detail in this chapter is not readily available in government archives. For certain files 
on the police response to protest in Martinique and Guadeloupe, I had to obtain special permission 
to view the restricted documents. Likewise, permission was obtained to access the private archive 
of Pierre Bolotte, the prefect of Guadeloupe during the 1967 massacre. This chapter also contains 
interviews with French Caribbean nationalists. Ken Kelly, the former editor of the GONG journal, 
was kind enough to allow access to his private collection of GONG pamphlets and journals.913 
This material was banned in the 1960s and is difficult to come across. It offered an invaluable 
insight into the political approach and ideology of GONG. Interviews with eye witnesses of the 
1967 massacre included Jacques Jarvis, who had not told his story before, even to his parents. 
Finally, in the British Virgin Islands, the unpublished memoir of activist Noel Lloyd and the 
interview footage with members of the Positive Action Movement provided a vital perspective on 
events that have thus far been ignored by historians. This collection of sources has allowed me to 
cover, in greater detail, events which are mostly absent from the official history of these islands. 
Ultimately, this chapter will show that protest movements asserting local autonomy and self-
determination greatly influenced local politics and the nature of decolonisation in these islands. 
 
1. Martinique: Décembre 59 and OJAM 
In the French Antilles, nationalist movements were closely linked to major incidents of unrest, 
rioting and state violence.914 The most significant period of agitation after departmentalisation 
occurred in Martinique in December 1959. The uprising began after a traffic incident between a 
black Martinican and a white metropolitan on 20 December in the capital, Fort-de-France. This 
 
913 GONG stands for the Groupe d’organisation nationale de la Guadeloupe. 
914 Louis-Georges Placide, Les émeutes de décembre 1959 en Martinique: Un repère historique (Paris: Editions 
L’Harmattan, 2009), 201. 
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relatively minor episode escalated into three nights of violent clashes between protestors and the 
police, resulting in the death of three young men. 
 
This ‘popular rebellion’ was spontaneous and not organised or orchestrated by any political 
group.915 Instead, several factors contributed to the level of discontent among young, urban 
Martinicans: rapid population increase since the Second World War; a very young population, with 
forty-eight percent of Martinicans under twenty; chronic underemployment; increasing racial 
tensions in Martinican society due to the arrival of many white pied-noirs from Algeria, often 
bringing racist colonial attitudes, and an increased number of white metropolitans gaining 
government jobs; and the approach of the CRS, French riot police, towards Martinicans.916 The 
incident escalated due to the overreaction of French law enforcement. Frantz Moffat, the 
Martinican involved in the traffic incident, described how he had argued with a man who drove 
into his scooter, but they had then agreed to go for a drink to sort things out. Suddenly, the CRS 
arrived with tear gas and fired live bullets into the air to disperse the crowd in La Savane, the main 
park in the city centre.917 This enraged the young Martinicans in the park and sparked the first 
night’s riots.  
 
The excessive use of force by police in Martinique was not unique to the events of December 
1959. Police shootings during sugar workers’ strikes in 1948 and 1951 had resulted in many 
casualties.918 Furthermore, the first night’s unrest was unplanned and disorganised in nature. 
Placide suggests that the next two nights of rioting were slightly more coordinated, otherwise the 
police would have been able to enforce control earlier.919 In the absence of the Prefect, the 
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Secretary General, Guy Beck, was concerned about rioting spreading to the countryside and 
imposed a curfew on 23 December in an attempt to regain order.920 The authorities feared the 
influence of the Cuban Revolution and some right-wing commentators blamed the Martinican 
Communist Party for stirring up trouble.921 However, the spontaneous nature of the rioting took 
the communists by surprise, as much as the rest of the political establishment, and there is no 
evidence of the unrest being orchestrated by any particular political group. Occurring less than a 
year after Castro had taken control in Cuba, Décembre 59 in Martinique exacerbated Cold War 
political divisions in the island. 
 
Local politicians were quick to condemn the police response.922 The Conseil Général held an 
emergency meeting after order was restored. While they called for calm, they protested against the 
brutal repression of the riots by the CRS and police forces. They identified the key causes of the 
protests as: the ‘arrogance and racism of certain metropolitans’; CRS brutality; and the general 
impoverishment and unemployment which disproportionately affected the youth.923 The Secretary 
General, on the other hand, blamed the violence on ‘disruptive elements’ of Martinican society.924 
Yet, to avoid further disruption, the state opted for appeasement rather than a heavy handed 
approach and, despite many arrests during the riots, only three men were given prison sentences.925 
It is difficult to ascertain how many people were involved in the unrest, but the Minister for the 
Interior at the time reported 500 to 1500 people in the streets.926 
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In the immediate aftermath, Décembre 59 became highly politicised, with many arguing it was 
indicative of the failures of departmentalisation. When the matter was debated in the French 
Senate, Martinican socialist senator, Paul Symphor, was keen to reassure the Senate that ‘there is 
no separatism’ in Martinique.927 The Martinican Communist Party, on the other hand, called for 
Martinique’s political status to be changed to a federated territory within the French Republic.928 
While the French government introduced certain measures to try to alleviate some of the social 
and economic issues facing young Martinicans, they also increasingly criminalised nationalist 
activity in the DOMs. In 1960, as part of changes to the French Constitution, new measures 
permitted the police to arrest anyone who was perceived to be threatening the ‘territorial integrity’ 
of France.929 A decree in October of that year gave the Prefects of the départements d’outre-mer further 
powers to monitor and deport civil servants.930 
 
Décembre 59 was not a nationalist protest but a spontaneous reaction to the poverty and social 
issues of 1950s Martinique. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a turning point in Martinican national 
consciousness.931 The three young men who lost their lives during the unrest have become heroes 
in the nationalist rhetoric which sees Décembre 59 as a popular uprising against French colonialism. 
This is despite the fact that, as the 2016 commission of enquiry noted, it is impossible to ascertain 
if they were involved in protesting, were curious onlookers, or were just passers-by.932 The events 
have become known as Les Trois Glorieuses by the Martinican Left, a term which was coined by the 
Vice-Rector at the time, Alain Plenel.933 Plenel was one of the first people to fall foul of the new 
laws aimed at restricting the spread of nationalism. In 1960, Plenel paid homage to the three 
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victims of Décembre 59 during the inauguration of a new primary school.934 As a result, he was exiled 
from Martinique, later demoted through a presidential decree from de Gaulle, and not fully 
exonerated by the French state until 1982.935 In mainland France in the 1960s, Antillean student 
organisations, influenced by the spirit of Décembre 59, increasingly advocated for greater local 
autonomy. Frantz Fanon was greatly disappointed that a widespread revolution did not take place 
after the 1959 uprising.936 Those who took more radical action, such as Édouard Glissant who co-
founded the Antillean-Guianese Front for Autonomy (FAGA), often found themselves exiled 
from their place of birth.937  
 
Décembre 59 led directly to the founding of the Anticolonial Martinican Youth Organisation 
(OJAM) in 1962. This nationalist organisation bridged the gap between students in Paris and 
workers in Martinique.938 OJAM spread their manifesto declaring ‘Martinique for Martinicans’ 
across the island in 1962 on the anniversary of Décembre 59.939 Within two months, eighteen 
members of OJAM were arrested for a supposed secret plot against the French government. 
OJAM members had close ties to Algerian independence activists and emphasised the importance 
of the Algerian War and other anticolonial movements in shaping their ideas.940 A huge solidarity 
campaign sprang up in Martinique, Guadeloupe, Paris and Algeria calling for the imprisoned young 
men to be released.941 Letters written by the eight OJAM activists who were held in Fresnes 
demonstrated their internationalist outlook and emphasised their belief that ‘decolonisation is an 
absolute necessity in the modern world’.942 They were tried in the Court of State Security and, 
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though thirteen were acquitted, three of these thirteen had already spent ten months in prison.943  
The other five men were given prison sentences of between one to three years, despite the fact 
that the court acknowledged there was no evidence of an attempt or plan to carry out an attack.944 
The ‘OJAM affair’ demonstrates how quickly French authorities were prepared to repress any 
nationalist movement in the wake of the 1959 riots, especially one which threatened to unite 
students in Paris and workers in Martinique. 
 
The Martinican nationalist movement failed to gain significant support among the electorate 
following the OJAM affair. Groups like the Socialist Revolutionary Group (GRS), the National 
Movement of Martinican Liberation (MNLM), and the Martinican Independentist Movement 
(MIM) remained marginal and concentrated among intellectual circles. The leader of MIM, Alfred 
Marie-Jeanne, was elected as a councillor in the local elections of 1973, but nationalist 
organisations did not achieve significant electoral success and many rejected the French electoral 
system altogether.945 Through the 1970s, the increased levels of welfare support from the French 
state, combined with the continued repression of nationalist and communist activists, made it 
difficult for pro-independence groups to gain ground. It was not until the 1990s that MIM made 
more significant gains in the regional council elections.946 Guadeloupean nationalists encountered 
similar hurdles in the 1960s and 1970s in their quest for independence. 
 
2. Guadeloupe: GONG and Mai 67 
As OJAM demonstrates, student organisations in Paris were central to the development of 
Antillean nationalist movements. Guadeloupean nationalism was closely linked to groups in 
Martinique, as well as being influenced by exchanges with activists and intellectual movements 
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from around the world. In Guadeloupe, the development of the first organisation to explicitly call 
for independence, the National Organisation Group of Guadeloupe (GONG), coincided with the 
most turbulent and violent period of unrest in the twentieth century, known as Mai 67. GONG 
and Mai 67 are indicative of the nature of protest and nationalism in Guadeloupe. 
 
Guadeloupean nationalism grew out of the postwar context of Parisian student activism. In 1963, 
GONG was established in Paris, and, like OJAM, was subject to considerable state repression. 
GONG’s leader, Pierre Sainton, was a doctor whose nationalist beliefs had developed while he 
was a student in Paris. He was involved in several anticolonial international student organisations 
in the 1950s.947 He had been president of the Paris branch of AGEG (General Association of 
Guadeloupean Students) and was involved in Édouard Glissant’s FAGA.948 Sainton and other 
Guadeloupean members of the FAGA split from the organisation to form a more radical, solely 
Guadeloupean nationalist movement. The leaders of GONG were wary of working openly after 
the imprisonment of the Martinican OJAM activists.949 There was also a strong global dynamic at 
work, most notably through GONG’s connections to Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam.950  
 
Building on these global links, GONG became more active in the Caribbean region in 1966, with 
members attending the Tricontinental Conference in Havana and successfully pushing through 
their resolution for the ‘right of Guadeloupe to independence’.951 This resolution was controversial 
among the Left in Guadeloupe and the Guadeloupean Communist Party declared that the 
Tricontinental resolution did not correspond to ‘the reality of our struggle’.952 Furthermore, the 
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March 1966, 1. 
 221 
Prefect of Guadeloupe perceived the enthusiasm generated by the Tricontinental conference, 
combined with the geographical proximity to Cuba and the growing agitation in Guadeloupe to 
be a ‘direct threat’ against Guadeloupe’s ‘national status’.953 
 
Discontent in Guadeloupe intensified in 1967, when the social and economic climate was 
particularly volatile. Hurricane Ines had devastated the islands the year before, killing thirty-three, 
causing millions of francs in damage and exacerbating issues of poverty and unemployment.954 
Furthermore, growing numbers of sugar workers had moved to the new urban areas developing 
around Pointe-à-Pitre, looking for work in the expanding construction sector. With insufficient 
housing to cope with this demographic change, slum areas developed on the outskirts of the city. 
In March 1967, two days of major unrest followed a racist incident in Basse-Terre. A white shop 
owner, Vladimir Srnsky, reportedly set his dog on Raphael Balzinc, a black shoemaker who was 
disabled, and who had been sitting outside Srnsky’s shoe shop.955 Srnsky was rumoured to have 
encouraged his dog with the racial slur ‘Dis bonjour au nègre’, sparking demonstrations and clashes 
between protestors and the police.956 
 
This increasing discontent in Guadeloupe was further demonstrated when, on 1 May, at a march 
in Capesterre, protestors held banners with slogans like ‘Guadeloupe for Guadeloupeans’, ‘Down 
with colonialism’, and ‘Vive la révolution guadeloupéenne’.957 Several members of GONG participated 
including Pierre Sainton, who gave a speech at the march. Sainton noted that while nationalist and 
internationalist slogans proliferated, the most pressing issue of those marching was the dire 
situation facing young Guadeloupeans.958 French intelligence services became increasingly 
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concerned about GONG’s activities in Guadeloupe and placed all known members under higher 
surveillance.959  
 
With the authorities already on high alert and racial tensions at breaking point, a peaceful strike in 
Pointe-à-Pitre triggered several nights of violence. On 26 May 1967, a group of striking 
construction workers gathered in the city centre outside the Chamber of Commerce awaiting the 
resolution of a pay dispute. Rumour spread among the crowd that Georges Brizard, one of the 
construction bosses, had directed a racist comment at the workers. The crowd, of around one to 
two thousand people, began to get angry, throwing stones and conch shells at the police.960 The 
CRS, were given the order to shoot to clear the crowd.961 Jacques Nestor was the first 
Guadeloupean to be killed and he appears to have been deliberately targeted.962 He was a 
charismatic, pro-independence activist and member of GONG who had been monitored for a 
while by the French intelligence services. A state of violence and civil unrest ensued, and 
eyewitnesses described Pointe-à-Pitre as a warzone with looting, shootings and torture.963  
 
The repressive response from the state meant that passers-by, not involved in protesting, were 
also targeted by the police. Solange Yvon Coudrieu, a sports teacher, was out trying to buy a gift 
for Mother’s Day. He was shot without warning by the police with a ‘dum-dum’ bullet which blew 
apart his right leg.964 Jacques Jarvis was on his way home from work when he was shot at by police. 
He escaped with a bullet wound to his arm by hiding in an unfilled grave.965 He never spoke of 
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what had happened to his parents. These accounts suggest that agents of law enforcement were 
indiscriminate and brutal in their attempts to regain control of the city streets. 
 
Some Guadeloupeans resisted police violence by assisting those wounded or by engaging in clashes 
with the police. Witnesses described a sense of revolution in Pointe-à-Pitre over the three days. 
Young people from the run-down outskirts of the city joined the confrontations with the police 
with naïve enthusiasm and shouts of ‘Let’s join the revolution’, not expecting the extreme 
response.966 In an interview, Jarvis recalled, ‘we had leaders like Che Guevara, like Castro, Ho Chi 
Minh, Mao, we read a lot of Mao… and for us… we were in a kind of revolution, but badly 
prepared’.967 Indeed, protestors were ill-equipped to mount any significant form of organised 
rebellion due to the spontaneous nature of the unrest, a scarcity of equipment and weapons, and 
the lack of leadership. Furthermore, national sentiment was relatively weak in Guadeloupe and 
when news spread to the countryside, people regarded it as a city affair. This was, perhaps, partly 
due to rural Guadeloupeans not experiencing the same daily reminder of stark and visible 
inequality. In the city, an avenue abruptly divided the middle-class neighbourhood from the 
slums.968 According to Jean-Pierre Sainton and Raymond Gama, class consciousness was weak 
among most workers at this time.969 They characterise Mai 67 as a spontaneous, urban popular 
uprising, highlighting the ‘sociological rupture’ between the city and countryside.970 This city-
country divide prevented unrest developing into an island-wide insurrection, just like Décembre 59 
in Martinique. It seems likely that, despite high levels of discontent in Guadeloupe in 1967, the 
lack of leadership and the undeveloped nature of the nationalist movement meant that this 
potential turning point could not be exploited. 
 
966 Hector Déglas and Paul Tomiche, in interview in ‘Mai 67: Au nom de la verité et de la justice’, Études 
Guadeloupéennes, 2008, 23. 
967 Jacques Jarvis, in interview with author, 19 April 2017. 
968 Ibid. 




At the same time, in Pointe-à-Pitre, many citizens were discouraged from participating in the 
uprising due to fear of police tactics, which included torture. Marcelle Delphine, a nurse at the city 
hospital, observed police entering the hospital and arresting anyone who looked like they had been 
injured in the protests.971 Nurses and doctors managed to hide some protestors to protect them 
from the police. Ambulance drivers reported that the police were even shooting at medical 
vehicles.972 Eyewitnesses also described acts of violence by demonstrators towards the white 
inhabitants of the city, which was picked up and focused on in many news reports at the time.973 
Evidently, the violent response of law enforcement was a significant deterrent in preventing more 
Guadeloupeans from taking part in the protests. 
 
The French government manipulated the situation by blaming the escalation of violence on 
GONG militants.974 Even before order was restored on 28 May, the authorities rounded up anyone 
suspected of being a member of GONG in both Guadeloupe and Paris. Ken Kelly, the editor of 
GONG’s journal, was arrested in July 1967, despite living in Paris at the time of the unrest.975 He 
and other imprisoned Guadeloupeans went on hunger strike in protest.976 These arrests, combined 
with the brutality of May 67, solidified an atmosphere of fear in Guadeloupe, where most 
Guadeloupeans were afraid even to tell their families that they had been involved in or affected by 
the clashes with the police.977 Sainton and Gama have highlighted the traumatic impact of May 67 
and its aftermath on the collective consciousness of Guadeloupeans.978 They argue that this trauma 
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brought back collective memories, passed down the generations, of the brutal re-enslavement of 
many Afro-Guadeloupeans in 1802 during the reoccupation of Guadeloupe by Napoleonic 
France.  
 
The covering-up of the Mai 67 massacre began immediately, with inconsistencies in official 
reports, particularly as to when the first shots were fired.979 French officials announced that eight 
people had died during the clashes with police.980 Witnesses and historians have cast doubt on this 
figure given the level of violence across the three days, the rumours of disappearances, and the 
fear which stopped families of the dead and missing from reporting it to the authorities. In 1985, 
the Secretary of State for the overseas departments and territories, Georges Lemoine, suggested 
that the death toll was eighty-seven, though it is unclear what he based this figure on.981 Since then, 
certain commentators, particularly Guadeloupean activists, have suggested the number could be 
as high as one hundred, or even two hundred. However, the 2016 Stora Report contended that 
they could not identify any more than the eight deaths listed in official accounts, and that it was 
impossible to establish for certain how many people died. Furthermore, the report argued that, 
although it was difficult to establish who was individually responsible, Mai 67 was ‘a massacre 
during a protest, knowingly ordered on the ground and approved by the government under the 
presidency of General de Gaulle’.982 
 
The state’s response to protests and the lack of further unrest was greatly influenced by the close 
links between events in Guadeloupe and the recent Algerian War. The CRS riot police and the 
military police were the same as those deployed during the Algerian War. The Prefect of 
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Guadeloupe at the time, Pierre Bolotte, had previously served in the colonial administration in 
Algeria.983 Furthermore, the construction boss who sparked the anger among the protestors was 
an Algerian pied-noir.984 The state response to May 67 reveals French authorities feared GONG 
could grow in the way the FLN had, and so they responded in a similarly repressive manner. 
 
The protests during May 67 were not organised by GONG nationalists, nor did most 
Guadeloupeans involved openly advocate independence. The unrest was the product of years of 
inequality, poverty and frustration over the failures of departmentalisation, combined with recent 
issues of a severe hurricane and increasing racial tensions following the events in March in Basse-
Terre. The rumoured racist comment was enough to turn a peaceful strike into an enraged crowd 
of protestors. 
 
As with the OJAM affair, following the arrests, the matter became an issue of national security. 
Nineteen Guadeloupeans were put on trial in 1968 for threatening the territorial integrity of the 
French Republic.985 The pro-independence activist Louis Théodore was tried in absentia, as he was 
in hiding and had evaded arrest. The trial of the nineteen Guadeloupean ‘patriots’ in 1968 gained 
much media coverage in France.986 Student protestors gathered in Paris demanding the fair 
treatment of the imprisoned activists.987 This came just a few months before the turbulent civil 
unrest of May 68 in France. The trial lasted from 19 February to 1 March 1968 and the defendants 
were all men aged between twenty-eight and forty-six, from a range of professions: teachers, 
students, lawyers, doctors, journalists, mechanics.988  
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The importance of the trial for France’s relationship with the Antilles was highlighted by the 
presence of Martinican intellectual and politician Aimé Césaire. Césaire spoke in favour of the 
defendants, arguing that ‘there is no doubt that the French Antilles are de facto colonies’.989 Jean-
Paul Sartre also testified at the trial in support of the eighteen Guadeloupeans. He argued ‘this 
trial… proves, precisely, that our Guadeloupean friends… do not have the same rights as French 
people from France and that, consequently, they are not French’.990 Several witnesses referred to 
a ‘plot’ against GONG, maintaining that the French government was trying to undermine 
GONG’s legitimacy and find an excuse to suppress the organisation.991 While the prosecution 
offered evidence that members of GONG had distributed pro-independence propaganda material, 
they were unable to provide any proof linking GONG to the violence in Pointe-à-Pitre the 
previous year. Ultimately, six men, including GONG’s leader Pierre Sainton, were given suspended 
sentences of three to four years in prison for the ‘dangerous threat’ they posed to the French 
Republic, and the other thirteen were acquitted.992 
 
The systematic repression by the French government was one of the most significant factors in 
restricting nationalist activity in Guadeloupe. After the trial, GONG disintegrated as an 
organisation, with so many key members in prison.993 May 67 had provided a good excuse for 
French authorities to clamp down on the nascent nationalist movement in Guadeloupe. The 
movement was snuffed out before it could gain any traction in the islands, though other nationalist 
groups did emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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Nevertheless, Mai 67 has become symbolic in Guadeloupean nationalist rhetoric. Many of the 
nationalist groups in the 1970s and 1980s had either been directly affected by May 67 or saw it as 
a key moment in their political awakening. Luc Reinette, who in 1981 founded the Popular 
Movement for Guadeloupean Independence (MPGI), was a student in Paris at the time of the 
massacre.994 He argued that May 67 was the catalyst for the development of his nationalist beliefs, 
symbolising the Guadeloupean nationalist struggle against repressive French colonialism.995 
During the 1980s, Reinette was accused of involvement in several bombings and was imprisoned 
in Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe. He famously managed to escape and avoid capture by hiding out in 
the forest for three years. He was extradited to France after attempting to seek political asylum in 
St Vincent and was sentenced to thirty years in prison, but was pardoned by François Mitterrand 
after two years.996 Guadeloupean independence movements in the 1980s were more violent than 
their Martinican counterparts, with over sixty bombings in the first half of the decade.997 
Furthermore, they did not achieve the electoral success of Martinican groups like MIM in the 
1990s.  
 
Evidently, Mai 67 cast a long shadow over Guadeloupean nationalism for many decades. It appears 
likely that the trial and imprisonment of GONG members and other anticolonial activists was a 
significant deterrent, acting as a warning to others of what would happen if they campaigned for 
Guadeloupean independence. Given that such instances of extreme colonial violence have, in 
other colonial settings, generated greater political unity and provided momentum for 
independence, it is worth considering why that did not occur in Guadeloupe. The 1919 Jallianwala 
Bagh massacre, for example, is often seen as a turning point in Indian nationalism, uniting 
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opponents of British rule and hastening independence.998 Also, Kim Wagner argues that violence 
alienated the colonised population and created martyrs for nationalists, ultimately weakening 
colonial rule.999 Following Mai 67, Jacques Nestor did become a martyr figure for Guadeloupean 
nationalists and memorials to his death were held for several years after.1000  
 
However, while it is true that colonial violence terrorised and alienated Guadeloupeans, it was 
counterbalanced by the momentum of assimilation, which accelerated in the 1970s. When 
analysing contemporary conflicts, scholars have several indicators to predict whether levels of 
violence and state instability will result in a regime change, including the level of grievances, the 
vulnerability of the state, and the resources available to facilitate mobilisation.1001 If we apply this 
logic to Guadeloupe, whilst grievances were clearly significant, the French state ensured it had the 
military power to protect itself. Furthermore, protestors and nationalists lacked the resources to 
mount any serious threat to the government. Therefore, in the French Antilles, radical nationalist 
organisations developed in the 1960s but were subject to considerable state repression and failed 
to gain political traction. Major popular uprisings did occur, but they were concentrated in the 
urban centres, motives were mixed, and the state response prevented them from evolving into 
island-wide rebellions. 
 
3. The British Virgin Islands: The 1949 Freedom March and the Positive Action Movement 
The forms of clandestine, left-wing independence organisations which developed in the French 
Antilles in the 1960s did not emerge in the British Virgin Islands. Instead, as Maurer has 
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highlighted, calls for self-determination and national identity were closely linked to changes in the 
law and legislature.1002 Furthermore, land issues were central to notions of BVI autonomy. Thus, 
the two major instances of protest between 1945 and 1980 demonstrate BVIslanders’ wish to 
assert self-determination over their land and their legal system. 
 
The first major protest in the twentieth century occurred in 1949, following increased pressure on 
the Commissioner about the lack of political representation for BVIslanders. The Road Town elite 
were the first to voice their dissatisfaction, assembling petitions to mobilise the labourers and 
farmers in Tortola and the fisherman from the other main islands.1003 As no newspaper yet existed 
in the BVI, and since so many BVIslanders worked in St Thomas, Tortolian community leaders 
used the Virgin Islands Daily News in the USVI to circulate details of the political situation in the 
BVI. One 1949 article described the ‘rumbling sound…coming out of the British Virgin Islands 
which may soon attract the attention of No.10 Downing Street’.1004 It attributed the unrest in the 
BVI to the US influence, claiming ‘having tasted freedom and the pursuit of happiness served the 
American way, the younger inhabitants of Tortola are clamoring for a liberal form of government 
which gives them voice in their own affairs’.1005 Yet the political awakening in the BVI also came 
more generally as a result of the military factory experience during the war. Harrigan and Varlack 
argue that many went from subsistence farming in Tortola to work in the munitions factory in St 
Thomas, leading to a newfound sense of political consciousness and BVIslander identity.1006 
 
Britain did not capitulate to calls for a legislative assembly until Theodolph Faulkner, a fisherman 
from Anegada, inspired and led a large political protest march through Road Town, Tortola.  
Faulkner had come to Road Town with his pregnant wife and was angry at the lack of medical 
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help and general state of neglect in Anegada.1007  He began giving nightly talks in the old market 
square about the lack of a legislative assembly. Faulkner had previously worked at a refinery in 
Curaçao and had witnessed workers organising and protesting for better working conditions.1008 
Local elites capitalised on this ‘psychological moment’ by spreading the word to people in other 
islands to come to Road Town to protest.1009 
 
On 24 November 1949, 1500 people marched through Road Town with a manifesto for the 
Commissioner. Significantly, the protest manifesto that the BVIslanders put together emphasised 
their rights to an elected assembly as ‘British subjects and Citizens of the British Empire’.1010  It 
was an emotive and patriotic manifesto which constructed an image of BVI identity as rooted in 
Christian values. Furthermore, they likened their suffering under the current colonial government 
to the era of slavery, describing themselves as ‘we, the politically enslaved people of these British 
Virgin Islands’.1011  The British responded swiftly to the protest. Although the Colonial Office 
ignored calls for Commissioner Cruikshank to step down, they agreed to the proposal for a 
legislative assembly.1012  The manifesto was remarkably conservative in its language and demands 
and this approach would become characteristic of future negotiations over the political status of 
the BVI. Maurer has described this as a ‘nationalist popular uprising’, though it is important to 
note that BVIslanders were not calling for independence.1013 The march has become recognised as 
the turning point in BVIslander political and national consciousness, and is known as the ‘Freedom 
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March’.1014 Contemporary politicians have even suggested making it a national holiday called 
‘Liberation Day’.1015 
 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, BVI society generally discouraged protest and this was 
reflected in the rhetoric of politicians and newspaper articles. It was not until the late 1960s that 
BVIslanders once again took to the streets. The 1960s were a decade of significant economic and 
social change, with Laurance Rockefeller beginning work on the BVI’s first major tourist resort in 
Virgin Gorda in 1961.1016 This brought new visitors and workers from other Caribbean islands, 
North America and Europe. As other economic opportunities encouraged more new arrivals, the 
structure of BVI society began to change rapidly from the relatively classless group of black 
farmers and fishermen to a roughly three-tiered society: white migrants tended to have more 
economic opportunities and power; BVIslanders occupied the middle ground; and black 
Caribbean workers from other islands carried out most of the manual labour.1017 Like the nearby 
US Virgin Islands, these changes brought increased xenophobia toward both groups of new 
arrivals.1018 Furthermore, BVIslanders began returning home, either temporarily or permanently, 
from working abroad in the US and Europe, bringing with them ideas and experiences about 
migration, racial inequality and anticolonial conflicts. 
 
This atmosphere of increased racial tension and fear over the pace of change provided the 
backdrop for the British Administrator’s contentious decision to sign the Batehill agreement. The 
Administrator, Martin Staveley, agreed a 199-year lease of Wickham’s Cay, a central part of the 
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capital, and more than four-fifths of the island of Anegada.1019 The lease was sold to the chairman 
of Oldham Athletic football club, Ken Bates, and his company Batehill Ltd.1020 The terms of the 
agreement would have prevented most BVIslanders from having access to these important areas, 
most noticeably in Anegada where land had traditionally been shared for farming and fishing.1021 
Ken Bates was a particularly divisive choice of developer. During his time as chairman for Oldham 
Athletic, he had defied international sanctions, taking his team on a tour of Rhodesia and meeting 
Ian Smith.1022 The tour was highly controversial and even sparked a parliamentary debate in which 
the Minster of State for the Commonwealth, George Thomas, deplored the decision.1023 
Commonwealth Office correspondence reveals that the Cultural Relations Department went to 
great lengths in an attempt to persuade Bates not to go through with the tour, even considering 
confiscating the entire team’s passports.1024 The Rhodesian connection led some BVIslanders to 
describe Bates as ‘a modern-day Cecil Rhodes’.1025  
 
BVIslander Noel Lloyd was the pivotal figure who would mobilise opposition to the Batehill 
agreement. Lloyd was one of the most vocal of the recent returnees to the islands and commanded 
a great deal of respect among Tortolian society. Born in 1936, he grew up in Tortola in a house 
built of ‘guinea grass and coconut branches’, like most houses at the time.1026 Lloyd had spent the 
1960s working as an engineer in the US and in the RAF in Britain.1027 Frustrated by racism in both 
the UK and US, Lloyd returned to the BVI in 1964 full of enthusiasm about how to develop the 
islands. However, his attempts to set up a free technical school and to establish a ‘nationalist’ 
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political party both struggled to get off the ground.1028 Noel Lloyd was the obvious person to 
approach when surveyor Walter ‘Lindy’ deCastro became concerned about the Batehill agreement. 
When deCastro informed Lloyd about the agreement, Lloyd took to the local radio and newspaper 
to spread the word to other Virgin Islanders.1029 
 
The turning point in generating opposition to the Batehill agreement came when Martin Luther 
King was assassinated on 4 April 1968. This greatly affected Noel Lloyd and prompted him to take 
more direct action against injustices in the BVI. He began a one-man march around Road Town, 
drumming up support for a renegotiation of the Batehill agreement and likening the issue to racial 
inequality in the US.1030 He formed the Positive Action Movement with Walter deCastro, Patsy 
Pickering and other politically active BVIslanders. On 8 April, Lloyd led a second march around 
Road Town, gathering a crowd at the Recreation Ground.1031 While the Administrator claimed 
only 150 took part in this non-violent protest, the local newspaper reported a crowd of 3000.1032 
In his speech, Lloyd compared their situation to the oppression of African-Americans, as well as 
referring to Rhodesia and the hanging of six black men who had ‘rebelled against white 
domination’.1033 The next day, the Positive Action Movement and its supporters marched to 
Government Hill, carrying placards reading ‘down with foreign controlled government’, and ‘King 
shall not die in vain’.1034 At least ten marches took place over the following weeks, calling for the 
Batehill agreement to be reconsidered.  
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However, Lloyd did not feel their grievances were being taken seriously. To get the attention of 
the British government, he decided to take over the local police station ‘in the name of the 
Queen’.1035 This echoed the combination of conservatism and radicalism apparent in the 1949 
march, as well as appeals to the monarchy made in Caymanian protests. On 13 April, in the early 
hours of the morning, along with four other Positive Action members, Lloyd broke into the police 
station and arrested the six sleeping officers inside. He set off the station hurricane siren and locked 
the officers in the barracks. The siren woke the residents of Road Town and caused considerable 
embarrassment to the police force.1036 Lloyd was subsequently arrested, which sparked a wave of 
arson and other protests in solidarity.1037 Both the Administrator and the Foreign Office were 
extremely concerned about the incident and its implications for British maintenance of law and 
order in the territory.1038  
 
It was at this time that rumours began to spread about Lloyd’s mental health. It is unclear whether 
this was generated by the police and colonial officials to discredit him or by his supporters to get 
him out of prison and to a hospital. In his memoirs, Lloyd argued that he had been poisoned while 
in prison.1039 He complained of a copper taste in his mouth and a pain around his liver. Later that 
year he was diagnosed with liver disease, which could explain the copper taste and his strange 
behaviour.1040 Patsy Pickering argued that he received several beatings, some to the head.1041 
Whether or not Lloyd did suffer from mental health issues, rumours about his mental state plagued 
him for the rest of his life and were used to discredit his political views. Lloyd managed to escape 
from prison by jumping over the wall and his supporters successfully lobbied for him to be taken 
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to a hospital in Jamaica.1042 While Lloyd was out of the territory, the Positive Action Movement 
continued its campaign in his absence. 
 
The British government became increasingly concerned about the situation and agreed to calls for 
an enquiry into the Batehill agreement.1043 Though the commission of enquiry did not conclusively 
endorse one side or the other, the British government eventually agreed to loan the BVI $5.8 
million dollars to buy back the land leased to the Batehill company.1044 Despite the success of the 
Positive Action campaign, the incident had a severe impact on Noel Lloyd’s life. He continued to 
be monitored by the police and was seen as a troublemaker, making it difficult for him to obtain 
bank loans and other financial assistance for his businesses. His attempts to run in local elections 
were hampered by old rumours of mental instability. The role of Noel Lloyd was underestimated 
and unacknowledged for many decades until in 2008, shortly before his death, he received the BVI 
Badge of Honour from the Chief Minister, and the following year a park in the capital was renamed 
‘The Noel Lloyd Positive Action Movement Park’.1045 
 
The Positive Action Movement managed to provoke drastic action from the British government. 
The Virgin Islands had been viewed as a quiet, trouble free territory, and were mostly neglected 
for the first half of the twentieth century. As a result, the police force in the islands was of a ‘token 
nature’, with only twenty-one police officers permanently in the territory for a population of 
around 10 000.1046 Two key incidents prompted the British government to intervene in the Batehill 
agreement: the situation in nearby Anguilla; and Lloyd’s invasion of the police station. During the 
Anguilla crisis from 1967 to 1969, Anguillans ejected the St Kitts police force and later kicked out 
the British representative sent to negotiate their political status. This sparked a significant 
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overreaction by the British, who invaded Anguilla and were the object of much international 
condemnation and ridicule for the unnecessary offensive, dubbed the ‘Bay of Piglets’.1047 Britain 
was particularly concerned about the increase in anti-British rhetoric in the BVI following their 
invasion of Anguilla.1048 The Administrator described Walter deCastro’s response to the Anguilla 
situation as amounting to a ‘hate campaign against Britain’.1049 
 
The Tortola police station invasion highlighted the vulnerability of British control in the BVI. Like 
their interpretation of Anguilla, British officials misunderstood local sentiment, assuming protests 
could quickly escalate into a violent anti-British rebellion. Reinforcements of troops and weapons 
were requested, along with anti-riot gear and training for the existing police force.1050 The 
exaggeration of the threat is apparent in the intelligence report assessment of the ‘Tamarind Tree 
Boys’. Noel Lloyd’s memoir suggests they were a group of young men, mostly construction 
workers, who used to spend time under a tree outside a church.1051 Lloyd knew them well, as they 
would often help out in the community in times of crisis, and he encouraged them to join the 
Positive Action marches. However, intelligence reports described them as the ‘strong-arm group’ 
of the Positive Action Movement and suggested they could generate violent unrest.1052 The British 
government monitored Walter deCastro and reported on all his radio and newspaper 
contributions, as well as any public speeches he made.1053 DeCastro was also harassed by police 
and arrested in 1971 over a minor dispute about building permits.1054 DeCastro claimed the arrest 
was due to his outspoken opinions of the government.1055  
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Furthermore, British intelligence reports obscured and underestimated the role of women in the 
Batehill affair, omitting women from lists of the Positive Action leadership. These omissions, 
alongside the Administrator failing to invite the female leaders to meetings, contributed to the 
normalisation of a lack of female voices at the negotiating table. In a territory where women were, 
on average, better educated than men, women were active in community groups and church 
organisations but rarely gained leadership positions. BVI historian Eugenia O’Neal sees 1968 as a 
turning point in women’s involvement in political change.1056 Patsy Pickering was Lloyd’s deputy 
and held many of the Positive Action meetings at her salon in Road Town. She was described by 
Torquil Norman, one of the British investors in the Batehill company, as ‘glamourous’, 
‘communist’ and a ‘troublemaker’.1057 Luelda Harrigan was part of the Positive Action executive 
committee and her enthusiasm during the marches and shouts of ‘we got to take back our country 
from Kenneth Bates’ inspired many women to join the protest.1058 The British government 
contributed to a phenomenon during this era of decolonisation in the Caribbean in which women’s 
voices were often silent or absent from political decisions.1059  
 
In terms of nationalism, while key members of the Positive Action Movement did advocate 
independence, the organisation was not explicitly nationalist. Noel Lloyd believed in fighting for 
BVI independence and created a ‘rebel flag’ for the Positive Action Movement which he hoped 
would one day be used if independence was achieved.1060 He carried this independence flag out at 
the front of the 9 April march through Road Town.1061 Lloyd saw opposing the Batehill agreement 
as a first step towards full internal self-government and eventual independence. Nonetheless, he 
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declared his support for the Queen and seems to have believed that the British government in 
London would act fairly and impartially if they could be persuaded to intervene.1062 Independence 
was not a popular option in the BVI at the time, and the Positive Action Movement drew people 
from all sectors of society, including more conservative islanders. 
 
The 1949 Freedom March and the Positive Action Movement of the 1960s demonstrate that there 
was not a lack of nationalism and protest in the BVI. However, it did not manifest in pro-
independence political organisations. Instead, BVI national identity and assertions of self-
determination were closely tied to the Legislature. Control over law making was seen as an 
expression of BVI autonomy which is why the 1949 March to reinstate the Legislative Assembly 
was so significant. Since abolition, land ownership was a crucial part of BVIslander identity and 
thus the issues of foreign ownership of land in the 1960s sparked significant unrest. BVIslanders 
promoted the importance of self-determination but it was directed towards maintaining control of 
land, rather than campaigning for independence. Similar conflicts over land development were 
prominent in the Cayman Islands in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
4. The Cayman Islands: Land Disputes and Political Turmoil 
The Cayman Islands were noticeably more conservative politically and socially, compared to the 
other territories, and this is reflected in the absence of any independence organisations and the 
muted nature of protest in the postwar years. Yet Caymanians did take to the streets to protest 
when they were dissatisfied with local government. Rather than directing their discontent at British 
rule or in an attempt to push for independence, protests were aimed at local representatives: the 
Administrator or members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). Like the British Virgin Islands, in 
the 1960s Caymanians were concerned about the increasing number of foreign workers and about 
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land development. These issues sparked a period of unrest at the end of the 1960s which persisted 
into the 1970s. 
 
Like in the BVI, the 1960s prompted considerable social and political change. The previous chapter 
explored the heated debates about autonomy and the failure of party politics in the early to mid 
1960s. The Caymanian political scene diversified somewhat in the aftermath of these events. As 
Hannerz has highlighted, in the late 1960s many of the prominent merchant political figures were 
retiring and this offered an opportunity to businessmen from the lower ranks of the merchant elite 
who were less free to ignore popular concerns.1063 Through their business interests, these men 
were often dependent on foreign capital, but would still exercise pressure to curtail foreign control 
of the Caymanian economy. A further factor contributing to the changes in the 1960s was the 
increased level of immigration. Because of the particularities of Cayman society and constructions 
of race, the response to this immigration was different compared to the BVI. Caymanians 
responded negatively to both groups of new arrivals: wealthy white migrants and less wealthy black 
workers from other Caribbean islands. However, the majority of the anti-immigration rhetoric was 
directed towards black migrants, particularly Jamaicans, partly due to the power of the white 
merchant elite over societal debates.1064 
 
The 1968 election in George Town was the catalyst for the period of unrest and protest. The 
election had to be rescheduled due to protests about incomplete electoral rolls.1065 The electoral 
roll issue prevented many George Town residents from voting and appeared to predominantly 
affect black Caymanians from inland neighbourhoods of the capital.1066 This led to suspicions that 
 
1063 Hannerz, Caymanian Politics, 112. 
1064 For Cayman’s changing relationship with Jamaica in this period see: Williams, Defining the Caymanian 
Identity, 107–28. 
1065 The Caymanian Weekly, 4, no. 46, 14 November 1968, 1. 
1066 Hannerz, Caymanian Politics, 119. 
 241 
it was a deliberate attempt to reduce the votes for Ira Walton.1067 Walton was a black taxi driver 
from Cayman Brac who was one of the few MLAs not in the merchant elite, and he had 
campaigned against foreign influence in the Cayman Islands.1068 A demonstration was organised 
and protesters marched to the town hall where voting was taking place. As a result, the vote was 
postponed in order to quell the unrest. The matter had to be passed to the FCO and an order in 
council from the Queen facilitated a second election.1069 The incident highlighted that George 
Town MLAs and residents were prepared to voice their grievances with the Administration 
through public protest, a method usually frowned upon in Caymanian society. Furthermore, 
discrimination towards black Caymanians, previously ignored in the political arena due to the 
domination of the white merchant oligarchy, was now being raised as an issue in the wake of the 
slight diversification of MLAs. 
 
The Administrator responded to the growing unrest by resorting to the traditional rhetoric of 
loyalty to the Queen and Britain, reiterated by officials and merchants throughout the twentieth 
century whenever there was any suggestion of a challenge to the status quo. He reminded the 
Legislative Assembly that they had ‘a collective responsibility to Her Majesty the Queen and to all 
Caymanians’.1070 He also claimed that ‘local interests must be subordinate to national interests’.1071 
This language of respectability was echoed in The Caymanian which encouraged voters to maintain 
a ‘peaceful and orderly manner’.1072 The number and attitude of people from Britain gaining 
government jobs complicated and challenged this notion of Britishness. Previously, Caymanians, 
especially influential islanders, had identified as a kind of ‘settler extension’ of Britishness.1073 Yet 
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British civil servants tended to distinguish between Brits and ‘native’ Caymanians, increasing 
tensions between Caymanians and the administration.1074 The number of non-Caymanians 
employed in government positions became a key point of contention. At the end of 1969, three 
members of the Legislative Assembly held a boycott to demonstrate against this issue. Annie 
Bodden, one of the demonstrators, argued that they had the worst administration she could 
remember, illustrating how dissatisfaction was always directed at local officials, rarely at the British 
government in London or British rule in principle.1075 
 
This increasing discontent about immigration and the introduction of foreign goods manifested in 
a 1969 protest over the importation of prefabricated buildings. Demonstrators gathered on the 
waterfront to prevent a boat carrying the buildings in question from landing.1076 The police were 
called to try to resolve the dispute but, in the end, the landing had to be aborted. In his speech on 
the matter to the Legislative Assembly, the Administrator argued that it was unusual for peace to 
be disturbed and he threatened that it could damage Cayman’s reputation and tourism. He warned 
‘I do not think anyone here would like to see this become a habit in these Islands’.1077 This mirrored 
an earlier speech in which he had emphasised Cayman’s ‘reputation as a stable and attractive tax 
haven for overseas investors’ and argued that ‘it is in our interests to provide the right atmosphere 
for their continued growth and increase’.1078 Pressure about maintaining Cayman’s recent 
economic prosperity through respectable behaviour and stability successfully discouraged any 
protests in this era from becoming violent or more disruptive. The prefabricated buildings became 
symbolic of foreign encroachment in Cayman and, while the Legislative Assembly eventually 
agreed that some would be allowed to land, others were sent back. 
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The most significant protest in recent Caymanian history occurred in April 1970 and, like the 
British Virgin Islands, it was over the issue of land development. On 20 April, over 500 people 
marched through the capital demanding the repealing of the recent Land Development Law.1079 
More people entered the protest as spectators joined the crowds. Several MLAs were involved, 
including Ira Walton and Annie Bodden.1080 Protestors became known as the ‘Land Boys’, which 
obscures the role of women like Annie Bodden who were prominent orchestrators of the march. 
The demonstrators presented a petition to the Administrator which called for a new election, as 
well as the reconsidering of several recent laws. The petition was by no means radical, assuring the 
Administrator that protestors were ‘not trying in any manner to usurp power or to govern 
ourselves’.1081 The marchers also presented a letter addressed to the Queen in which they 
demanded a new Administrator. They declared their pride in their ‘English heritage’ and spoke as 
‘loyal citizens of your empire’.1082 
 
Though demonstrators were generally united in their opposition to the new Land Development 
Law, their motives for protesting were varied. Placards highlighted a wide range of grievances, 
including: ‘Caymanians united - repeal all unjust laws now’; ‘stop communism’; ‘We want to live 
in the future as we have done in the past’; ‘Say no to the regulation’; ‘We have lost faith in our 
representatives’; and ‘No more foreign police - this is not the Congo’.1083 The administration and 
local government were particularly concerned by what appeared to be black power symbols 
employed by certain marchers. A group of young men carried armbands with a black ‘P’, leading 
some to call them ‘black power troublemakers’.1084 Bodden argues that these young men were 
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influenced by the Black Power movement elsewhere in the Caribbean and US but, within the 
Cayman context, Black Power meant a sense of black consciousness and a focus on issues of police 
harassment.1085 It was a non-violent protest which sought greater equality, not the overthrow of 
government, as some suggested or feared. Bodden sees this as a key moment in the development 
of a black consciousness movement in Cayman, which failed to take off and develop into a larger 
political movement. This was partly down to the suspicion and fear in Caymanian society of 
anything radical or connected with Jamaican politics, as well as measures taken by the government 
to monitor and deport suspected Black Power advocates.1086 
 
An emergency meeting of the Legislative Assembly was called in response to the land protest 
march. It was unusual in many ways, as the windows of the meeting room were boarded up, armed 
police flanked the Administrator, and a British warship lay on standby in Cayman waters.1087 Like 
the response to the Positive Action protest in the BVI, the British misinterpreted a peaceful protest 
against local officials and land development for a possible campaign to overthrow the government, 
and resorted to reinforcements and additional weaponry. This British display of force was ridiculed 
by several MLAs and the Administrator was forced to reduce the security measures. He instructed 
the police to remove their arms and members of the public helped to take the boards off the 
windows.1088 Through Legislative Assembly resolutions, certain regulations were repealed but the 
interim Land Development Law remained.1089 It was seen as a success by those who fought against 
it but in reality, the laws were introduced with very little adjustment. 
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It is difficult to characterise the protest as a whole as ‘anticolonial’, particularly given the wide 
range of motives of the demonstrators. Certainly, some objected to the number of people from 
Britain gaining employment in the government over Caymanian candidates. Bodden has suggested 
that this was the first instance of ‘anti-English’ sentiment expressed publicly by ordinary 
Caymanians.1090 However, most of this ‘anti-English’ anger was directed at the Administrator, and 
the protestors’ petition was decidedly pro-British in celebrating ‘the heritage of English justice 
handed down to us by our forefathers’. Therefore, the protest was fragmentary and divided in 
nature, reducing its potential for wider impact. The period of unrest in the Cayman Islands, 
culminating in the 1970 demonstration march, shows that Caymanians engaged in issues of self-
determination and autonomy, and protested when they perceived these rights to be threatened. 
Nonetheless, Caymanian society and politics was noticeably more conservative in nature and no 
political organisation or protest group advocated independence in this period. 
 
5. Race and Internationalism in Protest Movements 
The comparative analysis above, in addition to unearthing these islands’ experiences of protest in 
the age of decolonisation, also allows us to identify two shared themes: race and internationalism. 
Racial tensions were a significant factor in most of the protests of the postwar era in these 
Caribbean territories. Rumours of a racist incident sparked the unrest of both Décembre 59 in 
Martinique and Mai 67 in Guadeloupe.  Moreover, racial discrimination and the changing dynamics 
of BVI society were central to the Positive Action protest. Due to the monopoly of the merchant 
elite in the Cayman Islands, Caymanian society was presented as a racial utopia and rampant 
discrimination and racial inequality were not openly discussed. However, Cayman was not immune 
to the Black Power ideas sweeping through the Caribbean in the late 1960s and, though it was 
strictly monitored and repressed, a nascent black consciousness movement did develop. 
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Rather than being isolated from global trends of self-determination and social protest, these 
territories were heavily influenced by and connected to international movements and ideas. The 
Positive Action Movement demonstrates the impact and influence of the US civil rights movement 
in the Caribbean. The assassination of Martin Luther King directly prompted Noel Lloyd’s one-
man march and inspired other BVIslanders to join him. The Positive Action Movement adopted 
tactics of non-violent civil disobedience, similar to those used by civil rights activists. The church 
influence and respectability which King represented would have appealed to the traditional BVI 
society of the 1960s. Though Lloyd did not specify the inspiration for the term ‘Positive Action’, 
he could have been influenced by King’s Strive Towards Freedom in which King called for ‘vigorous 
and positive action’.1091 Without doubt, perceptions of race and the changing dynamics of BVI 
society were central to the Positive Action protest. Concerns that black BVIslanders were being 
excluded from the economic developments prompted many in a generally conservative society to 
take to the street. Patsy Pickering argued ‘what alarmed us most was when [Bates] said that the 
only black people...that will be allowed on Wickham's Cay will be those who are maids’.1092 Verne 
Maduro, another Positive Action member asserted that ‘it was almost getting close to apartheid 
system’.1093 This division, as more wealthy, white migrants and tourists arrived, often bringing with 
them colonial attitudes about race, heightened the sense of black consciousness among 
BVIslanders.  
 
1968 saw the emergence of a Caribbean Black Power movement in Jamaica but it would be wrong 
to characterise BVI Positive Action as ‘Black Power’ in nature. As Joseph has highlighted, the 
traditional separation in scholarship between the civil rights era in the US (1954-1965) and the 
decade of Black Power (1966-1975), obscures the considerable overlap between the two 
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movements, and the same is true of the Caribbean.1094 At no point did the Positive Action leaders 
refer to ‘Black Power’, and the movement as a whole sought to use peaceful methods to resolve 
the land development dispute. Furthermore, British intelligence reports confirm that no 
BVIslanders attended the 1969 Black Power conference in Bermuda.1095 Nonetheless, both Lloyd 
and deCastro advocated more radical, violent action rooted in black consciousness and pride, 
which more closely resembles other Caribbean Black Power organisations. In one of his first 
speeches as leader of the Positive Action Movement, Lloyd argued that if the Batehill agreement 
was not overturned, they would take ‘violent Positive Action’.1096 DeCastro later changed his name 
to Ras Uhuru, emulating many Black Power activists who adopted Rastafarian or African-inspired 
names. The BVI was evidently not isolated from the development and spread of civil rights and 
Black Power movements across the Caribbean region. Likewise, in the Cayman Islands, 
international movements like Black Power did have an impact, but the conservative nature of 
Caymanian society prevented global protest ideologies from gaining ground.  
 
Nationalists in the French Antilles, particularly those who had worked or studied in Paris, were 
greatly affected by black internationalist ideas. The 1959 riots in Martinique sparked an 
international solidarity campaign which spread to Guadeloupe, Paris and even Venezuela.1097 
Protestors and striking workers in the French Antilles throughout this period demonstrated an 
internationalist outlook, referencing Vietnam, Algeria and other decolonisation struggles in their 
slogans and speeches.1098 Reporting on protests in 1968, the Antillean student journal Alizés did 
not focus solely on France’s ‘May 68’. Alizés engaged with global issues like the assassination of 
 
1094 Peniel E. Joseph, ‘Rethinking the Black Power Era’, The Journal of Southern History 75, no. 3 (2009): 707–
11. 
1095 Intelligence Report, July 1969, FCO 44/336, 1, TNA. 
1096 Lloyd, The Positive Action Movement, 26. 
1097 Armand Nicolas, Histoire de la Martinique, Volume 3 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996), 192. 
1098 Sainton, Vie et survie d’un fils de la Guadeloupe, 224–25. 
 248 
Martin Luther King and the ongoing war in Vietnam.1099 The journal positioned Antillean students 
as part of a global struggle against colonialism and inequality, pledging solidarity with those 
suffering in ‘other countries where fundamental human rights are ignored: Rhodesia, Angola, 
South Africa…’1100  
 
Furthermore, some nationalist groups in Martinique and Guadeloupe adopted a pan-Caribbean 
approach to their activism rooted in the struggle against racial inequality. Combat Ouvrier (Worker’s 
Struggle), for example, campaigned on issues of racial discrimination and antiimperialism across 
the Caribbean, such as their 1980 campaign against repression in Haiti.1101 Though the slogan 
pouvoir noir, or Black Power, does not seem not have been used frequently by these groups, racial 
inequality was a central issue. They were evidently influenced by Black Power movements in the 
rest of the Caribbean. The radical nationalist groups of the 1970s engaged in regional solidarity, 
focusing on the racial inequality prevalent across the Caribbean. 
 
Activists in all four territories were aware of anticolonial protests for independence and post-
colonial campaigns for equality. Debates in newspapers and interviews demonstrate that they saw 
themselves as part of this global decolonisation struggle. The fight against racism was a central 
part of many anticolonial campaigns, drawing in support and solidarity from around the world, 
including the overseas territories, as a unifying and emotive issue. 
 
Conclusion: Nationalism in Comparative Perspective 
The nature of protest and nationalism in these territories situates them within a global narrative of 
decolonisation. Nationalist organisations began to develop in the French Antilles in the 1960s, as 
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discontent grew over the failures of departmentalisation. However, due to considerable state 
repression, these organisations had to operate clandestinely and struggled to gain momentum in 
the face of imprisonment and intimidation. It is difficult to predict whether, had an open debate 
been allowed, these pro-independence groups would have had more electoral success. Suspected 
nationalists, communists and ‘subversives’ in the British Overseas Territories were also monitored 
by intelligence services. This contradicted British policy after 1962 which implied that the British 
would adopt a more open approach to self-government when Caribbean colonies demanded it.1102 
 
Although major protests sprang up in these territories, they were not enough to counter the impact 
of departmentalisation in the French Antilles and the adoption of crown colony status in the 
British territories, which had shifted the political conversation away from independence. The 
impact of the Cold War on British and French officials, combined with colonial polices which 
restricted open dialogue and promoted assimilation, reduced the impact of these protests. Local 
elites often colluded with colonial officials to maintain the status quo and political parties failed to 
channel popular discontent into an effective vessel for change. These factors, discussed in previous 
chapters, help to explain why protests in these territories did not translate into steps towards 
independence. 
 
In the BVI, certain community leaders advocated future independence, but there were no pro-
independence organisations before the 1980s. Nationalism in the BVI was expressed as a sense of 
national identity, distinct from Britain and the rest of the Caribbean, and identified with BVI 
autonomy of law making and land rights. Protest remained conservative and infrequent. In the 
Cayman Islands, there were no nationalist organisations in this period and protests over issues of 
land rights and self-determination were comparatively moderate. 
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Comparing the nature of social protest in these territories highlights several common factors. 
Protests were fuelled by issues of self-determination, perceived threats to land rights, social and 
economic inequality, and racial tensions. Most protest were urban and concentrated around the 
capitals. Many protestors expressed an internationalist outlook, likening their situation to other 
struggles for self-determination, decolonisation or civil rights in Algeria, Vietnam, the US, South 
Africa, and elsewhere. A comparative analysis also reveals the clear differences and the local 
context which shaped protest. For example, communist ideas were popular among many 
protestors in the French Antilles, whereas demonstrators in the 1970 march in Cayman declared 
‘stop communism’.1103 This reflects the differing political arenas where left wing politicians 
achieved great electoral success in the French Antilles while the British territories were far more 
conservative. 
 
Crucially, in the French Antilles, nationalist organisations developed in the 1960s whereas they 
were noticeably absent from the British territories. Though outside the scope of this thesis, from 
the 1980s onwards, the prospect of eventual independence became a topic of mainstream political 
debate in the BVI.1104 In the twenty-first century there has been a growing consensus that the BVI 
could become independent in the future.1105 In the 2018 Decision March, thousands of 
BVIslanders marched against the UK’s plans to impose public registers on the BVI to enforce 
greater transparency, bearing slogans like ‘End Colonial Rule’, ‘No Imperial Legislation’, and ‘We 
Want Freedom’.1106 The debate over independence, colonialism and self-determination continues 
to this day. In the Cayman Islands, on the other hand, ‘voluntary colonialism’ across both politics 
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and society has prevented calls for political independence.1107 The 1982 French decentralisation 
laws finally allowed Martinique and Guadeloupe the ‘cultural right to difference’ which has 
removed the question of political status from mainstream political debate.1108 Nonetheless, the 
forty-four day general strike in 2009 which brought the French Antilles to a standstill, though 
‘non-nationalist’ in nature, demonstrates that a desire for change is potent.1109 
 
The opening chapter of this thesis illustrated the major political decisions which pulled the 
territories closer to the metropole in the aftermath of the Second World War. This chapter has 
highlighted that departmentalisation in the French Antilles and crown colony status in the British 
territories did not end debates about political status. Islanders continued to challenge the status 
quo and to protest issues of self-determination and autonomy. Decolonisation was not a distinct 
change from colony to independent state, and citizens of newly independent states continued to 
grapple with notions of neo-colonialism and self-determination, just like citizens in the non-
independent territories. It is evident that non-independent territories add to this more nuanced 



















1107 Bodden, Patronage, Personalities and Parties, 306–16. 
1108 Miles, ‘Fifty Years of Assimilation’, 50. 
1109 Bonilla, Non-Sovereign Futures, 150. 
 252 
Conclusion 
Decolonisation without Independence 
 
 
This thesis has argued that Martinique, Guadeloupe, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman 
Islands were very much part of the history of twentieth century global decolonisation. It has shown 
that these territories’ experiences were shaped by the interaction of six interrelated factors: the 
impact of the Second World War and postwar changes to political status; the influence of the 
global Cold War; the policies of the colonial state; the power of local elite groups; the role of 
political parties; and the effect of protests and independence activists. The basic premise of this 
research is that it is only by examining decolonisation as a process, made up of these overlapping 
influences that we can fully understand this history of decolonisation without independence. This 
history has been revealed through a distinctive methodology that combined a comparative 
analytical framework and a wide range of different sources, including witness testimony and 
interviews with political activists. Crucially, the processes of decolonisation in these territories 
reveal more connections to decolonisation in independent states than has previously been 
suggested. Though the outcomes of decolonisation appear different, they must nonetheless be 
considered part of the global history of decolonisation. 
 
The Second World War had a considerable impact on the overseas territories, as chapter one 
demonstrated. In Martinique and Guadeloupe, experiences under the hardship of the Vichy regime 
prompted Antilleans to pursue a closer relationship with France. In 1946, they departmentalised 
and became an integral part of the French Republic. This had significant consequences for 
decolonisation in the French Caribbean since all future political negotiations would take place 
from a much closer position to the metropolitan power. In the Cayman Islands, the war 
encouraged a greater sense of Caymanian identity, separate from the rest of the Caribbean. Though 
they joined the West Indies Federation, the Cayman Islands chose to split away from Jamaica and 
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become a crown colony in 1962, rather than remain tied to an independent Jamaica. Partly due to 
the sense of affinity with Britain among the Caymanian elite, and partly because of a growing sense 
of separation from Jamaica, the Cayman Islands chose to strengthen their relationship with Britain. 
In the British Virgin Islands, the close ties to the USVI which increased during the war, prompted 
BVIslanders to opt out of the Federation and become a crown colony. This relationship with the 
USVI would continue to influence the process of decolonisation throughout the twentieth century. 
 
As chapter two showed, the Cold War had a dual impact on the Caribbean territories. Acts of 
defiance like the Cuban Revolution served to inspire local activists to rebel against colonial 
authorities. However, the Cold War also encouraged greater repression from Britain and France 
in an effort to curb the spread of communism. The impact of the global Cold War on the overseas 
territories helps to highlight the connections between the islands and global protest movements. 
This was particularly true in the French Antilles where students and activists were prominent in 
anticolonial networks. 
 
Chapter three exposed how both Britain and France employed irregular, inconsistent approaches 
and policies towards the overseas territories. Most significantly, the colonial states did not allow 
an open discussion about independence. Though islanders certainly exercised varying degrees of 
agency in political decisions and the way decolonisation developed, they were never permitted a 
free and open choice during the period in question. As chapter four argued, this was partly due to 
the close relationship between the colonial state and local elites who colluded to bring about a 
form of decolonisation that was in their own interests. For example, in the Cayman Islands, in 
1962, the British Commissioner and the merchant elite successfully blocked the newly elected 
NDP from gaining power in the Executive Council. Had the NDP not been thwarted, it could 
have prompted greater constitutional change in Cayman and may have weakened the merchant 
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monopoly over local politics. However, the NDP were prevented gaining any real political power. 
This was closely tied to the failure of party politics in the Cayman Islands. 
 
In all four territories, political parties failed to become vehicles for genuine political change. 
Chapter five revealed how, in Martinique and Guadeloupe, parties were associated with 
metropolitan political groups, restricting their ability to advocate local issues. The Left were greatly 
divided between pro-autonomy and pro-independence factions, preventing them from presenting 
a united front to tackle the power of local economic elites and the French state. In the Cayman 
Islands, party politics failed to develop and attempts to create parties were unable to overcome the 
merchant elite. In the BVI, political parties were active from 1967 onwards but always revolved 
around personalities rather than policies. Finally, as shown in the last chapter, protest groups 
emerged in all of the territories under consideration. However, in the French Antilles protest 
movements were subject to considerable repression which they were unable to overcome. In the 
British Virgin Islands, protest marches in 1949 and 1968 were hugely successful in forcing the 
British government to change course. Although these movements included independence 
advocates, the protests themselves did not push for independence. Protests in the Cayman Islands 
were more conservative than the other territories and failed to generate significant change.  
 
This thesis has shown that the six factors identified above are crucial to understanding the process 
of decolonisation in the overseas territories.  These factors demonstrate that the territories were 
well connected to wider global movements towards decolonisation and independence. There were, 
however, particular local circumstances which meant that, notwithstanding that wider global 
context, the individual territories did not become independent. While the global connections of 
these territories have been overlooked, it was ultimately the particular local circumstances which 
were most influential in shaping their non-independent status today. 
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For the Cayman Islands, the most significant factor was the monopoly that the white merchant 
oligarchy held over politics and the economy. The colonial state colluded with the merchants, who 
prevented the emergence of any alternative political leadership. Protest was relatively muted and 
conservative in nature. The one opportunity to disrupt the power of the merchants came from 
Ormond Panton in the 1960s. Though arguably a merchant himself, he was seen as an outsider 
and sought to improve representation for ordinary Caymanians with a view to eventually achieving 
independence. However, the merchants and the British Administrator colluded to block Panton 
from the Executive Council. In the aftermath of Panton’s defeat, party politics disintegrated and 
there were no significant challenges to the status quo for the rest of the period in question. 
 
In the British Virgin Islands, the relationship with the US Virgin Islands is the most important 
factor in their decision not to seek independence. This relationship encouraged BVIslanders not 
join the West Indies Federation, as they were keen to protect their access to the USVI economy 
and jobs market. The possibility of amalgamation dominated political debates, public opinion and 
British colonial correspondence, drawing attention and energy away from the question of 
constitutional development. Furthermore, with the American Virgin Islands, a US territory, as the 
BVI’s closest neighbour, a non-independent status was normalised for both the public and 
politicians. 
 
For Martinique and Guadeloupe, the most important factor in opting for continued dependence 
was the timing of departmentalisation, immediately after the Second World War. The timing was 
crucial as it allowed Antillean politicians to persuade the French National Assembly of the 
Frenchness of Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as Réunion and French Guiana, in a time of 
national reconstruction after the Occupation. Once the departmentalisation law was passed in 
1946, most political energy for the next ten to fifteen years revolved around how best to implement 
it. Nationalist groups did not develop until the 1960s, partly influenced by the Algerian War and 
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the Cuban Revolution. The psychological impact of the Algerian War on the French state was 
considerable and, as a result, France was desperate to keep hold of the French Antilles. Openly 
declaring nationalist beliefs became illegal and nationalist groups were subject to considerable 
repression. This was combined with a more concerted effort to improve social security in the 
Caribbean and policies that encouraged a greater degree of Francisation. Debates about autonomy 
continued in mainstream politics but were curtailed by the 1982 decentralisation laws. 
 
Due to the centralised nature of the French state, there are considerable similarities in the 
decolonisation of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the 
differences too. The most significant point of divergence in the histories of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe occurred after the French Revolution. While the plantation owners and the institution 
of slavery in Martinique were protected by British control, in Guadeloupe slavery was abolished 
and many plantation owners were executed. The forcible reintroduction of slavery, when French 
forces took back control in Guadeloupe, left a legacy of trauma in Guadeloupe that continued to 
influence Guadeloupean relations with France. This time of rebellion against French rule has 
become symbolic in Guadeloupean nationalist histories and rhetoric. This divergence between the 
two islands altered their societies so that the Békés remained powerful in Martinique but became 
less significant in Guadeloupe. In the postwar years, Guadeloupe experienced more significant 
unrest than Martinique and the nationalist movement became more radicalised and violent by the 
1980s. In Martinique, independence advocates had greater electoral success, particularly by the 
1990s, though this is outside the scope of this study. 
 
Up to now, the widely accepted view has been that the dependent territories of the Caribbean are 
an anomaly, isolated from global trends.  This thesis has clearly demonstrated that this was not the 
case. It has identified the many ways in which those territories were connected with wider global 
movements towards independence. Islanders from the overseas territories were greatly influenced 
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by international debates about anticolonialism and decolonisation. Migrating for work or study 
was commonplace, and many of those involved in local political debates and protest movements 
had been influenced by their experiences abroad. However, their debates about their islands’ 
political status took place within the circumstances of island society. Positioning these local 
politicians, activists and intellectuals as both interconnected to wider anticolonial debates and yet 
acting in a particular island society, helps us to understand how these islands negotiated a 
decolonisation without independence. It is this complex inter-relation of global trends with a 
specific local context that underscores the nature of decolonisation history in non-sovereign states. 
 
Furthermore, the histories of these islands are important for challenging our preconceptions about 
decolonisation and the so-called postcolonial world. The recent Windrush scandal in the UK and 
the debates in France about the unacknowledged struggles of the ‘BUMIDOM generation’ 
highlight the ongoing impact of colonial ideologies, policies and history today.1110 These issues 
demonstrate the continued tensions between France and Britain’s colonial history and their 
relationship with the Caribbean. As this thesis has shown, comparative studies help us to move 
past notions of national exceptionalism, particularly when it comes to the history of empires and 
decolonisation. There is great potential for future comparative research on the experiences of these 
two generations of Caribbean peoples in Britain and France. 
 
In the twenty-first century, independence debates and referenda have been reignited in places like 
Cataluña and Scotland. In the recent independence referendum in the French Pacific collectivity 
 
1110 See Le Rêve français, mini-series film directed by Christian Faure, France 2, 21 and 28 March 2018; 
Claude-Valentin Marie, ‘Des « Nés » aux « Originaires » Dom en métropole: les effets de cinquante ans d’une 
politique publique ininterrompue d’émigration’, Informations sociales 186, no. 6 (2014): 40–48; Pattieu, ‘Un 
traitement spécifique des migrations d’outre-mer’; Sylvain Pattieu, ‘The BUMIDOM in Paris and Its Suburbs: 
Contradictions in a State Migration Policy, 1960s–1970s’, African and Black Diaspora: An International 
Journal 10, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 12–24; Ruth Craggs, ‘The 2018 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting, the Windrush Scandal and the Legacies of Empire’, The Round Table 107, no. 3 (4 May 2018): 361–
62. 
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New Caledonia, the pro-French faction had a much narrower victory than expected. This suggests 
that arguments about independence and decolonisation in France’s outre-mer will not dissipate.1111 
Protests in the British Virgin Islands and in the French Antilles in the past decade demonstrate 
that citizens in the overseas territories continue to contest their current political status and 
relationship with the metropole. 
 
Finally, in light of Brexit, new interest has been shown in the legacies of empire and decolonisation 
in twenty-first century Britain.1112 Brexit has renewed the debate about ‘imperial nostalgia’ and its 
impact on British politics and society. Likewise, in France, the ongoing battle for the memory of 
French colonialism was apparent in the 2017 French presidential elections.1113 The French 
republican model makes it difficult for France to deal with legacies of empire and notions of race, 
identity and citizenship. The works of Césaire and Fanon on the contradictions inherent in the 
idea of the indivisibility and universality of the French Republic remain pertinent.1114 The British 
Overseas Territories and the French départements d’outre-mer form a very physical reminder of the 










1111 David A. Chappell, The Kanak Awakening: The Rise of Nationalism in New Caledonia (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2013); Olivier Roueff et al., ‘Éditorial, Kanaky Nouvelle-Calédonie: situations 
décoloniales’, Mouvements 91, no. 3 (28 August 2017): 7–14; Natacha Gagné and Marie Salaün, ‘L’Océanie 
peut-elle être décolonisée ?’, Mouvements 91, no. 3 (28 August 2017): 15–23; Patrick Castex, Kanaky Nouvelle-
Calédonie indépendante? (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2018). 
1112 Philip Murphy, The Empire’s New Clothes: The Myth of the Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018); Stuart Ward and Astrid Rasch, eds., Embers of Empire in Brexit Britain (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2019). 
1113 Yahia H. Zoubir, ‘Macron et l’Algérie: l’amorce d’une véritable réconciliation?’, Les Cahiers de l’Orient 
128, no. 4 (3 October 2017): 37–46; Sudhir Hazareesingh, ‘L’histoire dans le débat politique français’, 
Histoire@Politique 31, no. 1 (1 June 2017): 8–16. 
1114 Pap Ndiaye, La Condition noire: Essai sur une minorité française (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2008); Achille 
Mbembe, ‘Faut-il provincialiser la France ?’, Politique africaine N° 119, no. 3 (2010): 159–88. 
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Appendix 
Timeline of Key Events 
 
 
The Cayman Islands 
 
1503  Islands sighted by Christopher Columbus 
1670  Spain recognises British possession of the islands in the 1670 Treaty of Madrid 
1670-1730 Permanent settlement begins 
1831  Establishment of the Legislative Assembly 
1834  Abolition of slavery 
1863  Cayman becomes a dependency of Jamaica 
1953  Barclays DCO establish the first bank 
1958  Cayman joins the West Indies Federation as a dependency of Jamaica 
1959  First constitution, including women’s suffrage 
1962 Cayman becomes a crown colony of Britain once Jamaica declares its 
independence 
1966 The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law – crucial to the development of 
the offshore financial centre 
1971 Title of Administrator changed to Governor 
 
The British Virgin Islands 
100BC First recorded settlements of Taíno from South America 
1400s Kalinago displace the Taíno 
1493 Islands sighted by Christopher Columbus – Spanish claim the islands but never 
settle there 
1615 First permanent colonial settlements established by Dutch privateer Joost van Dyk 
1665 First documentation of enslaved people being held on Tortola 
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1672 Britain takes control of the islands 
1790 First major uprising against slavery (followed by continued revolts throughout the 
early 19th century) 
1834 Abolition of slavery 
1901 Legislative Council dissolved 
1917 Neighbouring Danish West Indies become the Virgin Islands of the United States 
1950  Legislative Council reinstated 
1956  BVI becomes a crown colony 
1967  Ministerial government introduced, including a Chief Minister 
 
The French Antilles 
130AD  Taíno settle in Martinique 
300AD  Taíno settle in Guadeloupe 
1200s  Kalinago arrive in Martinique and Guadeloupe 
1635  Guadeloupe settled by the French 
1638  Martinique settled by the French 
1793  Slave revolt in Guadeloupe and Martinique 
1794 Britain attempts to seize Guadeloupe but is prevented by French Governor Victor 
Hugues and an army of free people of colour and enslaved people 
  Britain captures Martinique and reinstates slavery 
1802  Slavery reinstated in Guadeloupe by Napoleonic France 
  Martinique returns to French control 
1848  Abolition of slavery 
1853  The first indentured labourers from India arrive to work on the plantations 
1946  Departmentalisation 
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